P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑‑This appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court, is directed against the judgment passed by my brother S. A. Mahmood who dismissed a peti tion (Writ Petition No. 52‑R. of 1960) which had been presented by the appellant Bahar Muhammad with a view to getting declared void and imperative the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner with regard to half of a house being given to another person while the other half was given to the appellant.

2. The dispute relates to a house known as Bungalow No. 105, Ferozepur Road, Lahore, of which the transfer price has now been fixed by the Settlement Department as Rs. 34,

500. On the 9th of September 1947, Bahar Muhammad appellant got possession of half of this bungalow under the orders of the District Magistrate, Lahore, and on the 20th of February 1948 the bungalow was allotted by the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, to the appellant who is a displaced person and has verified claim for property left in India. Subsequently, Zubair Siddiqi, who is one of the respondents In this appeal, was allotted half of the ground‑floor of the bungalow while the annexe to the bungalow was allotted to Abdul Nasir Siddiqui. All the three occupants of the bungalow made applica tions for transfer; the appellant claiming the whole of the bungalow while each of the other two claimed only that portion of it which was in his possession.

3. On the 20th of February 1959, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Centre V), Lahore, holding that the house was divisible, passed an order that half of it shall go to the appellant and the other half to Zubair Siddiqi who is the second res pondent to this appeal, the first respondent being the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore. Against this order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Bahar Muhammad appealed to the Additional Settlement Com missioner, Lahore, who holding that the house was indivisible, gave the whole of it to the appellant. A revision petition pre sented by Zubair Siddiqi before Khan Farzand Ali Khan, Settle ment and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, was dismissed by his order dated the 28th of March 1960 and against this order of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, Zubair Siddiqi presented a petition for revision before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. This petition was dealt with by Pir Ahsanuddin, Chief Settlement and Rehabili tation Commissioner who held that as Zubair Siddiqi had already presented a revision petition before the Settlement and Rehabili tation Commissioner, he was not entitled to present another petition for revision even to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, but treating the petition of Zuhair Siddiqi as a miscellaneous peti tion passed an order giving a part of the main building and a part of the annexe to Zuhair Siddiqi and a part of the building and a part of the annexe to Bahar Muhammad appellant. This order was passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the 19th of November 1960 upon which Bahar Muhammad had presented the writ petition which, as already mentioned, was dismissed by a learned Judge of this Court.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant raised two main con tentions which were these : (1) That only on: revision petition could be entertained under the Displaced Persons (Compensation ant! Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and as Zuhair Siddiqi, respondent No. 2 had presented a revision petition which was dismissed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, on the 28th of March 1960 no petition for revision lay to the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, and (2) that under subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, it was not every house which could be declared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to be divisible but only those houses which could have been declared as big mansions but had not been so declared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

5. With regard to the first of his two above mentioned contentions, learned counsel for the appellant relied on section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner having conferred powers of revision on Khan Farzand Ali Khan, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, he himself was incompetent to entertain a revision petition against an order of Khan Farzand Ali Khan. It was pointed out that after holding that no second revision lay, the Chief Settlement Commissioner had treated the petition for revision as a miscellaneous petition and had passed an order which could be passed only in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, It appears to me that there is considerable force in the contention that an order of the type that was passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in the present case could be passed only in exercise of powers of revi sion. If the Chief Settlement Commissioner did not possess the powers of revision against an order passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by a subordinate Settlement authority, I can think of no provision in the relevant law, and none, was pointed out at the hearing, under which the Chief Settlement Commissioner could have upset the order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, by the simple means of calling the petition for revision presented before him as miscellaneous petition and not a petition for revision. The question that arises therefore, is whether the view expressed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, (to be referred to in the sequel as the Act), contemplated that only one order could be passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and after such an order had been passed by a Settlement Autho rity, be that authority even subordinate to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, no orders in exercise of revisional jurisdiction could be passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner is correct. On the relevant dates, the relevant part of section 20 of the Act, of which the first subsection was deleted by an amending statute, stood as follows: ‑ "(2) The Chief Settlement Commissioner at any time may, and shall on being directed by the Central Government, call for the record of any case or proceeding under this Act in which a Settlement Commissioner or an Additional Settlement Commissioner or a Deputy Settlement Commissioner or an Assistant Settlement Commissioner has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit. (3) A Settlement Commissioner specially empowered in this behalf by the Chief Settlement Commissioner may, at any time, call for the record of any case or proceeding under this Act in which an Additional Settlement Commissioner or a Deputy Settlement Commissioner or an Assistant Settle ment Commissioner under his jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correct ness, legality or propriety of such order and may pass such order, in relation thereto, as he thinks fit. (4) An Additional Settlement Commissioner specially em powered In this behalf by the Chief Settlement Commissioner may at any time call for the record of any case or proceed ing under this Act in which a Deputy Settlement Commissioner or an Assistant Settlement Commissioner under his juris diction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying himself, as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that under section 20 of the Act only the Chief Settlement Commissioner had been given the power to pass an order in revision and when the Act talked of the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to confer powers of revision on Settlement Commissioners or Addi tional Settlement Commissioners, the intention was that when he conferred on his subordinates, powers to exercise revisional jurisdiction the Chief Settlement Commissioner divested himself of the power given to him by subsection (2) of section 20 of the Act. In my view this interpretation of section 20 of the Act is untenable. Had it been mentioned anywhere In the Act thatl8 only one order could be passed in exercise of powers of revision, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant would have had force, but the Act nowhere says that an order in exercise of powers of revision can be passed only once. It would be noticed that the Act itself confers the power of revision on the Chief Settlement Commissioner but proceeds to authorise him to confer powers of revision on Settlement Commissioners and Additional Settlement Commissioners of his choice. It is in exercise of this power given to him by the Act that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had by an order authorised Settlement Commissioners to hear petitions for revision. It would be a complete misreading of the provisions of section 20 of the Act to suppose that when conferring on his subordinates powers under subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was handing over his own powers of revision to them The language used in subsection (2) of section 20 of the Act which is clear and unambiguous makes it incontrovertible that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could call for the record of any case at any time in order to examine the legality or propriety of an order passed by one of his sub ordinates and could pass thereon any order that he considered fit and that if the Central Government wanted him to call for the record of any such case to determine whether a proper or legal order had been passed therein he has to look into the record for that purpose. It will be noticed that no power has been conferred on the Central Government to direct a Settle ment Commissioner or an Additional Settlement Commissioner to call for the records of any case to see whether a proper or legal order had been passed and it follows, therefore, that if the contention of learned counsel for the appellant were correct the powers given to the Central Government by sub section (2) of section 20 of the Act can be taken away by the Chief Settlement Commissioner by exercising the powers con ferred on him by subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act. I find no difficulty in holding that even when in exercise of the powers conferred on him by subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner autho rises his subordinates to exercise powers of revision, the powers given to him by means of subsection (2) of section 20 of the Act remain entirely intact as the power which the Chief Settle ment Commissioner can exercise under subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act is in addition to the power which he possesses under subsection (2).

6. In the same connection, learned counsel for the appellant also urged that the conferment of powers on the Chief Settle ment Commissioner to authorise his subordinates to hear revi sion petitions amounted to conferment of legislative powers on that officer and as this was opposed to all principles of law, the section itself would be unenforceable. Even if I assume that the powers conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner by means of subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act could not be conferred on him, I do not see how the rest of the section becomes invalid. If it be assumed that the Chief Settle ment Commissioner could not have conferred on any of his subordinates the power to pass orders in revision, the case of the appellant would suffer rather than benefit. If the Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, could not hear a petition for revision, the Chief Settlement Commissioner would in any case have the power to do so, and his order dated the 19th of November 1960 would, therefore, be unassailable on the ground that a second revision petition was Incompetent. I am, however, clear in my mind that by conferring on the Chief Settlement Commissioner the power to confer powers of revision on his subordinates under subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act, the law‑making authority had not contravened any law.

7. The second contention of learned counsel for the appellant may now be taken up. This contention was based on his interpretation of subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act which subsection at the relevant time stood as under: "(2) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, * * * * * * * * * * * (4) `house' means evacuee residential premises of any value in an urban area, or of the value of ten thousand or more in a rural area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and out‑houses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises, notwithstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or out‑house is in the possession of a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential building situated within the premises of an industrial concern, or a building or premises declared under paragraph 16 of the Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel: Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consists of more than one residential unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then, unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a house: Provided further that where the area of the gardens and grounds attached or appurtenant to a house exceeds three times the plinth area of the house including out‑houses and garages, if any, the area so in excess, or such part thereof as the Chief Settlement Commissioner may determine shall not be treated as part of the house." Malik Muhammad Akram, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the only interpretation that could be put on this subsection was that only those buildings could be held by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to be divisible which could, under paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act, have been declared big mansions or hotels, but had not been so declared. He amplified this argument by saying that if this was not so, it was not necessary to make a reference in the first proviso to buildings or premises not declared as big mansions or hotels. I find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the con tention of learned counsel for the appellant that only a big mansion or a hotel could be declared, under subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act, to be divisible has no force. The scheme of the Act shows that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could, in exercise of the power given to him by paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act, declare a building or premises, whether residential or commercial, to be a big mansion or a hotel, and if that declaration were made such building was to be disposed of by unrestricted public auction. Paragraph 16 further said that no building, the monthly rent of which in 1946 was less than Rs. 500 shall be declared to be a big mansion or a hotel. It would be noticed that under paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to declare a building or premises whether residential or commercial to be a big mansion or a hotel were unlimited except to this extent that he could not declare any building to be a big mansion or a hotel unless its rent in 1946 was more than Rs. 500 or more per mensem. The interpretation which learned counsel for the appellant would have the Court place on subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act is so unusual that it cannot be accepted without doing considerable violence to the language employed in the relevant provision of law. It would be noticed that subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act concerns itself with "house" and if the interpretations of Malik Muhammad Akram, Advocate, were accepted it will have to be held that though paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act was applicable not only to houses but also to commercial buildings, subsection (4) of section 2 concerned itself only with houses though it made a reference to paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act. It is an elementary principle of interpretation that the words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary natural meaning and such meaning is to be departed from only if the language employed makes it incumbent that the departure should be made. The language of subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, does not indicate that an interpretation other than the one that flows from the words used in the provision had to be placed on the words used, and the result is that the interpretation suggested by Malik Muhammad Akram cannot be accepted.

8. Before closing, I consider it necessary to point out that the argument of Mr. Muhammad Akram with regard to the Chief Settlement Commissioner being incompetent to pass an order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction if he had con ferred powers of revision on Settlement Commissioners or Additional Settlement Commissioners could be said to suffer from inconsistency, I have mentioned already that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had declared the house to be divisible. Under subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, it is only the Chief Settlement Commissioner who can hold whether a house is divisible or not, and the power would have vested fn that officer alone had it not been for section 31 of the Act under which any power given to the Chief Settlement Commissioner could be delegated by him to any of his subordinates. The Chief Settlement Commissioner had delegated the powers of declaring a house to be divisible to all Deputy Settlement Commissioners, Additional Settlement Commissioners and Settlement Commis sioners. If the argument of learned counsel for the appellant, that by exercising his powers under subsections (3) and (4) of section 20 of the Act the Chief Settlement Commissioner became divested of his own powers of revision mentioned in subsection (2) of that section, were correct, he would not have had a single word to say for his client because in the case under consideration the Deputy Settlement Commissioner who had first of all dealt with the case had held that the house was divisible into two portions and his order would have been final. I am clear in my mind that the order of the Deputy Settlement Com missioner that the house was divisible was not final and was subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, revisional jurisdiction of the Settlement Com missioner as well as the revisional jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In view of what I have said above, I would hold that the appeal has no force and would dismiss it, but as some points of law did arise for consideration, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal. ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑‑I agree. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.