1968 PLP 307 (PTD)
GURU ESTATE Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BIHAR AND ORISSA
| Citation | 1968 PLP 307 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court India |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | GURU ESTATE Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BIHAR AND ORISSA |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1968 PLP 307 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1968 PLP 307 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court India bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1968 PLP 307 (PTD) (GURU ESTATE Versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, BIHAR AND ORISSA). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate (R. S. Mahanty and B. P. Maheshwari with him) for Appellant.
- N. D. Karkhannis and R. N. Sachthey for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
Religious trust‑Priests of temple‑Funds collected by way of donations from devotees to offer Bhog to the Lord‑‑Permission to priest to appropriate offerings for himself and pilgrims from district of donor‑Donations whether exempt from tax‑Income-tax Act, 1922, S. 4(3) (i), (ii). The assessees, a Hindu undivided family, were Pandas (priests) attached to the temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri. They assisted devotees in performing worship and ceremonies. In addition to pranami, which were emoluments for services rendered by them, they received or collected from pilgrims donations under deeds known as Annadan Patras by which the donors directed that the amounts should be utilised by the assessees for offering Bhog to the Lord, but permitted the assessees to appropriate the offerings for themselves and the people hailing from the district of the donors. The donations so received were credited to a separate account and expenses were defrayed towards Bhog to the Lord. The question was whether the donations were exempt under section 4(3) (i) or (ii) of the Income‑tax Act, 1922. The Appellate Tribunal held that there was no evidence to show that the pilgrims understood the character of the deed they were signing and that therefore no trust was intended or created by them ; that, having regard to the way in which pilgrims were attracted and treated by the assessees, the receipts under the Annadan Patras were of the nature of income from the business of pilgrim traffic carried on by the assessees ; that the assessees were not an institu tion ; that, therefore, they were not entitled to exemption from tax under section 4(3) (i) or (ii). On a reference, the High Court assumed that a religious trust was created by the donations and held that the trust, created by the Annadan Patras was a private religious trust and the income of the assessees derived through Annadan Patras was not exempt under clause (i) or clause (ii) of section 4(3). On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, (i) that the donations derived by the assessees through the Antadan Palras were neither derived from property held under a trust or other legal obligation solely for religious or charitable purposes nor income of a religious or charitable institu tion derived from voluntary contributions applicable exclusively to purposes, religious or charitable, and that therefore the dona tions were not exempt under clause (i) or clause (ii) of section 4(3); (ii) that, however, the High Court erred in deciding the question referred to it on the assumption that a trust was created. The High Court was bound to accept the findings of the Tribunal that the receipts were in the nature of income from a business carried on by the assessees and that no trust was ever intended to be created by the pilgrims, and had to decide the question of law on the basis of those facts. The function of determining the facts rested with the Tribunal, and the High Court had to advise the Tribunal as to the law applicable on the facts found by the Tribunal and based on a review of the evidence. Edwards v. Bairstow (1955) 28 I T R 579 ref.
Judgment & Decree
The amounts received or collected from the pilgrims under Annadan Patras (which were also styled as Attika Patras) were credited in an account known as Annadan Account, and expenses of "food offerings" to the deity were defrayed out of that fund. The assessees claim that out of the unspent balance they purchased property in the name of the deity Jagannath. The Income‑tax Officer held that Annadan received by the assessees was not exempt from liability to tax, for, in his view, there was no valid trust in writing and "there was no authority to enforce' the obligation", that the amounts received by the assessees be spent for religious and charitable purposes, that the assessees were not shebaits appointed under a writing and the income sought to be taxed was in the nature of voluntary contribu tions and was not derived from property held under a trust or other legal obligation. In appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Cuttack Range, confirmed the order. He held that the assessees as Pandas held a trust fund in their charge every year from which no income was received but a part of the fund was spent by them for the purpose for which the trust was created and the balance was appropriated by them to their own use and that they did not derive income from voluntary contributions applicable solely to religious or charitable purposes. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal confirmed the order observing : "Except the bare assertion of the assessee before us, there is no evidence to show that the pilgrims understood either the character or the implication of the document they were signing. The assessee has not shown either that he gave receipts to the pilgrims indicating his trustee position and his undertaking to employ the receipts for the purposes of the supposed trust. Out of these funds collected, a major portion is spent upon loans to pilgrims, charity, expenses for feeding the pilgrims and other items ...This itself as a fact shows that the money paid by the pilgrims was not used for the exclusive purpose of offering Bhog...Having regard to the way in which the pilgrims are attracted, brought to Puri, treated there, taken to the temple, fed and ultimately induced to make a pay ment, there is only one conclusion possible that the business of pilgrim‑traffic was carried on by the assessee. The facts do not show that any trust was intended or created by the pilgrim..." The Tribunal also observed that the assessees were not an institution and they were not exempt under section 4(3)(ii) of the Act from liability to pay Income‑tax, especially because the objects for which Annadan fund was to be expended were not public objects, and the payments made by the pilgrims as Annadan could not be said to be for the benefit of the public or for charity. The Tribunal declined to submit a statement of the case on the question of law alleged to arise out of their order because in their view in disposing of the appeal it was found that "no trust was intended to be created as alleged by the assessees, and that the assessees had not proved that they were under any obligation to devote the income to any particular use". The assessees then moved the High Court for an order under section 66(2) of the Indian Income‑tax Act calling upon the Tribunal to state the case. The High Court directed the Tribunal to state the following point of law arising out of the case and to refer it for decision: "Whether, on the facts of this case, the amounts received by the assessee under the Attika Patra are liable to tax?" At the hearing of the reference the High Court was of the opinion that it "was not necessary to discuss the larger question whether the contributions made through Annadan Patra by the donor would amount to a trust or else whether it is a mere device to give the entire income to the Panda for his own benefit." They then observed that "even if it be assumed (without deciding) that a religious trust was created for the main purpose of offering Bhog to Lord Jagannath at Purr' by the execution of the Annadan Patra, the essential, question on which the assessability of this income to Income‑tax depends, is whether such a trust is a private religious trust or a public religious trust." The court proceeded to consider the appropriate tests for ascertaining whether the trust was public or private and held that the trust created by the Annadan Patra was a private religious trust and the income of the assessees derived from that source was not exempt from liability to pay Income‑tax under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub section (3) of section 4 of the Indian Income‑tax Act. The material part of subsection (3) of section 4 of the Indian Income‑tax Act as it stood at the relevant time was as follows: "Any income, profits or gains falling within the following classes shall not be included in the total income of the person receiving them: (i) Subject to the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 16, any income derived from property held under a trust or other legal obligation solely for religious or charitable purposes, where such purposes relate to anything done within the taxable territories, and in the case of property so held in part only for such purposes, the income applied or finally set apart for application thereto. (ii) Any income of a religious or charitable institution derived from voluntary contributions and applicable solely to religious or charitable purposes." It is manifest on a bare perusal of the two clauses that income of the assessees would be admissible to exemption under clause (i) of subsection (3) if it be derived from property held under a trust or other legal obligation, solely for religious or charitable purposes, and under clause (ii) if it be income of a religious or charitable institution derived from voluntary contributions appli cable exclusively to purposes religious or charitable. Income sought to be taxed does not answer either of these descriptions ; it is not income derived from property held under a trust or other obligation for the purposes specified, and the assessees are not an institution, religious or charitable. They are members of a joint Hindu family who carry on the vocation of Pandas and the income on the finding of the Tribunal is not applicable exclusively to purposes, religious or charitable. On this limited ground the claim of the assessees for exclusion of the receipts under the Annadan Patras from their total income is liable to be rejected. This interpretation of the relevant provisions is sufficient to dispose of the appeals, but we deem it necessary, having regard to the manner in which the case was approached by the High Court, to indicate the restrictions inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the High. Court. The Tribunal held that the receipts called Annadan were earned by the assessees in the conduct of their business as Pandas and the facts did not indicate that any trust was intended or created by the pilgrims. Under' the scheme of the Income‑tax Act the function of determining facts rests with 'the Tribunal and, on the facts found; the High Court has to advice the Tribunal as to the law applicable. The Tribunal having found that the receipts were in the nature of income of a business, and no trust was ever intended by the pilgrims who gave Annadan the High Court had to record its opinion on the basis of those facts. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal may not be regarded as final if it is not supported by any evidence, or is founded upon a view of facts which cannot reasonably be entertained, or upon a misconception : vide Edwards v. Bairstow ((1955) 28 I T R 579). The High Court made an order under section 66(2) because, in their opinion the consideration whether the pilgrims understood the true character or the implication of the Annadan Patras signed by them was irrelevant, and that merely because there was a breach of trust committed by the assessees, the trust was not destroyed. But it was not open to the High Court to ignore the finding of the Tribunal that there was no trust, and the receipts under Annadan Patras were income from "the business of pilgrim traffic". Under the Income‑tax Act, on conclusions of fact recorded by the Tribunal, if a question of law arises, the High Court will deliver its opinion provided it is properly referred. The conclusion of the Tribunal was based on a review of the evidence. The Tribunal on the evidence relating to the manner in which the pilgrims were attracted, brought to Puri, treated there and taken to the temple, fed and ultimately induced to make a payment inferred that the receipts were in the course of business. At the hearing of the reference the High Court addressed itself to a question which was not referred by the Tribunal. The High Court on the assumption that a trust was intended to be created by the pilgrims by giving Annadan proceeded to hold that the trust was a private trust. In so holding the High Court attempted to exercise not the advisory jurisdiction in respect of the decision of the Tribunal which alone is conferred by sec tion 66(2) of the Indian Income‑tax Act, but jurisdiction which in substance was appellate. The Tribunal had recorded a finding that there was in fact no trust intended or created by the pilgrims. On that finding no question as to the applicability of section 4(3)(i) in any event could arise. It was open to the assessees to demand that a question that the finding was based on no evidence or that it could not reasonably be arrived at by any person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law. Some vague state ment was made in the application to the High Court for an order for calling for a statement of the case that the finding was based on no evidence, but the High Court was not asked to call upon the Tribunal by an order under section 66(2) to submit a state ment on the question that the finding that there was no trust was based on no evidence. On the question referred the High Court was bound to accept the findings of the Tribunal and to decide the question of law, if any, arising therefrom. The High Court, however, ignored the finding that the income received as Annadan was part of the income or properties of a business carried on by the assessees, and on the assumption that a trust was created they regarded the trust as a private religious trust. In so doing the High Court did nor in substance answer the question submitted to it. Normally, in, circumstances such as this case discloses, we would have called for a finding from the High Court on the question which was referred by the Tribunal, but on the view we have already expressed no useful purpose will be served by adopt ing that course. On the true meaning of section 4(3)(i) in the absence of any finding that the Annadan income was derived from property held under a religious or charitable trust, the claim of the assessees for exemption must fail. Their claim to exemption under section 4(3)(ii) must fail because they are not a religious or charitable institution. The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to the costs of these appeals. Appeals dismissed.