1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).‑Mrs. Naheed Anjum Sheikh has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, in which she has impleaded the Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education and the Director Public Instructions, Punjab, Lahore as respondents. 2. By virtue of this appeal she has prayed that the notification, dated 3rd September, 1977 passed by the Governor of the Punjab, be set aside as being illegal and her earlier promotion be maintained. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was inducted into service as Senior English Teacher in 1967. She continued working as such uptil 1977, when by the order of the Governor of the Punjab, dated 30th May, 1977 she was inducted in N.P.S.‑17. She took over charge as a Headmistress of the Government Bashir Memorial High School w.e.f. 31st May, 1977 under the orders of the Director, Public Instructions Punjab, Lahore, dated 31st May, 1977. However, after a lapse of 4/5 months of her such induction into N.P.S. 17, while holding the charge of Headmistress, Martial Law Instruction No. 21 was promulgated on 8th August, 1977 by the Martial Law Administrator, Zone A, Lahore and in consequence, thereof, the case of the appellant was scrutinized by the Department Promotion Committee of the Education Department on 30th August, 1977 and it was found by the said Committee that the appellant bad superseded 240'seniors in the Department, thus her case came within the purview of para. 2(c) read with para. 3 of the M.L.I. 21 dated 8th August, 1977 and would deem to be ad hoe appointee whose reversion to her original grade was justified. By reaching to this conclusion, the Committee recommended her reversion to the Governor of Punjab, who was pleased to issue notification, dated 3rd September, 1977, by which the appellant was reverted to N.P.S. 14 as S.S.T. which was her original appointment. The appellant dissatisfied with the reversion made a re presentation to the Governor on 17th November, 1977; 15th January, 1979; 1st March; 1980 and 12th April, 1982. As she did not get any reply to the same, she made another attempt by filing another representation on 26th January, 1983, which was replied on 10th April, 1983 that her repre sentation was considered and rejected. Aggrieved against the final reply, she took her grievance before the Lahore High Court vide Writ Petition No. 2165 of 1983, which was ultimately disposed o8 by Justice Gul Muhammad Khan, as incompetent on the ground that the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore. Hence this appeal. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney assisted by the representative of the Depart ment and have perused the entire record of this case carefully with their assistance. 5. At the very outset the learned District Attorney has come out with a preliminary objection that the appeal is hopelessly time‑barred as it relates to an order which pertains to the year 1977, and is liable to be dismissed on this score alone and secondly the order being an order passed under M.L.I 21, would be an order passed by Martial Law Instructions which has got complete protection under the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981, and thus appeal would be incompetent in that manner also. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that point of limitation would not arise as the order passed was void ab initio against which no limitation can run. It was further submitted that the appeal was absolutely maintainable as M.L.I. 21 was not attracted to the case of the appellant as her appointment was made in the prescribed manner and was a regular one. For this purpose, he has relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in case of Safdar Hussain v. Government of the Punjab, Excise and Taxation Department (1984 P L C 271) decided on 29th June, 1983. Learned counsel for the appellant has laid lot of stress on rule 6 of the West Pakistan Education Service Class II (Administration Branch) (Women Section) Rules, 1963, which according to him, lays down that promotion from Grade‑14 to Grade‑17, would be only by selection and responsible to hold the post of higher responsibilities. It has been further submitted that the only deviation in this case would be that the case was not referred to the Departmental Promotion Committee and was independently taken by the Education Minister on behalf of the Chief Minster. It was further argued that infact, what the Governor has done in this case, is that he himself exercised the powers which he had already delegated to the Departmental Promotion /Selection Committee and in this manner, no illegality had been committed and the authority which delegates himself can assume the same power and there was relaxation of Rules of such cases. In this manner it has been concluded vie‑a‑vie the point of relaxation of rules, that no relaxation of rules would be made in this case and thus the case would not fall within the ambit of M.L.I. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued in the alter native that while the committee met for determination of this issue visa‑vie the case of the appellant, the appellant was provided no chance to appear, before the said Committee and thus this would be a case, hit by fundamental principle of natural justice and would be liable to be set aside on this score alone. Reliance has been placed on 1980 P L C 32. Further reliance has been placed on P L D 1978 Lah. 1355. It was further urged that the Committee exceeded its jurisdiction as .it could only de termine the suitability and eligibility of the appellant and could not take the seniority‑cum‑fitness into consideration, as the same was not permit ted by the Rules of the service already quoted above. 7. With regard to the point of limitation it has been submitted that the appellant kept her grievance alive although not before the proper forum as she was not fully conversant to the law of the land and thus the delay so caused may be condoned and for this purpose an application for condonation of delay has been filed. 8. On the other hand learned District Attorney has submitted that he would rely on section 8 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 wherein it has been laid down that in the matter of selection posts, merit would always be considered as one of the criteria and in the matter of non selection posts, seniority‑cum‑fitness would be yardstick for promotion of a civil servant. With regard to the point that the appellant was not heard at the time, her reversion was recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee. Learned District Attorney has submitted that it did occur so but at the same time submitted that she was ultimately heard by the Sub‑Committee constituted by the Appellate Authority, thus the defect if there was any, was cured by giving her opportunity of personal hearing. However, he has vehemently argued that the appellant had no business to wait for six long years to keep this matter before a forum not competent for the purpose, and has come before this Tribunal when her grievance started from the date she was reverted i.e. 3rd September, 1977 and then went to the Lahore High Court which was not a right forum even at this late stage. He has further urged that ignorance of law is no excuse and the appellant being an educated woman, should have been fully conversant with the law of the land and thus her application for condonation of delay be rejected. 9. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments advanced by the parties and find lot of force in the stand taken by the learned District Attorney on the point of limitation particularly when we find from the record that her reversion from Grade‑17 to Grade‑14 was made by the Governor of the Punjab on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee in the year 1977. We are of the considered opinion that it was incumbent upon the appellant to file an appeal against the said order of the Governor before this Tribunal as according to the Rules she was not permitted to make repeated representations to the Governor and keep the limitation alive. When ultimately she received a reply on 10th April, 1983, she again failed to come before this Tribunal and instead, filed a Writ Petition No. 2165/83 before the High Court. In these circumstances, the appeal before us would be hopelessly time- barred. We have also taken into consideration the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that as the order was void ab initio, therefore, the law of limitation will not come into display against the appellant. We hardly find any force in this argument as the record o this case reveals that the order of reversion from N.P.S. 17 to N.P.S. 14 was made by an authority, which was competent to do so and that too o the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee of the Education Department, when it was found that the appellant had superseded 240 seniors in the Department, without any rhyme and reason. The appellant has wasted six long years by making uncalled for represen tations, when she fully knew that the order, which was being assailed by her, was an order of the Governor against which no representation was available to her under section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. Furthermore, she being an educated lady, should have known that the remedy, if any for her grievance, was only available to her before the Punjab Service Tribunal, which was the only forum to redress grievance of the civil servants. 10. In view of the detailed history of the case so given above, we, sustain the preliminary objection so raised by the learned District Attorney and proceed to dismiss the appeal as being time‑barred. There will be no order as to costs. A. E. Appeal dismissed.