P L D 1969 Lahore 383 (PLP)

This revision petition is directed against an order dated the 24th of June 1968, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Gujrat, in Suit No. 17/5, filed on 24‑3‑1965/20‑5‑1965.

2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to this petition are that one Muhammad Din, as the next friend of Muhammad Shafique minor, filed Suit No. 262 of 1964 against Shabir Hussain for pre‑emption of the property in dispute. On the 15th of May 1964, the learned Civil Judge directed that in respect of one fifth of the average sale price of the property the next friend may furnish personal security bond. This was to be done by the next date of hearing, namely, the 4th of July 1964. It is not disputed that this order was carried out by the next friend of the minor.

3. It appears that Muhammad Din withdrew the suit on the 15th of March 1965, on the ground that he was not in a position to pay the price of the land. Thereafter, on the 24th of March 1965, one Ghulam Nabi, as the next friend of Muhammad Shafiq minor, filed an application for the restoration of the suit. This application was accepted and the suit was again registered as Suit No. 17/5. Later, on the 24th of June 1968, the learned Civil Judge directed that in respect of one‑fifth of the average sale price of the property in dispute a personal security bond may be furnished by the next friend, namely, Ghulam Nabi, as originally ordered by his learned predecessor on the 15th of May 1964. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been filed.

4. Maulvi Ihsanul Haq, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the first order for furnishing personal security bond as security of one‑fifth of the average sale price was illegal, and so is the second order. According to the learned counsel, wherever the Legislature has empowered a Court to take security, it has always meant that security should be taken of a person other than the one who, being a party to the suit or proceedings, is required to be bound for a given purpose in a given case. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has referred me to some of the specimen forms provided in the Code of Civil Procedure for sureties. In my opinion, the forms in the Civil Procedure Code are no guide for the interpretation of section 22 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913.

5. Execution of a personal bond is also one of the modes in which a person may be called upon to furnish security who question, however, whether in a given case personal bond should be demanded or security depends on the facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf. Speaking generally, security is anything that makes the money more assured in its payment or more readily recoverable as disting uished from, e.g., a mere I. O. U., which is' only evidence of a debt. The word is not confined to a document which gives charge on specific property but includes personal securities for money. Similarly, `bond' is an instrument whereby a person binds himself to pay a sum of money to another or to perform an act by virtue of an agreement.

6. The question under consideration is to be decided on the phraseology of section 22 (1) and 22 (5) (b) of the above mentioned enactment. These are in the following terms:‑‑ "

22. Plaintiff may be called on to make deposit or to fill security.‑(1) In every suit fur pre‑emption the Court shall at or at any time before the settlement of issues, require the plaintiff to deposit in Court such sum as does not, in the opinion of the Court, exceed one‑fifth of the probable value of the land or property, or require the plaintiff to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the payment, if required, of a sum not exceeding such probable value within such time as the Court may fix in such order. (5) (b) If any security so furnished for any case becomes void or insufficient, the Court shall order the plaintiff to furnish fresh security, as the case may be, within a time to be fixed by the Court, and if the plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the suit or appeal shall be dismissed." A perusal of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) will show that the Court is required to fix an amount for which security is to be demanded and then to fix the nature of the security to be furnished by the plaintiff. In the present case, the learned Civil Judge fixed one‑fifth of the probable value of the property and directed that security should be furnished in the shape of personal security bond by the plaintiff. By doing so, the learned Court intended that the person and property of the plaintiff will be responsible for the payment of the amount. In my opinion, this was a perfectly correct order and it cannot be said that by passing the order the learned lower Court departed from any practice or procedure of high legal authority.

7. Coming to section 22 (5) (b) of the Act, it will be noticed, in case of a security having become void or insufficient, the Court has authority to order the plaintiff to furnish fresh security within a time to be fixed by the Court. It cannot be denied that in the present case, after the next friend of the minor plaintiff withdrew the suit on the ground that he was not in a position to pay the price of the property in dispute, the security furnished by him had become inoperative. One does not know under what circumstances the next friend of the minor withdrew the earlier suit. But as noted above, the suit was restored ht the instance of another next friend of the minor plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge, on this occasion also, called upon the plaintiff to furnish personal bond by way of security of the one‑fifth probable value of the property in suit. In my view, this time also no illegality was committed by the learned Civil Judge. I am satisfied that the learned lower Court in this behalf has acted properly and has complied with the provisions of law, set out above.

8. In the result, I do not see any force in this revision petition which is summarily dismissed. Petition summarily dismissed.