1989 PLP 4496 (MLD)

(iv) In 110 khatas the sanction has been obtained through unauthorised representatives rather than from the right‑holders themselves. (v) The Consolidation Officer has amended 36 khatas on 27‑6‑1980 while the scheme was also confirmed on the same date. Obviously the amendment was made after the confirmation. At least 14 khatas appeared to have been tampered with. (vi) In 20 khatas the schemes have been approved under section 40(4) of the Ordinance. Learned Member observed that out of a total of 267 khatas, 180 were either disputed or suffered from serious irregularities which could not be remedied/set right through normal process of filing appeals/revisions. Learned Member took the view that in order to set right the wrong, "the present schemes will have to be revised and wandas of the land‑owners re‑framed according to their entitlement as recorded in the jamabandi zerkar." lie, therefore, in exercise of his suo Motu powers a/s 13 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 recalled "'the confirmation order of the Collector (Cons.) and all orders passed subsequently in appeals/revisions, confirming or modifying the said orders "and directed vide order dated 9‑3‑1988 that the wandas of the right‑holders be re frained according to the following guidelines:‑‑ "(a) The land be redistributed strictly according to the entitlement of the right‑holders as recorded in the jamabandi zerkar. (b) A new Advisory Committee should be constituted by obtaining‑the consent of the right‑holders. (c) The classification of soil should be fixed in consultation with the Advisory Committee. (d) The right‑holders should be accommodated on their owned and possessed land to the extent possible and in so far as the principles of consolidation permit. (e) Any improvement in the land obtained as a result of consolidation should also be kept in view while working out the classification and fair compensation should be provided to the party, which has improved the land, in case this land is proposed to be taken away from him. (f) The whole work should be completed within a period of three months and a compliance report in this behalf should be submitted to the Board of Revenue for information."

2. Feeling aggrieved with the aforementioned order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue, petitioners have challenged it in the present constitutional petition.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as also the learned counsel appearing for the respondents at the limine stage and the Consolidation Officer present with record. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the first instance made a grievance regarding the non‑hearing of the petitioners through their counsel. He submitted that he was engaged by the petitioners to represent them before the learned Member, Board of Revenue but he could not appear before him on the date fixed viz. 9-3‑1988 as he was involved in some criminal case. He, however, sent a message/request to the learned Member for adjournment but the learned Member proceeded with the case and decided it in his absence. Petitioners were thus deprived of an opportunity of being heard through their counsel. The grievance is wholly misconceived. Petitioners and/or their counsel could or should have made alternate arrangement for their representation. The Member was under no obligation to adjourn the case on the aforesaid request assuming that it was really conveyed to him. Even otherwise, this point does not merit any serious consideration for the reason that the point of view of the petitioners who wanted the Consolidation Scheme to be upheld was amply canvassed before the learned Member who took due note thereof in his impugned order. I have also allowed full opportunity to the learned counsel to point out any flaw or error in the findings recorded by the learned Member, Board of Revenue and for that purpose, complete record was made available to him in Court for his examination/inspection. Learned counsel has made submissions to his full satisfaction but he has not been able to demonstrate any substantial defect in the aforenoted findings of the learned Member. In the circumstances, the grievance that the petitioners were not heard by the learned Member through their counsel is of no consequence.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has next contended that the suo Motu revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue could not be exercised on the miscellaneous applications moved by the aggrieved right‑holders and that, too, long after the` expiry of the limitation period. To support his submission, learned counsel has relied upon Kala v. Board of Revenue PLD 1985 SC

208. I find no force in this contention. Suo Motu jurisdiction can be competently exercised on the basis of information coming from any source. In the present case, on receiving the complaints regarding the irregularities/illegalities committed during the course of consolidation proceedings, learned Member obtained a report from ADC(C) and it was only when the latter confirmed the complaints and recommended interference in suo Motu revisional jurisdiction that the notices were issued by the learned Member to all the right‑holders of the village for revision/reversal of the Consolidation Scheme. Authority cited by the learned counsel has no application to the instant case as it proceeds on its own facts and lays down a wholly different proposition. In the precedent case, their Lordships, inter alia, held that the existence of right of an appeal is not a bar to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Revisional authority may well exercise its powers notwithstanding the fact that the applicant before it has not availed the right of appeal available to him in law. Learned counsel has also referred to two other cases of Board of Revenue reported in PLD 1985 Rev.26 and PLD 1985 Rev.151. In both these cases, Board of Revenue had refused to interfere in suo Motu jurisdiction but the decision in each case rested in particular facts of that case. It has not been laid down therein that suo Motu revisional jurisdiction cannot at all be exercised at a belated stage. It was rather observed in the first mentioned case that a case can be taken up and decided judicially in exercise of suo Motu revisional powers u/s 13(1)(a) of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, "notwithstanding the expiration of any time."

5. Yet another argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the suo Motu revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify the decisions rendered judicially on individual appeals and revisions. In support of this argument, learned counsel relied upon Sufaid Khan etc. v. M.B.R. (Cons), etc. NLR 1982 Rev.87. The case cited by the learned counsel is distinguishable on facts. In the cited case, Board of Revenue on the judicial side had rejected the plea of reconsolidation in the village but later on after about 5 years, the Board of Revenue passed an order on the administrative side directing Addl. Deputy Commissioner (Cons.) to start consolidation operations afresh in the village. This latter order was challenged in the writ petition which was accepted and the order impugned therein was set aside and it was held that "once a matter has been decided on the judicial side, the exercise of executive authority to nullify the effect of judicial decisions will be an improper exercise of authority". This principle is not attracted to the instant case as the Board of Revenue in directing fresh consolidation in exercise of its suo motu revisional jurisdiction has acted on the judicial side. It may pertinently be observed that the jurisdiction exercised by the Board of Revenue quite clearly vested in it as 13(1)(a) of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 which is reproduced hereunder:‑‑ "Section 13.‑ (1) The Board of Revenue may (a) at any time of its own motion call for the record of any proceedings under this Ordinance pending before, or disposed of, by any Revenue or Consolidation Officer. Reference may usefully be made to the case of Abdul Majid Khan etc v. Member, Board of Revenue (Cons.) etc. 1986 M L D 782 wherein it was clarified that the principle discussed in Sufaid Khan's case afore‑referred is not attracted to a case where the Board of Revenue acted on the judicial side in directing the revision of the Consolidation Scheme in exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction.

6. On the merits of the case, learned counsel for the petitioners sought to assail the findings of the learned Member, Board of Revenue regarding the irregularities/illegalities committed during the preparation of the Consolidation Scheme on the ground that the said findings were contrary to the record and, therefore, liable to be struck down in writ jurisdiction. Learned counsel referred to (1) PLD 1962 Lah. 797, (2) PLD 1963 Lah. 63 and (3) PLD 1969 Kar. 401 for the proposition that a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction contrary to the record or which is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence can 6e upset in writ proceedings. There can be no cavil with this proposition but I must observe that it is not attracted to the instant case. As noted above, learned Member on perusal of the record found that 180 khatas out of a total of 267 khatas suffered from serious irregularities which could not be remedied through normal processes of appeals/revisions. The illegalities/irregularities pointed out by the learned Member have also been specified in detail in various statements submitted by ADC(C) in this Court. Copies of these statements were supplied to the learned counsel to enable him to verify their correctness with reference to the original record /registers relating to the Consolidation Scheme of the village produced in Court. Learned counsel on examination of the record has pointed out some minor discrepancies in the impugned findings. For instance, learned Member found in the impugned order that 500 kanals and 7 marlas of land was doubly allotted. Learned counsel on examination of the record submitted that this finding was incorrect to the extent of 75 kanals and 4 marlas. Even if this submission is taken to be correct, still more than 400 kanals stood doubly allotted. Similarly, the findings with respect to other illegalities noted in the impugned order are also found to be substantially correct. That being so, keeping in view the nature and extent of the illegalities/irregularities committed during the consolidation proceedings, learned C Member was perfectly justified in directing fresh consolidation of the village. The impugned order passed by the learned Member in his discretion on being satisfied about the necessity of fresh consolidation does not call for any, interference in writ jurisdiction.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has made a grievance that in case of fresh consolidation, petitioners would be put to a great loss in case the areas allotted to them during consolidation are taken away from them because they had developed those areas. This apprehension of the learned counsel has been taken care of by the learned Member by observing in the impugned order that "any improvement in the land obtained as a result of consolidation should also be kept in view while working out the classification and fair compensation should be provided to the party, which has improved the land, in case this land is proposed to be taken away from him." Upshot of the above‑discussion is that the impugned order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue is not open to any exception warranting interference in writ jurisdiction. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed in limine. M.Y.H./R‑162/L Petition dismissed.