P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑This order will dispose of two Writ Petitions Nos. 6 and 7 of 1957, the facts in which are simple and in which identical questions of law arise. The relevant facts of the first petition No. 6, are that Taj Muhammad the deceased, brother of the petitioner, sold certain lands and water rights to. Mirza Khan, respondent No. 1, by cleans of a mutation in consideration of Rs. 6,000 in 1945. The petitioner was a minor at the time and his one‑fifth share in the property was also sold by Taj Muhammad. He attained majority on the 31st December 1946 or on 1‑1‑1947. On the 26th June 1950, he brought a suit for possession of his one‑fifth share and the cancellation of the sale made by Taj Muhammad to that extent. By order of the Deputy Commissioner the dispute was referred to a Jirga of six persons who gave their award on the 23rd October 1954, in favour of the respondent. A finding was recorded that the petitioner was major at the time of the impugned sales and had duly authorised Taj Muhammad by a power of attorney to effect the alienation and consequently the Jirga recommended dismissal of his suit. The Deputy Commissioner did not agree with this finding and referred the matter in dispute to another Jirga. The second Jirga after con sidering evidence already recorded gave its award on the 28th September 1955, which was against the petitioner. This time the Deputy Commissioner accepted the award so that the petitioner's suit stood dismissed. The petitioner went up in revision to the Commissioner who found that the petitioner was a minor at the relevant time but dismissed the revision petition on the ground that the suit had been brought beyond limitation. In the second petition No. 7, Pir Muhammad and Ghulam Muhammad are both petitioners. They had brought a suit under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, against Shah Nawaz and Abdullah Khan, respondents for cancellation of a sale of land and water rights by means of certain mutations effected by Taj Muhammad and Agha Muhammad, the deceased brothers of the petitioners, in favour of Haji Khan Tama Khan, the deceased father of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in the years 1937, 1938 and 1939. The petitioners were at the time minors and their shares in the property were also sold by their deceased brothers. The peti tioners sued for cancellation of that sale to the extent of their own shares (one‑fifth each), and for pre‑emption of two‑fifths share of the two deceased brothers in the alienated property. Their fifth brother, Shah Muhammad, had also joined them as a plaintiff in the suit which was referred to a Council‑of‑Elders by the Deputy Commissioner, Quetta‑Pishin. The award of the majority of the Jirga was in favour of the petitioners and it was accepted by the Deputy Commissioner and their claim dec reed. A revision petition was filed by respondents 1 and 2 to the Commissioner, Quetta Division, who reversed the decision, holding that the petitioner's suit was time‑barred and that the sales of the land and water rights in respect of the petitioner's shares were effected by their deceased brothers as their guardians. In each petition the contention is raised that the order of the Commissioner was wrong on merits as well as without jurisdiction in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Khan Abdul Akbar Khan v. The Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar (P L D 1957 Pesh. 100). The Full Bench decision of this Court referred to above undoubtedly supports the contention of the petitioners that after the enforcement of the new Constitution the Commissioner had lost jurisdiction in the case. Mr. M. Anwar who appeared on behalf of the Commissioner, attempted to argue that as the revision petitions had been filed before the Constitution came into force, the Commissioner's jurisdiction was not lost. Vested rights, whether of revision or appeal, according to the learned counsel, could not be taken away by a change in the law. The principle thus propounded would, however, be applicable to cases of repeals of statutes but would not be available in the circum stances of the present cases. The new Constitution for the first time, has conferred fundamental rights on the citizens of Pakistan and Article 4 of the Constitution declares that any existing law, which is repugnant to those fundamental rights, will be void to the extent of the repugnancy. In the Full Bench decision it has been laid down that all provisions of the Frontier Crimes Regula tion, which vested rights in the relevant authorities to refer civil disputes to a Council‑of‑Elders, were ultra vires the Constitution and the result is that those provisions must be deemed to have become void from the date of the enforcement of the new Con stitution. No question of repeal arises and the principle sought to be pressed into service by Mr. Anwar would not save the jurisdiction of the relevant authorities even in respect of pending actions. It follows that the proceedings, which had undoubtedly started under the Frontier Crimes Regulation cannot be finalised under the scheme envisaged therein, because, before the matter could be dealt with in revision by the Commissioner his jurisdiction had vanished. The Deputy Commissioner's order therefore, also cannot be allowed to stand because it was not the final order, a revision having already been filed against it. The dispute consequently remains in an inchoate state and since the Council‑of‑Elders of the authorities named in the Frontier Crimes Regulation are no longer capable of dealing with it, the parties must be relegated to the ordinary remedy in the civil Court. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to say whether the decision of the Deputy Commissioner on the merits was correct or not. We direct that as there has been no final decision of the dispute under the Frontier Crimes Regulation and no final decision can now be given under that enactment, the plaint be returned to Ghulam Muhammad petitioner in Petition No. 6 and to Ghulam Muhammad and Pir Muhammad petitioners in Petition No. 7 for presentation to the competent civil Court. The costs will be borne by the parties in both petitions in this Court. S. A. H./S. Q. Order accordingly.