1983 PLP 504 (SCMR)

MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, J.‑Through this petition leave is sought to appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court dated 5‑7‑1981 in Civil Revision No. 334 of 1981.

2. On 13‑9‑1963 an Agreement for exploitation of forests of Black Mountains, which at the relevant time; fell within Special area attached to the N: W. F. P. was entered into between the petitioners and the respondents. The Conservator of Forests, Abbottabad terminated the Agreement under clause 25 on the ground that the respondents had committed breach of the Agreement which resulted in a suit, filed by the respondents, in the Court of Civil Judge, Lahore, challenging the rescission of the contract and seeking permanent. injunction to restrain the appellants from interfering with the exploitation of the forests or bringing down the timber from the Black Mountains to the settled area of District Hazara decree was passed by the learned Civil Judge, Lahore on 2‑7‑1919. With regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the Lahore Civil Court an objection was subject‑matter of ‑separate round of litigation, but was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in favour of the respondents.

3. Appellants filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge before the learned Additional District Judge, who, after hearing the parties, passed a consent decree in accordance with a compromise entered into by the parties at an earlier state, vide order dated 8‑3‑1980. The respondents then filed an execution application to which the appellants raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the decree was not executable after the enforcement of Ordinance VII of 1980 and Regulation No. I of 1980 by the N: W. F. P. Government. The Executing Court passed two separate orders, by virtue of one, the objection raised by the appellants was rejected on the ground that the N: W. F. P. legislation did not bind the Punjab Courts nor govern the decrees passed by them; and by means of the second order, the Court held that Since time has not been specified in the decree as required under section 82, C. P. C. it was necessary to adopt the procedure laid down in the aforesaid section, and in this connection a notice was directed to be issued to the N.‑W. F. P. Government through the Punjab Government intimating that 26‑2‑1981 has been fixed as the date by which the decree is to be satisfied.

4. Appellants, aggrieved with these two orders, filed an appeal before the District Judge, Lahore, alongwith an application, for the condonation of delay. On 25‑2‑1981 the Additional District Judge heard the appeal but dismissed the same on the sole ground of limitation, observing "I would first take up limitation point. The impugned order was passed on 16‑I1‑1 980 and appeal has been filed on 12‑1‑1981. The grounds taken up by the appellants for the condonation of delay are that the matter was referred to various officers of the Courts such as Advocate‑General of N.‑W. F. P. for legal opinion, and it was after lot of deliberations that decision was taken to file the appeal. It was referred to 1981 S C M R 37, to contend that the delay could not be condoned" As stated above, revision was filed against the aforesaid order of the learned Additional District Judge which resulted in the impugned judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 5‑7‑1981. Appellants then filed a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court and leave was granted by this Court vide order dated 13‑12‑1981 to consider whether the delay in this case should not have been condoned and the question decided on merits, in order to resolve the important question of law that was raised in this case.

5. Examining the contentions raised by the learned counsel we find that the appeal against the order of the learned Civil Judge was barred by time as the impugned order was passed on 16‑11‑1980 and the appeal had been filed on 12‑1‑1981. The period of limitation being 30 days, no satis factory ground bad been made out to condone the delay. The only explana tion which has been offered by the petitioners is that it was obligatory for the petitioners to consult a number of functionaries of the Provincial Government before filing the appeal, in question; the petitioners were not to blame for being late in submitting the appeal, and, therefore, the delay on their part ought to have been condoned by the learned Courts below. This argument as repelled by the High Court referring to Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (1981 SCMR 37). In this case it was observed: "This Court has repeatedly laid down that so far as the limitation is concerned, the Government cannot claim to be treated in, any manner differently from an ordinary litigant. In fact, the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases, and its resources are much large then those possessed by ordinary litigants. If in spite of these faclities, the Government cannot comply with the requirement of the law of limitation then it is for it to take step to have that law changed. See Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji 1970 S C M R 558 ; The Deputy Director Food, Lahore Region, Lahore etc. v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah 1979 S C M R 45 and Custodian of Enemy Property v. Hoshang M. Dastur and others 1979 SCMR191." . It was further observed by the learned High Court Judge that the condonation of delay in the instant case, was sought on the ground similar to the one pressed in Province of Punjab v. Sh. Zafar Din Ahmad (P L D 1979 Lah. 55) and Pakistan and another v. Rehm Dad and another (1980 C L C 574) but without any success. Next contention of the learned counsel was that the period of limitation would run against the petitioners after compliance with the provisions of section 82, C. P. C. whereunder the Court is bound to send a copy of the judgment to the concerned Government for satisfaction of the decree, founded upon the judgment, and unless the period specified has expired, no execution proceedings could be initiated against the Government judgment‑debtor. Perusal of the provisions under section 82, C. P. C. would show that the decree against the Government or a public officer in respect of any such act as aforesaid, a time shall be specified in the decree within which it shall be satisfied, and if the decree is not satisfied within the time so specified, the Court shall report the case for orders of the Provincial Government; and that execution shall not be issued for. any such decree unless it remains unsatisfied for the period of three months computed from the date of such report. This provision of law would hardly extend the period for filing an appeal against the impugned order passed by the Court of Civil Judge at the initial stage. This would only bar the execution by attachment or issuing other orders permissible under Order XXI, and rules thereunder. Here, in the instant case, the petitioners have admitted that a copy of the impugned order was available but, later on, the petitioners applied for another copy of the same order without showing any reason for doing so. We consider that this appeal is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.