P L D 1976 Quetta 53 (PLP)

5. However, I find no merit in both the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

6. Mr. Abdul Rashid Khan who was holding the post of Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 1-4-1965 and 11-4-1965, and who is presently Secretary, Governor's Inspection Team, Baluchistan, has filed a counter affidavit an behalf of respondent No. 2 stating therein that Chaudhry Mohammad Arshad, Advocate who was then appearing before him on behalf of the petitioner did not press before him that the disputed signature of respondent No. 1 on the despatch register should be sent to a handwriting expert for comparison with the admitted signature of respondent No. 1 and that Chaudhry Mohammad Arshad also did not make any request to him to summon the clerk who had made the entry in the despatch register. Not only Mr. Abdul Rashid Khan has denied the allegations made by the petitioner but respondent No. 1 has also denied the same in his counter-affidavit. I may mention here that respondent No. 1 had filed his counter-affidavit and supplied a copy thereof to Mr. Hanafi, as admitted by the latter but the same was not available on the record of the Court. Therefore, I allowed him to place a copy thereof on the record. However, in the absence of any applica tion on the record of the Settlement Department to support that any such request as alleged now, was made before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 1-4-1974 or thereafter, it is not possible to accept the bare statement of the petitioner or his Advocate who was appearing before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, particularly when the same have been controverted by an officer who is no more in the Settlement Department and has had no personal interest in the matter. In any case, if such a request was made and not acceded to by Mr. Abdul Rashid Khan, nothing prevented the petitioner to repeat his request at least after the 11th April 1974 or on the 11th May 1974 when the matter came up before another Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and it is not the case of petitioner that he made any such request before Mr. Faiz Mohammad Khan, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner who passed the impugned order. Therefore, the petitioner's grievance is not legitimate. The comparison of disputed signature of a person with his admitted or proved signature by Court or jury or a competent witness called for the purpose is a lawful mode of proof in view of the provisions of section 73 of the Evidence Act. No doubt, it is unsatisfactory and dangerous to stake a decision in a case where there is a direct conflict of testimony between parties as to general character of a signature, on the correct determination of the signature by mere comparison with the admitted signature, especially without the aid in evidence of microscopic enlargements or any expert advice as held by the Privy Council in Kassarbai v. Jethabhai Jivan (AIR1928PC227) but in the instant case there is no such conflict and in the absence of any positive evidence to the contrary' and in the absence of any effort on the part of petitioner to prove that the disputed signature on the despatch register was of respondent No. 1, the opinion of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on the genuineness of the disputed signature is not only according to law but also no fault can be found with it on the authority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in S. M, Zahir v. Pirzada Fazal Ali Ajmeri (1974 S C M R 490) wherein his Lordship Anwarul Haq, J. observed:- "As to the pronote and the receipt having become disputed documents, it is true that it would have been preferable for the learned trial Judge to examine expert evidence in this behalf, but there is no rule of law that this must be done. in every case." There are several other circumstances, which if taken into consideration, make it unbelievable that respondent No. 1 had received the notice by signing the despatch register. I have examined the despatch register. There are more than three thousand entries therein which show that communications were always made by post. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has been able to point out to me only seven entries in the despatch register out of more than three thousand entries therein where some person or the other appears to have received some letter, copy of the order or leave account etc. by signing the despatch register, and the entry in respect of respondent No. 1 is one of these seven entries. Therefore, it will be seen that in the case of respondent No. 1 an unusual method of service of notice was adopted which a at least throws doubt on the claim of the-petitioner that notice was received by respondent No.

1. The entry in respect of respondent No. 1 is in the green ink and his alleged signature is also in the same ink while it is not so in respect of many of the seven entries. This again creates a sort of doubt as to genuineness of the signature of respondent No.

1. Moreover, I have also compared the disputed signature of respondent No. 1 with his signatures on his applications available on the record of the Settlement Department. I have found marked difference between the disputed signature and the signatures on the applications. The character of several letters of disputed signature is different from his admitted signatures on the record. Further there is one more circumstance which if taken into consideration, makes it quite doubtful whether respondent No. 1 had at all received the notice as alleged and it is this that the order determining the price was passed on the 18th of March 1965 and it is alleged to have been received by him on the 20th March 1965 by signing the despatch register. It is not shown when and how he came to know of the order or the notice. The despatch register could not have been taken to him for obtaining his signature thereon. It means that respondent No. 1 must have visited the office of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to obtain the alleged notice. All this would show keenness on his part and if he was so keen, he would have naturally paid the price as promptly as he did after the passing of the order impugned in the petition. I am therefore, unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that he was not given due hearing and as such or otherwise, the principles of Natural Justice have been violated. This brings me to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner failed to carry out the direction of his Lordship Dorab Patel, J. as he only compared the signatures which does not satisfy the requirements of `enquiry' as directed by his Lordship. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the order passed by Ghulam Rasool, J. on the 29th July 1971 in the first petition which gave direction to `determine' whether the notice was served on respondent No. 1 or not, was modified by the order of his Lordship Dorab Patel, J. who had directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to hold an 'enquiry' on the question whether the petitioner had received the statutory notice for payment of the transfer price of the property. It is, however, agreed by Mr. Hanafi, that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, in the absence of any direct evidence could 'determine' the question of service of the notice on respondent No. 1 by comparing his disputed signature on the despatch register with the admitted signatures. Further, it appears to me that his Lordship Dorab Patel, J. did not intend to modify the order of Ghulam Rasool, J. by the use of a different word and the nature of direction with regard to the question of service of the notice on respondent No. 1 under both the orders remained the same, and I am not inclined to make any such distinction in the two orders as convassed before me by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. However, the direction of his Lordship Dorab Patel, J. was to hold enquiry on the question whether the petitioner bad received the 'statutory' notice for the transfer price of the property in dispute. Therefore, the question is whether the alleged notice dated the 20th March 1965 could be said to be the statutory notice. It is therefore, necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Settle ment Scheme No. VI and the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabili tation Act, 1958). Under paragraph 5 of the Settlement Scheme VI, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was required after he was satisfied that the applicant bad raised permanent construction on the building site to com municate his order to him in form as in Appendix IX (meant for locals) of the Settlement Scheme No. I, which provides payment of the property, transferred to locals by monthly instalments. It is the case of respondent No. 1 as well as the finding of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that no such appendix was issued to respondent No.

1. Moreover, under paragraph 22 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958 respondent No. t was entitled to pay the price within one year in 12 equal monthly instalments, and under paragraph 24 of the Schedule as substituted by Displaced Persons C Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1964 (Ordinance XIII of 1964), if respondent No. I had failed to pay two consecutive instalments then the Deputy Settlement Commissioner could call upon him to pay up the arrears within thirty days together with such interest as might be determined by him and it was only after he had failed to comply with such a notice that the transfer of the property to him was liable to cancellation. But, in the present case, the alleged notice, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, was served on respondent No. I was in utter disregard of the provisions of paragraphs 22 and 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita tion) Act, 1958. It will be useful to reproduce the material parts of the provisions in paragraphs 22 and 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, herein below:- "(22) any amount payable by a non-claimant displaced person or a local in respect of any property transferred to him shall be paid by him with in one year in 12 equal monthly instalments. (24) If any person to whom the benefit of payment by instal ments has been granted under this Schedule fails to pay two consecutive instalments or does not pay the amount due from him in accordance with the terms and conditions on which any property has been transferred to him, the Chief Settlement Commissioner or an officer authorised by him in this behalf may give such a person a notice to pay up the arrears within 30 days together with such penal interest as may be determined by the Chief Settlement Commissioner or such officer, failing which the transfer of the property to such person shall be liable to cancellation and he shall be liable to ejectment." It will also be of advantage if the contents of impugned notice are repro duced in extenso herein below: To Mumtaz Ali House No. 9-13/96 Quary Road Quetta Memo. No.

548. Dated Quetta the 20th March 1965. Subject: Payment of transfer price of Plot No. 7496. Reference your application dated 12-12-1960 requesting for transfer of above-mentioned plot. You are hereby directed to arrange for payment of transfer price i.e. Rs. 8,250 in respect of the plot in question within fortnight failing which the said plot will be put in forthcoming auction. (Sd.) 18-3-1965 Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Quetta/Kalat Region, Quetta." It would be seen that the notice neither required the payment of any Instalment' if the same were in arrears nor did it give the statutory time of 30 days. It only directed the payment in lump sum and within a fortnight. Thus the alleged notice for cancellation of transfer was in complete disregard of the provisions of paragraphs 22 and 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced D Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and therefore illegal, and as such, no statutory notice could be said to have been served on respondent No. 1 even if for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the notice dated the 30th March 1965 was served on him. It is also the finding of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that not only that alleged notice was not served on respondent No. 1 but the same was also not a statutory notice. I am, therefore, satisfied that directions of the Court dated the 27th July 1971 and the 28th September 1973 have been complied with in letter and spirit and the order impugned in this petition besides being lawful, is just and proper. I, therefore, dismiss this petition with costs. S. A. H. Petition dismissed.