P L D 1954 Lahore 175 (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This is a habeas corpus petition by one Muhammad Ali Jullundhri who has been detained under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act. The petitioner was arrested on the 28th of February 1953 by an order of the District Magistrate, Multan, of the same date passed under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act. By virtue, of that section, the District Magistrate could have ordered his detention for a period not exceeding 15 days. On the 11th of March 1953, the Punjab Government passed an order under the above‑mentioned section extending the date of his detention to the 12th of June 1953. On the 13th of June 1953 another order was passed by the Punjab Government extending the period of detention to the 11th of December 1953. The last order was made on the 10th of December 1953 and the period was further extended to the 12th of June 1954. The detention order of the 13th of June 1953 is impeached on the ground that it was passed when the previous order of deten tion had already expired and, there being no subsisting detention, the question of its extension did not arise. The two contentions are put forward as the basis of this argument. The first is that by the order of the 11th of March 1953, the petitioner was to be detained until the 12th of June 1953, which should mean that he was to be detained only till the expiry of the 11th of June 1953, and could not have been detained at all for any part of the 12th of June 1953. The second contention put forward is that even if the order of the 11th of March 1953 be interpreted as including the whole of the 12th of June 1953, still, as the order of the 13th of June 1953 must have been passed at some time during office hours and, in any case, after midnight of the 12th of June 1953, the order was passed at a time when the previous order was not in force. I may clear the ground by saying that if the order of the 11th of March was in fact not in force at the time when the order of extension was passed, it cannot now be questioned, in view of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Federal Court in Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan and another v. The Crown (P L D 1954 F C 1.), that the subsequent order would be illegal. The order of extension cannot be regarded as an original order of detention. This, in fact, is not contested by the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the Crown. After a careful consideration of the matter, I am not inclined to give effect to the first contention put forward. The words used in the order of the 11th of March 1953 are:‑ "The Governor of the Punjab is pleased to extend the period of detention of the aforesaid Maulvi Muhammad Ali Jullandhri until the 12th of June 1953." Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the words "until the 12th of January 1953" should be deemed to be exclusive of the 12th of June. He refers to Webster's New International Dictionary, page 2794, where the meaning of the word 'until' is thus stated;‑ During the whole time before; up to the time of, implying cessation or reversal at that time; as to remain until evening or the end of the month. In ordinary use, as well as in contracts and other legal documents, the question as to whether until is inclusive or ex clusive of the date mentioned generally depends upon the con nection or circumstances in which the word is used. The weight of judicial decisions is that until is Crime facie exclusive. Up to the time that or when, till such time as; The above quotation would show that the interpretation of `until' really depends upon the particular circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down, but that prima facie the word is to be interpreted in a sense exclusive of the point of time mentioned. On reference to Halsbury's Volume 32, page 138, paragraph 200, 1 find that the rule is stated a little differently. The para graph runs :‑ "

200. When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by lave or fixed by contract, and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first‑mentioned or of the last‑mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purpose for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as from such a day or `until such a day' are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day." This would show that the word `until' is presumed to be used in a sense including the day which is mentioned. On a perusal oft decided cases. I find that they are entirely against the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Issac v. Royal Insur ance Co. ((1870) L R 5 Exch.296 (3000)) a policy of fire insurance was to be in force from the 14th of February 1868 until the 14th of August 1868. A fire took place on the 14th of August 1868 and the question arose whether it was covered by the policy. It was held by Kelly C. B. that the words used would include the 14th of August. The learned judge inferred to Bellhouse v. Mellor where a similar expression had been used. In that case the words used were 'until the 29th of July' and it was held that the 29th of July was included. Even without the help of authority, I would not be inclined to accept this contention. If a period of time be mentioned after the word 'until'. I am quite clear that the whole of that period cannot be deemed to be excluded If, for instance, it was said that a person remained in Lahore until the 12th of June 1953, it would be difficult to argue that the use of this phrase be justified if he left before the 12th of June 1953 started. It may be that if he was present on the 12th and left in the middle of the day, it could be said that he was in Lahore until the 12th of June, but the expression must include some part of the day mentioned. In the present case, it cannot be contended that there was an intention to include a part of the 12th of June, and obviously the intention was to include the whole of that day. The second point urged by learned counsel has, however, force. We can presume that the order was made on the 13th of June some time during office hours. In any case, we can safely say that it was passed after the midnight of the 12th of June 1953. There was, therefore, at the time when this order was passed no previous order of detention in existence and any order of extension would be wholly inoperative. Learned counsel who appears for the Crown argues that an order which is passed on a particular day should be deemed to nave effect from the beginning of that day so that the order, even if it is passed during office hours, would relate back to the midnight of the 12th of June. Learned counsel relies for this on section 5 of the General Clauses Act under which section an Act of the Legislature comes into force immediately on the expiry of the day preceding its commencement. There is no doubt that so far as enactments are concerned, there is a special provision that when an enactment takes effect from a particular day it com mences from the beginning of that day. If the Governor‑General, for instance, gives his assent to an Act on the 12th of June 1953, and the Act is, under the law, to come into operation from the assent, its operation will be from the very begin ning of the 12th of June 1953 and not from the time at which the assent was given. The section, however, applies only to enactments. Learned counsel argues that I should apply it by analogy to executive orders. I cannot see my way to do that. If it were the intention of the Legislature that the same principle should apply to executive orders, the Legislature could have very well made a provision similar to that in section

5. The fact that such a provision exists only with respect to enactments would show that executive orders were not intended to be covered. Indeed strange results would follow if we were to apply this principle to executive orders police officer illegally confines a person on a particular day and after keeping him in confinement for a period of 12 hours records an order for his arrest which he is legally authorised to pass. If I have to accept the contention of learned counsel for the Crown, the confinement before the order passed would not remain illegal and the person concerned would have no right of taking any proceeding, civil or criminal. To take a different kind of example, a person is found in possession of an arm without a licence. He secures a licence for that arm after the recovery but on the same day. He would not, according to the argument put forward, be guilty of an offence under the Arms Act for be had a licence from the beginning of the date on which the arm was recovered from him. Learned counsel for the Crown has also drawn my attention to section 36 of the English Interpretation Act 1889, but that section too makes a provision similar to that contained in section 5 of the General Clauses Act and makes no reference to executive orders. While dealing with the argument, that we should apply the principle of section 5 to executive orders, I may point out that in England before the Acts of Parliament (Commencement) Act, 1793, (Goe. 3, Chapter 13), Acts of Parliament used to com mence from the beginning of the Session in which they were passed. We are not concerned with the technicalities of English law. With respect to judicial acts there is a rule in England that they are regarded to be in force from the commencement of the day on which they take place. This rule has, however, been criticised in England and its universal application has not been accepted. In Clarke v. Bradlaugh ((1881) 8 Q B D 63.) Lord Coleridge, C. J., said that the rule was not of universal applications. Baggallay, L. J., expressed a similar opinion and Lord Eshar (then Brett L. J.) said that he did not know of any principle on which this rule could be founded. These observations were approved in re F. B. Warren (1938 1 Ch. D 725.) As regards executive orders it has never been held that they operate from the beginning of the day on which they are passed. An argument based on the analogy of enactments was put forward in Johnson v Sargant ((1918) 1 K B 101.) but was rejected I therefore held that the order passed on the 13th of June 1953 was invalid and could not extend the period of the petitioner's detention. I order that the petitioner be released. A. H. Petitioner released.