P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

"Sh. Muhammad Shafi contends that Mr. Muhammad Rafiq was a Settlement Commissioner and he could not hear a revision against the order of another Settlement Commissioner although he had been delegated powers of Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. It is also argued that he could not hear the revision as the record had not been called before the relevant date, and that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had not given the petitioner notice or held an inquiry, as required by paragraph 10 of Settlement Scheme No: I. It is argued that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on remand having held in exercise of delegated powers of Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner that the house was divisible, Mr. Muhammad Rafiq could not hold otherwise. Notice."

3. Sh. Muhammad Shafi argued the case before me and challenged the order on two grounds, namely:‑ (a) That the Deputy Settlement Commissioner divided the premises by his order dated the 14th of January 1960 as the delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and no appeal or revision was competent against that order and for that reason subsequent orders passed in the case were without lawful authority; and. (b) That No. 8‑Panjmahal Road, Lahore, consisted in fact of two buildings absolutely independent of each other and the Chief Settlement Commissioner by his impugned order had declared these two buildings which under 1 aw were two houses into one house and this he was not competent to do under any provision of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The learned counsel did not address any argument on any other points which were noted by S. A. Mahmood, J., while admit ting the writ petition.

4. As far as the first contention is concerned, it has become wholly irrelevant after the amendment of the law by the Displaced Persons Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1965 (Ordinance XVIII of 1965) which came into force on the 2nd of June 1965) Subsection (3) was added to section 31, which reads as:‑ "(3) Any order passed by a Settlement Commissioner or an Additional, Deputy or Assistant Settlement Commissioner in exercise of any power delegated to him under subsection (2) shall be, and be deemed always to have been, subject to the provisions of Chapter VI in the same manner and to the same extent as any other order passed by a Settlement Commissioner, Additional, Deputy or Assistant Settlement Commissioner, as the case may be, is so subject." By the provision so added if any of the delegates of the Chiefi Settlement Commissioner passed any order the same was subject to the provisions of appeal and revision. The amendment was added with a retrospective effect. By this change in law at the time of hearing of the case it is clear that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dividing the property was appeal-able and a further revision was competent. The order passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner in appeal and other orders passed in revision are, therefore, within the competence of the Settlement Authorities. Sh. ‑Muhammad Shafi, learned counsel for the petitioner, conceded that in view of the amend ment of section 31, the objection taken by him, that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was no appeal-able or revisable, was no longer available to him.

5. As to the other contention that 8‑Panjmahal Road, Lahore, consisted of two buildings all that he stated was that it was constructed by Sardar Mehr Singh for his two daughters and that it made provision for two independent houses. He stated that there were two drawing‑rooms, two dining rooms and separate bathrooms. He also stated that there was a partition wall in the compound and a partition wall at the back of the premises. These facts by themselves do not in any way show that there were two buildings. It is admitted by him that the entire con struction was raised by one owner, Sardar Mehr Singh. The site plan (Annexure `R/1') submitted by him to the Municipal Committee, ‑Lahore, on the 17th of November 1930 shows that it was for one bungalow. The plan of the bungalow (Annexure `R/2') submitted on the same day by Sardar Mehr Singh also shows that it was one building in which there were two drawingrooms but there was only one dining‑room. The two drawing rooms are also on the same side which according to the present position are in possession of only one party. There is only one corridor. The resolution of the Municipal Committee, Lahore dated the 5th of December 1930 (Annexure `R/3'), also shows that this was one building. From the facts on the record and the actual position it is evident that 8‑Panjmahal Road, Lahore, consists of only one building and not two‑ as is contended. In case it had been proved that there were two buildings and not one then by the definition of the word "house" there would have been two houses. If there are two separate premises, however small or contiguous they may be, they will be two houses. On the contrary, if a building or premises consists of more than one residential unit and they are in possession of several persons, the building, howsoever big, it shall, by virtue of the definition contained in clause (4) of section 2, be only one house unless ordered otherwise by the ‑Chief Settlement Commissioner or his delegate. Doubtless, the material on the record shows that there are two residential units in the building in dispute. They have also been used by the parties separately for the last many years. These facts, however, do not warrant that these two residential units must necessarily be declared to be two houses. If the Legislature had so intended, it would have provided for the same in unmistakable terms. In fact this is what the Legislature intended when the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act came on the statute book in 1958. The house was defined in clause (4) of section 2 as:‑ "(4) house means evacuee residential premises of any value in an urban area, or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises, notwithstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or outhouse is in the possession of a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential premises, but does not include any residential building situated within the premises of an industrial concern, or a building or premises declared under paragraph 15 of the First Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel: Provided that where a building not so declared consists of more than one residential. premises, and such premises are in the possession of several persons; the premises in the possession of any one of such persons shall be deemed to be a house." The position of law as originally enacted, therefore, was that if the house consisted of more than one residential units and they were in possession of more than one person, then each portion in such possession was to be a house. Under the said definition the portion in possession of the petitioner was deemed to be a house. The law was, however, amended by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance LIII of 1959) and the proviso was substituted as:‑ "Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consist of more than one residential unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then, unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a house." By this amendment the whole position materially changed. Whereas earlier each unit was to be a separate house now even if there were hundreds of residential units in one building they could not be deemed to be separate houses and the entire building by the operation of law was one unless ordered otherwise by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In Fateh Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh (PLD 1963 S C 311) it was held: "(1) the delegate's power was only to declare whether the house should be regarded as consisting of more than one unit. If it was treated merely as one building the order was really passed under the normal powers of the officer exercisable under the Act and was not relatable to his powers as a delegate." What their Lordships held was that the building consisting of more than one units was normally to be treated as one house unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner or the delegate declares otherwise. The same view was re‑armed in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Altaf Hussain v. Chief Settlement Com missioner (PLD 1965 S C 68) and it was observed:‑ "We may add however that the view taken by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court that a building will be treated as one house oven though occupied by more than one person, unless the Settlement Authorities, in their discretion, order it to be divided, is in accord with the language of the first proviso to the definition of `house' in section 2 (4) of the Act." In this view of the matter the premises, 8‑Panjmahal Road, Lahore, consisting of two independent residential units will be one house unless declared otherwise.

6. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Settlement Commissioner after spot inspection had, by his order dated the 11th of August 1960, held the house to be divisible and the Chief Settlement Commissioner was in error to set aside that order. It is not denied that the Chief Settlement Commissioner also inspected the spot and after spot inspection he came to the conclusion that the premises was not divisible. It is also not disputed that by virtue of section 31, subsection (3), as was added by the Amending Ordinance No. XVIII of 1965, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was competent to entertain a revision petition against the order of the Settlement Commissioner under clause (2) of section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Act (XXVIII of 1958). At the time when the revision petition was disposed of on the 7th of June 1962 the Chief Settlement Commissioner could take action if the record of the case had been called for before the 13th of January 1962. The petitioner had at the time of admission of the petition taken the plea that the records had not been called for when the second revision petition was decided by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, but learned counsel for the petitioner gave up this plea at the time of hearing. The Chief Settlement Commissioner was, therefore, competent to pass such order in re lation to the revision entertained by him as he thought fit. It was, therefore, within the lawful authority of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to set aside the order of the Settlement Commis sioner. The only objection taken to the impugned order was that the Chief Settlement Commissioner did not appreciate the facts properly in setting aside the order of the Settlement. Com missioner. ~ I do not agree with this contention. The order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the relevant portion of which has already been reproduced above, shows that he had taken into consideration all the material facts of the case before coming to the final conclusion. I may, however, add that a fallacious method of appreciating the findings unless it amounts to a material mistake in assumption is merely an error in recording a finding as to the fact and such an error has never n been held to be an error of law justifying interference even under section 100 of the Code of Civil ‑Procedure. It can hardly be considered to be valid ground to say that the authority in not properly appreciating the evidence and the material has acted without lawful authority. It was next contended that the Chief Settlement Commis sioner omitted to mention certain facts which were taken into consideration by the Settlement Commissioner in dividing the property. Particular reference was made to the observation of the Settlement Commissioner that the portion in possession of each party had a separate lawn which had been divided by a hedge and that the Zana compound of each side of the bungalow was in possession of each party exclusively and that there were separate stair‑cases leading to the first‑floor. The mere fact that the Chief Settlement Commissioner omitted to mention certain facts which were taken notice of by the Settlement Commissioner does not go to show that he did not consider them. In fact he inspected the spot and the interested parties must have drawn his attention to everything which in their opinion was to help them in this case. In any case the finding of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is based on sufficient material to which he has referred in his order and it cannot be said that in omitting to make a particular reference to some of the facts noted by the Settlement Commissioner, he has in any way acted without lawful authority. The impugned order of the Chief Settlement Com missioner is unexceptionable. The writ petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. There‑ shall be no order as to costs. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.