1986 PLP 1018 (MLD)

After the disposal of the appeal by the Supreme Court, the S.A.0. was taken up and vide this Court's order, dated 8‑5‑1983 (Annexure 'P' to the writ petition) the impugned orders were set aside and the case was remanded for being decided on merits in accordance with law. It may be pointed out that afer the decision of the letters patent appeal, the Settlement Department issued a regular transfer order in favour of the petitioner on 3‑8‑1976 (Annexures 'T' to the writ petition).

7. After the decision of the S.A.O., the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues for the disposal of the eviction application:‑ (1) Whether the respondent is a defaulter ? O.P.P. (2) Whether the petitioner has no cause of action ? O.P.R. (3) Whether the disputed property has been incorrectly described ? O.P.R. (4) Whether the petition is not maintainable ? O.P.R. (5) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction ? O.P.R. (6) Whether a legal notice of transfer was to be served on the respondent? If so its effect. O.P.R. (7) Relief.

8. After recording the parties evidence, issue No.1 regarding default was decided against the petitioner, issues Nos.2 to 5 were not pressed by the respondent and regarding issue No.6, it was held that transfer in favour of the petitioner took place in August, 1976, when transfer order was issued in his favour, but by that time, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, had already been repealed and, therefore, there was no requirement of service of notice under section 30 ibid. On the basis of these findings, the learned Rent Controller vide his judgment, dated 4‑12‑1983, dismissed the eviction application of the petitioner. The petitioner went in appeal and the learned appellate authority (Additional District Judge) Lahore, dismissed the appeal on 15‑4‑1984 and upheld the findings of the learned Rent Controller.

9. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioner that in fact, the premises in question were transferred in his favour in 1960 notional possession was also given to him then and thus he was entitled to recover rent from the occupant of the premises under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which was then in force from the said date. It has further been urged that order passed by the Rent Controller under section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, has not been complied with by the respondent and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted.

10. These arguments have no substance. Under law, a person becomes the transferee of an evacuee property when the P.T.O. or T.O. (in case of big mansion or industrial concern) is issued in his favour. 1 the present case, as already stated, transfer order was issued in favour of the petitioner for the first time on 3‑8-1976 and, therefore, he had no locus standi to claim rent from the occupant of the premise prior to the said date. In this view of the matter, the order earlier passed under section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is a nullity in the eye of law, as already set aside while accepting the S.A.O.

11. It has also been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Rent Controller and the learned appellate Authority have wrongly come to the conclusion that the respondent was not a defaulter in Government of rent. This contention has been considered. It is an admitted fact that dispute about the title and the validity of transfer in favour of the petitioner has been finally settled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 5‑4‑1983. It is also an admitted position that the Supreme Court had ordered the respondent to continue to deposit the rent with the Settlement authorities and he had been complying with that direction. After the decision by the Supreme Court, a sum of Rs.600 has been deposited as rent with the Rent Controller. In such circumstances, the Rent Controller and the learned appellate authority cannot be said to be far wrong in arriving at the conclusion that the respondent was not a defaulter in payment of rent, muchless a wilful defaulter. The findings on the question of default recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the learned appellate authority in the absence of any jurisdiction a error or illegality cannot be called in question by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court. A Court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction has the power to decide an issue pending before it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that on the basis of evidence before such Court or Tribunal, a different conclusion can be arrived at, hardly justifies interference by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary Jurisdiction. In Zulfikar Khan Awan v. The Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development, Government of the Punjab, La e and 8 others 1974 S C M R 530, it was held:‑ "Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a matter is competent to decide it rightly ox wrongly and mere fact .that decision is incorrect does not render the decision as without lawful authority. " Similarly, in Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan and 2 others P L D 1985 . S C 131, it has been observed:‑ "Before parting with the case, we may observe that there is an increasing tendency to file Constitutional petitions even when the Courts whose orders are challenged had the jurisdiction to pass those orders, notwithstanding the fact that it has been held time and again that where a Court has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it can do so rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that the decision on a question of fact or law is not correct, does not necessarily render it 'without lawful authority' and certainly not illegal:" While making these observations, reference has been made to the well‑known case of Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others P L D 1974 S C 139.

12. As already observed, the learned Rent Controller and the learned appellate authority were also justified while coming to the conclusion that prior to 1976 i.e. before the issuance of the T.O., the petitioner had no locus standi to claim rent from the respondent. In Attaul Haque and 2 others v. H. Malik Electric Co. P L D 1971 Lah. 1007, it has been held by a Letters Patent Bench of this Court that the rent would be payable to transferees not on the basis of the delivery of notional possession of the property but on account of issuance of its permanent transfer deed in their favour.

13. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that apart from the merits of the case, the petitioner had no locus standi in regard to the ejectment petition culminating into the impugned orders. He has contended that the ejectment petition was filed in 1966, but by that time the T.O. was not issued in favour of the petitioner, which was issued ten years later on and, therefore, the petitioner could not seek the eviction of the respondent in 1966 and thus on this score alone the eviction application should have been thrown out. This is true that in 1966, the petitioner had no locus standi o cause of action to file the eviction application, but during the pendency of the litigation viz. S.A.O. arising out of the eviction application, T.0, had been issued in his favour and, therefore, cause of action matured and thus he could continue the eviction application which was not originally competent when it was filed. In Sheikh Fazal Muhammad v. Sheikh Muhammad shafi and 2 others 1983 C L C 261, this Court observed- "No doubt on the day when respondent No.1 moved the application for eviction the plea of personal need was not available to him but then the period of lease expired while the proceedings were still pending before the Rent Controller. Thus, even if respondent No.1 had not taken the said plea in the application as originally filed he could have moved the Rent Controller for the amendment of his application to incorporate the same as soon as the period of lease expired." It was further observed that while exercising writ jurisdiction such a technical objection should not be entertained which would result in forcing the parties to another round of litigation.

14. It is thus concluded that although the eviction application was not legally competent as it was originally filed but during the pendency of litigation cause of action matured and, therefore, on the ground of locus standi it could not be thrown out, but so far as the merits o the case are concerned, the learned Rent Controller and the learned appellate authority who happened to be tribunals of competent jurisdiction, came to a positive finding that the respondent was not defaulter and this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot interfere with such a finding recorded by tribunals of competent jurisdiction. In this view of the matter,, this writ petition must fail an is accordingly dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. S.A. Petition dismissed.