1990 PLP 904 (CLC)

‑‑‑‑Ss. 15 & 21‑‑‑Ejectment‑‑‑Personal requirement‑‑‑Wife can seek eviction on ground of personal requirement of her husband. Ghulam Mustafa v. Sharifan Bibi 1982 C L C 1012. ref. (g) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss..15 & 21‑‑‑Ejectment‑‑‑Personal requirement‑‑‑Mere desire of landlord to obtain possession of rented premises is not enough and he must prove that he required property genuinely for his bona fide reqwirement which should be proved by independent evidence. Khalid Dawood Pota for Appellant. Khursheed Anwar Shaikh for Respondent. Date of hearing: 19th November, 1989. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30‑10‑1986 whereby the ejectment application of the appellant/landlady was dismissed. The shop in dispute was purchased by the appellant in August 1983 when the respondent was already tenant of the previous landlord. No notice of attornment as contemplated by Section 18 of the Ordinance was sent to the respondent but this is immaterial of two reasons. Firstly, the appellant had orally informed the respondent in this regard and the respondent also admits that the previous owner and landlord had refused to receive rent from August 1983 and has informed him of the sale of the shop in favour of the appellant. The respondent having been thus admittedly informed of the sale by the previous owner as well as the, new owner, there was no further need to send a written notice. Secondly, the ejectment is not sought on the ground of default but on the ground of personal requirement and the law is settled on this point that when a new landlord seeks ejectment of his tenant on the ground of personal requirement, notice of attornment is not necessary.

2. Para. 4 of the ejectment application gives the personal requirements of appellant in the following words:‑ "That the applicant requires the premises, for her own use and the use of her husband to carry on their own business in the said premises," The respondent vehemently contested the bona fides of personal requirements of the appellant and it was stated in the written statement that the appellant's husband was already carrying on business at Jairam Street, behind Pak Type Foundry, in the same vicinity, under the name and style of Kifayat Traders and in proof of the claim he filed on record a copy of letterhead of this firm which shows the address and the name of the appellant's husband as proprietor. It was also claimed by the respondent that appellant's husband was also carrying on business in partnership with his brother at Burns Road. The respondent also claimed that he had obtained' this shop from the previous landlord after paying him Rs.65,000 as `Pugri' and it was brought on record in evidence that it was stipulated at the time of commencement of tenancy that except for default he would not be evicted from the premises unless the amount of `Pugri' was returned. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties before him, learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove the bona fides of her personal requirements and dismissed the ejectment petition.

3. So far as the question of 'Pugri' is concerned, I am of the view that when a tenant is inducted into any premises on payment of `pugri' and the landlord sells the premises to another person, that other person can seek eviction of the premises for his personal requirements and the payment of `pugri' to the previous owner/landlord is no bar as held by my learned brother Mr. Justice Qaisar Ahmed Hamidi in the case of Shehzada Sultan Humayun v. Mrs. Zainab Bai, reported in 1989 C L C 1338. However, I am also of the view that if the Tenant'; succeeds in proving that he had paid any amount by way of 'Pugri to the previous p landlord, the eviction should be conditional on tile repayment of 'Pugri' amount. After all, when .a person invests some amount in the purchase of immovable property he is expected to make relevant enquiries in respect of the said property. If the building is in the occupation of tenants, he is expreted to satisfy himself as to who are the tenants, what are the terms and conditions of the tenancy and whether any amount of Pugri or goodwill was paid by the tenants to the vendor. Such an enquiry becomes all the more necessary when the premises are commercial and in an area where, to the knowledge of everybody, no shop, however small it may be, can be obtained without paying any `Pugri' or goodwill. It is, therefore, to be seen whether the respondent has proved his contention.

4. Apart from the evidence of respondent's father and attorney who stated that the respondent had obtained the shop in 1979 by paying Rs.65,(100 byway of `Pugri', there is the evidence of ().W‑2 Shaikh Ashfaq Elahi who is also running a shop in the same area, He stated that as a businessman he could say that the demised shop was worth about Rs. 1,00,0(X) in 'Pugri' and no shop in the area could he obtained without payment of `Pugri'. O.W‑3 Muhammad Din deposed that the amount of `Pugri' of Rs.65,000 was paid before him. (The amount is stated in the affidavit as Rs. 64, 000 but it was conceded by both the learned counsel that it was an error of typing. He also stated that he was living in the area since 1948 and could say from his experience that no shop was available there without payment of `pugri'. The next witness of respondent is Sirajuddiri. He is an Estate Broker dealing in immovable property and he stated that about 7 years ago (he was examined in January 1986) respondent's father Harz Muhammad Ahmed had contacted him and expressed a desire to take a shop on rent. The witness further stated that he informed Harz Muhammad Ahmed that many shops were available on rent in Burns Road area but the amount of `Pugri' was around Rs.80,000‑Rs.1,00,000 but Harz Muhammad ‑Ahmed was not prepared to pay this amount and wanted a shop fetching less amount of `Pugri'. The witness could not procure such a shop for Harz Muhammad Ahmed but later learnt that he had obtained the demised shop on paying Rs.65,000 as `Pugri'. This witness Sirajuddin is not a witness of the payment of `Pugri'. He was merely examined to show that `Pugri' system was so rampant in the area that no shop could be obtained there without paying `Pugri'. In his opinion the demised shop was worth more‑ than Rs.65,000 in `Pugri' as per market rate prevailing at that time. He further stated that at present (January 1986) a shop of the size of demised shop fetched three times as much `Pugri' as compared to the rate prevailing seven years ago (7 years prior to January 1986). Although this witness Sirajuddin was cross‑examined at length, he was not cross‑examined in respect of para 4 of his affidavit in which he had given the opinion that the demised shop, which was worth more than Rs.65,000 in `Pugri' in 1979, was now worth three times as much. The appellant could not rebut the above evidence of the respondent. She could have examined the previous owner but this was not done by her and there is no explanation why it was not done. It is safe to draw the presumption that had the previous owner been produced he would not have supported the appellant on the point. It was pointed out by learned counsel for the respondent that if the demised shop had not been given to the respondent on `pugri', its sale price would have been much more than Rs.20,000 for which the appellant had purchased it and it was also pointed out that even though the appellant had purchased this shop for Rs.20,000 she was offered as much as Rs.50,000 by the respondent but the appellant was not willing to sell it even for Rs.50,000 and this showed the real worth of the shop and the reason why it was sold for a mere Rs.20,000

5. After taking into account all the evidence on the point, I am of the view that the contention of the respondent that lie had obtained this shop on payment of Rs.65,000 as `pugri' has been sufficiently proved. Respondent had examined not only neighbouring shopkeeper but also an Estate Agent whose business it is to deal in immovable property. There is no reason to disbelive this evidence which was also not controverted by the appellant. As such, in case an eviction order is passed in favour of the appellant, she will have to refund Rs.65,000 to the respondent.

6. We now come to the bona fides of personal requirements of the' appellant. It has already been observed above that Para. 4 of the crescent application describes the personal requirement of the appellant. This para has been re‑produced in full. It gives an impression that the appellant and her husband want to commence some business and for that purpose they require the demised shop. The appellant did not disclose that her husband was already well settled in business but wanted to shift his business premises from present one, which were rented, to the demised shop. Nor it Was disclosed as to why this shift was found necessary. It was the respondent who came forward with the details that the appellant's husband was already running his business in the name of Kifayat Traders and was also carrying on partnership business with his brother at another place. In his affidavit‑in‑evidence, however, appellant's husband admitted this fact and explained that the premises in which was running his business t were not only rented ones but also that they were too inadequate for his purpose I and that his own landlord was pressing him for their vacation. He did not at all substantiate his claim that his own landlord was pressing him for vacation of the premises. He could have easily done this by examining his landlord but this was not done. As for the inadequacy of the space in the premises in which he is running his business, he has not boon able to prove this. The ejectment application is very vague on the point and although the appellant explained her personal requirements through the evidence of her husband A.W.‑1 Sultan; Ahmed and her husband's nephew A.W‑2 Ahmed Jamil, it was not sufficient to discharge the onus upon her by law.

7. It is an admitted position in law that a wile can seek eviction of rented premises on the ground of personal requirements of her husband or of her l dependent children and there was no necessity to refer to the case of Ghulam Mustafa v. Sharifan Bibi (1982 C L C 1012) in support of this proposition. It is well settled law that mere desire of a landlord for obtaining possession of the rented premises is not enough and he must prove that he requires the premises genuinely for his bona fide reqirements and these bona tide requirements must be proved by independent evidence. I would under the circumstances agree with the learned Rent Controller that the appellant has not been able to establish the I bona rides of her r6quirements. The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M.Y.H./S‑532/K Appeal dismissed.