2002 PLP 1980 (CLC)

(2) Any person considering himself aggrieved by an order passed by a Commissioner, Collector or an Assistant Collector, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the order passed against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Commissioner, Collector or Assistant Collector, as the case may be, and such officer, may modify, reverse or confirm any order passed by himself or by any of his predecessors‑in‑office. Provided that

(a) an order passed by his predecessor‑in‑office shall not be reviewed under subsection (1) or subsection (2) by the:‑‑‑ (i) Commissioner, without first obtaining the sanction of the Board of Revenue. (ii) Collector, without first obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner, and no order shall be reviewed by any other Revenue Officer, without first obtaining the sanction of the Revenue Officer to whose control he is immediately subject. (b) An application for review of an order shall not be entertained unless it is made within ninety days from the passing of the order or unless the applicant satisfies the Revenue Officer that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within that period. (c) An order shall not be modified or reversed unless reasonable notice has been given to the parties affected thereby to appear and be heard in support of the order. (d) An order against which an appeal has been preferred shall not be reviewed. (3) For the purposes of this section, the Collector shall be deemed to be successor‑in‑office of any Revenue Officer of a. lower class who has left the district or has ceased to exercise powers as a Revenue Officer, and to whom there is no successor‑in‑office. (4) An appeal shall not lie from an order refusing to review or confirming on review a previous order."

7. The above‑quoted section provides two planks for invoking review proceedings. First, it is the Revenue Officer who may invoke it on his own motion and secondly a person who is aggrieved by such order who may invoke this power. I will discuss the latter case first. Only 90 days have been provided to an aggrieved person to invoke this remedy. This has palpably been done to put the proceedings to rest at certain point in time and to give adequate time and afford an opportunity to a person aggrieved by an order who even after due diligence could not ascertain some material fact impinging on his right/claim. On the other hand, the Collector has been provided far greater space in this regard. He can invoke review proceedings "at any time". There is no limitation on this score. This has been laid in the scheme ostensibly for the reason that Collector is mandated to ensure that the Revenue Record is correctly maintained. Any aberration is to be addressed forthwith and remedial measures are to be put in place.

8. According to para. 7.54 of the Land Records Manual, record of rights are prepared' under section 40 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, during the Settlement Operation or, any other time in pursuance of the orders of the Board of Revenue. Under section 41 of the Land Revenue Act, whereas preparation of periodical record (Misal‑e‑Miadi) on quadrennial basis is done. Record of rights of owners, tenants and mortgagees is updated through the procedure of mutations. Four years period provides adequate time to scrutinize the record which is in the process of preparation. After four years, Misal‑e‑Miadi is confirmed. This document attracts presumption of truth. As held by the superior Courts, once this Misal‑e‑Haqiat is prepared, the job of the Revenue Officer is over and it is for the Civil Court, a Court of competent jurisdiction to sift chaff from the wheat. Every fact adduced to is scrutinized on the basis of detailed enquiry, evidence and cross- examination. Presumption of truth attached to fact henceforth can only be repelled through a detailed enquiry. The suo motu power to review at any time thus is not unbridgeable. It has to be seen, in the light of scheme of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. There has to be very strong reasons to interfere with an entry on this count after a lapse of four years or with the confirmation of Jamabandi (Misle‑e‑Miadi). A patent fact may not be as patent after a lapse of time. It can more often invite intricacies and many over layers with the passage of time. It is settled law that no disputed entry in the Jamabandi should be altered either on the ground of mistake or fraud except on the basis of obvious clerical error or patent fact. A patent fact is the one which is visibly registered at first glance. Any matter requiring an enquiry or detailed evidence cannot be approximated with a patent fact.

9. In the present case, the impugned mutations were attested in 1950s and had subsisted in the Revenue Record for 50 years meaning thereby that these were carried through at least 12 quadrennial Jamabandis. This had given the impugned mutations a character of longstanding entry. These were based on a transaction which took place in 1924: The main argument to set aside this longstanding entry was that there was no record with regard to the reported sale proceeds and the District Board was not competent to make such a transaction, moreso when the land in question at certain point of time was a road track. The question arises whether there was any transaction between the parties, and, if so, whether the District Board was competent to enter into this transaction. These were 'the facts which required a detailed enquiry and evidence. These facts could not be looked into through a summary procedure and any such issue which was not amenable to summary proceedings should have been out of scope of the Revenue Officer. I will further like to reiterate that entries which are of longstanding character coupled with constructive and physical possession of a party are certainly not addressable through review proceedings at any time. Variables impinging on any entry giving it a longstanding character are to be weighed equally while determining the "timing" for the suo motu review of mutations. The Collector if at all he has to exercise this power at any time must satisfy that the entries are not of longstanding nature, do not deny the factum of continuous possession and do not need detailed' evidence and cross‑examination.

10. In view of these observations I am of the considered view that the Collector did not exercise review powers keeping in view the facts already discussed. His order therefore, suffers from inherent inadequacies and cannot be termed free from flaws. The Commissioner whereas has taken pains to dilate on the history of the case but in the ultimate he has merely affirmed the orders of the Collector. An order passed at the back of the petitioners could not be countenanced by the Revisional Authority moreso when it sought to alter an entry existing for 50 years. The Collector seemed quite sanguine to hold that the petitioners did not turn up despite notice. But there is nothing to suggest that he made any attempt to secure the attendance and resort to substituted service. The impugned orders are set aside and the two revision petitions are accepted. H.B.T./43/Rev. Revision accepted.