P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

Date of hearing : 10th September 1961. This order will dispose of Criminal Revision Nos. 698, 699 of 1960, 726, 729 and 730 of 1961. The petitioners in all these cases have been dealt with by the District Tribunal of Gujrat and each of them ordered to execute a bond in the sum of Rs. 5;000 with two sureties to be of good behaviour for periods specified in each case.

2. The main contention put forward by Mr. Zafar Ali Quresfhi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, is that the orders passed in these cases are illegal and without jurisdiction for the reason that under the Ordinance of 1959, the District Tribunal was to consist oily of the District Magistrate, whereas in the present cases the orders have been passed by a Tribunal consisting of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police.

3. The Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951 was repealed on the 4th of June 1959, by Ordinance XXXV of 1959 and under section 2 of the Ordinance the District Tribunal is to consist only of the District Magistrate, as against the Tribunal under the old Act which comprised the District Magistrate as well as the Super intendent of Police of the district. Proceedings in all these cases were instituted before the repeal of the 1951 Act but the orders have been passed after the repeal i.e., when the Ordin:xnce had come into force. The question is whether these pending proceed ings were to be governed by the old Act under which they were instituted or by the new Ordinance.

4. I think the answer to this question is provided by clause (e) of subsection (1) of section 4 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, I S56, which is analogous to clause (e) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. Under this provision of law, the repeal of an Act shall not "affect any investigation, legal proceed ing or remedy in respect of any such right; privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punish ment maybe imposed as if the Repealing Act had not been passed". It is thus clear that the present proceedings which were instituted under the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, could be continued even after the repeal of this Act by Ordinance XXXV of 1959, before the old Tribunal.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended, that there was no vested right in procedure and once the procedure was changed, all pending proceedings had to conform to the new procedure, with the result that the Tribunal composed of District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police could not continue functioning after the coming into force of the repealing Ordinance in 1959. To support this contention, the learned counsel referred to Muhammad Bashir v. The Province of West Pakistan and another (P L D 1958 Lah. 853) and Shafiq Ahmad v. State (P L D 1959 Lah. 420). The first mentioned case was decided by a Full Bench of this Court. It related to the validity of the confirmation of sentence under section 12 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, after the Constitution of 1556 had come into force, as it was contended that sections 11 and 12 of the Regulation had been rendered invalid as they were in conflict with Articles 4 and 5 of the Constitution. The learned Judges observed that there being no vested right in procedure, there is no corresponding liability, and if that procedure is rendered void by the Constitution, it must be abandoned imme diately in favour of the procedure which is valid. In coming to this conclusion, notice was taken of section 6 of the General Clauses Acct (X of 1897), and it was observed that in order to attract the application of that section, the case must be expressly one of repeal, and it is not enough that it should be analogous to repeal. It was added that when the Legislature repeals an enact ment, it does so consciously, but when it says in a particular statute that any existing law which is inconsistent with that statute shall be void to the extent of inconsistency, it is contemplating a possible conflict, and is not necessarily contemplating a repeal, and therefore the contemplation of any saving clause is out of the question. It would seem, therefore, that this authority does not help the petitioners.

6. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel related to the continuance of proceedings under the Essential Supplies Act (III of 1957). It was held that the Essential Commodities Distri bution Order, 1953, promulgated under the Essential Supplies Act, 1957, was not an enactment within the meaning of the General Clauses Act of 1897 and for that reason section 6 of that Act could not be used for the purpose. of keeping alive the proceedings which were pending at the time when the notification dated the 26th February 1958 was issued withdrawing the Order under which prosecution had been lodged it was further observed that the act complained against was no longer an offence punish able under law. Here, again, it is clear that the decision in this case is not relevant for our present purpose for the reason that the case did not fall under section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 7: On behalf of the State Mr. Saeed‑ur‑Rahman placed reliance on Karim Shah v. Mst. Zinat Bibi (195 I C 304). That was a case of continuing proceedings for the dissolution of the marriage of a Muslim woman, which had been instituted in the Court of the District Judge under section 5 of the Muslim. Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (XXVI of 1937), and were pending at the time when section 5 of the Shariat Act (XXVI of 1937), was no longer in force, it having been repealed by section 6 of the Dissolu tion of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939). The District Judge, however, proceeded to pronounce orders in this pending petition. In the High Court, it was contended that the jurisdiction of the District Judge having been taken away by the Legislature before the petition was disposed of by him, his order dissolving the marriage was a nullity. It was held that there being no provision in the repealing Act affecting proceedings which had been initiated under Act XXVI of 1937, when it was in force and were pending at the time of its repeal, the matter was governed by clause (e) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Consequently where the petition under section 5 of the Act of 1937 was pending before the District Judge on the date when the Act of 1939 came into force, the petition did not automatically lapse and the District Judge was bound to decide it in accordance with the provisions of the Shariat Act of 1937. It was further observed that the rule laid down in section 6 (e), General Clauses Act, applies to those cases only where an Act or Ordinance has been repealed by .a subsequent enactment ; it has no reference to temporary or exp~rtong statutes which automatically lapse at a certain date, or on the happening of a certain contingency, without fresh legislation.

8. Mr. Saeed‑ur‑Rahman also referred to a recent judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court delivered in the case oaf Sugni Chand Davaram Jatwani v. Pakistan and another (1), where it was held that the effect of section 6 of the General Clauses Act was that the proceedings in question were to be continued and completed in the same manner as if the law under which they were instituted had never been repealed. Such proceedings carried their own law with them i.e., they should be decided under the law as it was at the time when they were instituted, notwithstand ing the repeal of those provisions.

9. In Ordinance XXXV of 1959, there is no indication whatsoever that the pending proceedings are to be dropped or that) they are to be governed by the new law, Thus, there being nothing to the contrary, the provisions of section 4 (1) (e) of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act would apply, with the result that the proceedings which were pending before the District Tribunal, consisting of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, would be continued under the Provisions of the Punjab Control of Goondas Act, 1951, under which they were initiated notwithstanding its repeal. These proceedings carried their own law with them and had to be decided under the Act of 1951 and not under the Ordinance of 1959. The authorities cited by Mr. Saeed‑ur‑Rahman, appearing for the State, leave no doubt that this case is fully covered by the provisions of section 4 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act or section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. I, therefore, see no force in the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners and would dismiss the petitions. K. M. A.