P L D 1964 (W (PLP)

4. I have not been impressed by the reasoning of the learned Appellate Authority. On plain reading of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act it would appear that it only lays down that where special or local law provides for a period different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule, provisions of the Limitation Act will only apply to the extent expressly specified in this section. Undoubtedly in such cases section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply and only sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply in so far and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by special or local law. Thus in order to attract this provision of law two important factors must be kept under consideration. Firstly, whether the special law has prescribed for the appeal a different period of limitation from that prescribed under the First Schedule and, secondly whether under it, the application of sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 has in any way been curtailed for computing limitation. Otherwise these provisions of law shall have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining any period prescribed for any appeal by it. Clearly in such event section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable and shall have to be excluded from consideration.

5. Judging the contention of the appellant from this point of view it is perfectly clear that the period of limitation prescribed under section 15 (1) (b) is not different from the one prescribed under Article 152 of the Limitation Act for filing an appeal from a decree or order to the Court of a District Judge. Section 15(1)(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 provides as under :‑ "(b) Any party aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may within thirty days from the date of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction." Article 152 of the Limitation Act is in the following terms :‑ "Description of appeal Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run.

152. Under the Code Thirty days The date of the of Civil Procedure, decree or order 1908, to the Court appealed from." of a District Judge. Thus both under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and under Article 152 of the Limitation Act, thirty days have been prescribed for filing the appeal and this period is to be reckoned from the date of the order appealed from. It is, therefore, absolutely clear that the period of limita tion prescribed under the above‑mentioned special enactment is not by any means different from the one prescribed for similar appeals by the First Schedule. In view of this section 29 of the Limitation Act has no bearing on the point involved in this case.

6. Mr. Rais Ahmed Hashmi, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred me to a decision of the Calcutta High Court (Indian jurisdiction) in the case of Bijanlata Bassak v. Bhudhar Chandra Das (A I R 1955 Cal. 578). In that case relying on another decision of that Court in Province of Bengal v. Amulya Dhon Addy (A I R 1950 Cal. 356), it was held that the first portion of clause (2) of section 29 deals with only those cases where a period of limita tion is prescribed under the Schedule of the Limitation Act but a different period of limitation has been prescribed in the special law and that the effect of the words "the provisions of section 3 shall apply" was that sections 4 to .25 of the Limitation Act will also apply as section 3 itself provides. It was further held that the second part of clause (2) applied to those cases where no period of limitation was prescribed in the Schedule to the Limita tion Act and to those cases the provisions of section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply to the extent to which they were not expressly excluded by the special law and that the remaining provisions of the Act shall not apply. It was further noticed in that case that subsection (2) of section 29 does not include any provision for cases where the same period is prescribed both in Schedule I, Limitation Act and in the special Law. On this view of the matter K. C. Das Gupta, J. observed as under :‑ In my judgment, it will be absurd to think that the Legislature intended that though where a different period is prescribed in the special law than the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, all the sections 4 to 25 shall apply, these will not apply where the same period is prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act as well as in the special case. It seems reasonable to hold that the reason why nothing was said in section 29(2) as regards cases where the same period is prescribed both in the Schedule to the Limitation Act and in the special law was that no need was felt for any such special provision, it being taken for granted that where the same period is prescribed the provisions of sections 3 to 25, Limita tion Act will apply. With respect I am not inclined to construe the section under consideration in this manner. In my view the whole subsection (2) should be read together, and construed as a whole. It would b e most unjust if this subsection is divided into two portions. In 1912 the whole object of the Legislature in amending this section was that section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 should apply to period of limitation prescribed by special laws unless they are specifically excluded and that the remaining provisions of the Act should not apply. On the plain language of this section too this approach is not permissible. It is not possible by artificial means to demarcate a line of division for putting such a construction.

7. Mr. Ashik Ali Abdullah, the learned counsel for the respondents has also urged before me that section 29 (2) should be divided into two portions. He contended that the first portion of clause (2) deals with cases where different periods are prescribed. According to him, the second portion of the sub section beginning from the words "and" is not applicable to cases where a different period of limitation is prescribed but only to those cases where the period under the special law and the Schedule to the Limitation Act is the same. Thus this contention is in the opposite direction, which has also not impressed me because no such intention can be gathered from the language of the above‑mentioned subsection. In my view the word "and" the above subsection is not used in a disjunctive sense but in conjunctive sense. The subsection is to be read as a whole and is applicable to only those cases where a different period of limitation is prescribed under the special law.

8. I am, however, of the view that section 5 of the Limita tion Act is applicable to the appeals arising under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. This view is based entirely on different grounds. In the first place, it will be noticed that an appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is, of the same type and nature as one contemplated under Article 152 of Schedule I of the Limita tion Act. The said Article of Limitation Act contemplates an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal under section 15 of the said Ordinance is also of the same nature. The explanation to section 15 of the Rent Ordinance leaves no doubt in this respect, which is in the following terms :‑ "An appeal under this subsection shall be heard and deter mined as an appeal from an original decree under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if it is from an order of the Controller and as an appeal from the appellate order under section 100 of the said Code if it is from an order of the Appellate Authority and the provisions of Part VI and of the First Schedule to the said Code relating to appeals shall, with such modifications as the context may require, apply to such proceedings." Under the above‑mentioned explanation an appeal is to be heard and determined in the same manner as those under the Civil Procedure Code. 1, therefore, find not much difference between an appeal filed under the Rent Restriction Ordinance and the one filed under the Code of Civil Procedure. The object of the appeals under both the enactments is identical in all respects.

9. Assuming for the sake of argument that this is not the correct position, even then section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the appeals filed under the above‑men tioned Ordinance. It could at best be argued that it is one of those cases in which no period of limitation is prescribed in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act either directly or by fiction of law with the help of section 29 of the Limitation Act. Then the question will arise whether sections 4 to 25 are independent sections and the words "the period of limitation prescribed" in section 5 of the Limitation Act should be confined to the period of Limitation prescribed under Schedule I to the Limitation Act. The answer to this question depends on the answer of the further question whether section 3 of the Limitation Act governs sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act or not. In my judgment~ section 3 of the Limitation Act stands by itself and sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act are not subject to it and should be independently construed. In Ramdutt Ramkissen Das v. E. D. Sasson & Co. (AIR 1929 PC 103) the Judicial Committee seems to have approached the case before them on that basis In a recent l decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Indian) 290 jurisdiction) Rajjan Lai v. State (A I R 1961 All. 139) also it was held that the words prescribed in section 5 mean prescribed by any law and not by the Limitation Act itself. This view was also taken in Koer Duraj Pal Singh v. Th. Pancham Singh (A I R 1939 All. 403), Amarendra Lal Khan v. Mahindranath Roy (A I R 1955 Cal. 269) and Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty (A I R 1952 Mad. 186). It will be further noticed that section 5 of the Limitation Act is in Part III of the enactment which deals with the computation of period of limitation. Its language is in general terms and there is no limitation or restriction imposed so as to con fine it to the period of limitation prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the language used in sections 4 to 25 is such that it open to interpret them in such a manner that they may be given a general application. It seems to me that if such an interpretation is possible it should not be denied on technical grounds or broad policy of law. In one of the Lahore decisions of this Court in Hakman v. Mst. Satto (P L D 1958 Lah. 936) a Division Bench observed :‑ It is true that provisions of the statutes of limitation must be applied without regard to equitable considerations. Those pro visions are founded on the policy of law which, in the interests of the community as a whole, requires that there should be some point after which old and ancient disputes should not be agitated. The periods of limitation prescribed in pursuance of such a policy must necessarily, at least in some cases, be artificial and arbitrary and must be applied regardless of hardship in individual cases. These considerations, however, cannot apply to a case where a particular provision in a statute of limitation is not clear and definite. In construing such provisions considerations of justice and equity cannot be ignored. This also seems to be the trend of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Tahir Ali v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court (P L D 1963 S C 147). In that case their Lordships construed the word "appeal" occurring in section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, in a broad sense so as to include in it a revision falling under section 15(l), Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953. The learned counsel for the respondents was good enough to bring to my notice a decision of Shabir Ahmad, J., in Muhammad Azeem v. Muhammad Nawaz (P L D 1961 Lah.137). In that case his Lordships held that the mistake committed by the appellant counsel in presenting the appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, beyond time was not so gross, so as to disentitle his clients from getting the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in its presentation. It will thus be noticed that at least in Lahore section 5 of the Limitation Act has been found to be applicable to the appeals arising under Rent Restriction Ordinance.

10. After careful consideration of the question involved in this matter I have come to the conclusion that under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 no period of limitation different from the period prescribed by Schedule I, Limitation Act, is indicated. Therefore, the provi sions of section 29(2) have no application so as to exclude the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, from being applied to appeals under the said special enactment.

11. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and direct the Appellate Authority to dispose of the application filed by the appellant under section 5 of the Limitation Act in the appeals before him in accordance with law.

12. Under the special circumstances of the present case the parties will bear their own costs. K. B. A. Appeal accepted.