1990PLC218 (PLP)

(xxvi) `Trade Union' means any combination of workmen or employers formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or workmen and workmen or employers and employers or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business and includes a federation of two or more Trade Unions.

5. Application for registration:--Any trade union may, under the signature of its president and the secretary apply for registration of the trade union under this Ordinance.

14. Incorporation of registered trade union.--(1) Every registered trade union shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and the power to contract and to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable and shall by the said name sue or be sued. (2) The Societies Registration Act, 1860 (XXI of 1860), the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 (1I of 1912) and the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), shall not apply to any registered trade union and the registration of any trade union under any of these Acts shall be void." A bare reading of the afore quoted provisions would show that while a trade union can be formed "for the purpose of regulating the relations between the workmen and employers", its registration appears to be optional and furthermore the provisions not only oust such other enactment as are enumerated under section 14(2) in their application to a trade union formed under I.R.O. but a trade union registered under section 8, I.R.O., even after the cancellation of its registration under section 10 (ibid) may nevertheless be able to retain its identity, as is manifest from section 2(xxvi) though primarily for the purpose of regulating relations between the workmen and the employers etc.

9. However, it is pertinent to note, that once it ceases to be a registered trade union, as a consequence of action under section 10 of I.R.O., it can neither remain a body corporate by the name in which it was registered nor can it sue or be sued by the said name and this principle will also be applicable with all its force to an unregistered trade union.

10. This would lead us to examine the scope of Article 1'99 of the Constitution in such a situation. This Aritcle contemplates the "aggrieved party" who can invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court seeking a remedy which otherwise is not available to him adequately under a law. It also visualises a C "party" who is competent in law to maintain an action. It is thus obvious that a writ petition can be filed either by a person, a number of persons, or a corporate body.

11. It is now well-settled that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are applicable to the proceedings under Article

199. An unregistered body therefore can have a recourse to the relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure g which is contained in Order 1, Rule 8 (ibid) and which reads as follows:-- "Order 1, R.8. Parties to suits.--(1) Where there are numerous persons having the .same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or he sued, or may defend, .in such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. But the Court shall in such case give, at the plaintiffs expense, notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or, where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. (2) Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is instituted or defended under sub-rule (1) may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit."

12. It may also be pertinent to note that in such a situation even the Secretary or any other officer of an un corporate body cannot sue or be sued save with the compliance of Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. In the case of Khalid Ikramullah, Director, Social Security Institution, Lyallpur (Faisalabad) v. Punjab Employees Social Security (Non-ga7etted) Staff Union, Faisalabad reported as 1986 S C M R 618, it was noted by the Supreme Court that during the pendency of writ petition in High Court filed by Union, the registration of the Union was cancelled which was not taken note of by the High Court and it was held that:-- "The learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice the fact that the Labour Court has by a decision given on 2-9-1976 cancelled the registration of the respondents 'and this order has become final as no relief against it was claimed or obtained by the respondents with regard to the cancellation of its registration and there being no registered Union, the application under section 34 itself became incompetent and infructuous." And again: "In the circumstances and for the reasons given without discussing the merits of the claim, the appeal is liable to succeed on this preliminary ground that the respondent Union's registration having been cancelled, it could not seek under the Ordinance the relief which it was seeking from the High Court nor could, it be granted." In another case Rustam Cycle Factory Mazdoor Union v. Rustam Sohrab Cycle Factory Labour Union reported as 1981 P L C 414 it was found that during the pendency of the writ petition, the registration of the petitioner's Trade Union was cancelled by the Punjab Labour Court 11; and it was held:-- "In the context of its own dc-registration it hardly has any locus standi to present this petition. In fact the question of participation by the petitioner in a referendum for determination of a Collective Bargaining Agent under section 22 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 would arise only when the de-registration order is vacated or the petitioner union is registered afresh."

13. Without entering, therefore, into the merit of the remaining two grounds in this regard, we have no hesitation in sustaining the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondents in that the petitioner union, having been divested of its character as a body corporate in consequence of its de-registration, and as such, since it can neither sue or be sued by its registered name, it could not file the instant writ petition without a recourse to the provisions of. Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. and resultantly this petition is not maintainable in its present form.

14. Before parting with the matter, however, we would like to examine briefly; two other points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner qua the merits of the same:

15. He assailed the impugned judgments of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that the complaint having been filed by the N.R.T.C. through its General Manager, instead of the Registrar himself, as envisaged by section 10 read with section 13(b) of the I.R.O., it was bad in law and could not be entertained muchless decided by both the respondents Nos. 1 and

2. He further contended that it has wrongly been held that N.R.T.C. is an installation connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistani and therefore subsection (3) of section 1, I.R.O. was erroneously applied in the case of the petitioner union; and its de-registration on that score is illegal.

16. As against this, on the point of competency of complaint filed by an Officer of N.R.T.C: under section 10 of I.R.O., the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 argued that although section 10 envisages a complaint in writing made by the Registrar, yet it does not fetter his power under section 13(b)(ibid) to "authorise any person to lodge

complaints with the Labour Court

for action including prosecution

". He also maintained that the provisions of section 10 are not couched in negative terminology as envisaged from certain other provisions of I.R.O. and therefore the Registrar could validly delegate such powers of his under section 13(b) (ibid). The -learned counsel for the respondent further contended that, notwithstanding the registration of N.R.T.C. as a Private Limited Company under Companies Act, 1913, there is ample material on the record to establish that it is an organisation set-up, controlled and administered by the Government of Pakistan through a Board of Directors which comprised of the members, amongst whom are highly placed officers of the Armed Forces. He also submitted that the total paid-up capital of N.R.T.C., amounting to Rs.1;50,00,000 is shared by the Ministry of Defence in the sum of Rs.1,00,00,000 and the Ministry of Communication Government of Pakistan by Rs.50,00,

000. He therefore, maintained that N.R.T.C., being a manufacturer of such electronic components as are supplied to and used by the Defence Forces of Pakistan, both the learned lower forums have rightly held that in such circumstances, under section 1(3)(a); the provisions of I.R.O., including those pertaining to the forming and registering a trade union, shall not be applicable to the employees of N.R.T.C.

18. A reference to the relevant provisions of sections 10 and 13 of I.R.O. seems necessary which read: (1) The, registration of a trade union shall be cancelled if the Labour Court so directs upon a complaint in writing made by the Registrar that the trade union has-- (i) contravened (or has been registered in contravention of) any of the provisions of this Ordinance or the rules; or (ii)

(iii)

(2)

"

13. Powers and functions of Register.--The following shall be the powers and functions of the Registrar

(a)

(b) to lodge, oar authorities any Person to lodge, complaints with the Labour Court or Commission for action, including prosecution, against trade unions, employees, workers or other persons for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provision of this Ordinance or for expending the funds of a trade union in contravention of the provisions of its Constitution;

" A plain reading of provisions aforementioned indicates that although section 10 contemplates the Registrar as the person on whose complaint the Labour Court can cancel the registration of a trade union, yet under section 13(b), it also falls within the powers of Registrar to authorise any person to lodge a complaint with Labour Court for action which notably does not mean but includes prosecution against trade unions, employers, workers etc.

19. In our view the key word is action which, besides what is mentioned in section 13(b), may include an authorisation in matters of such function of Registrar as the one contemplated in section 10 inasmuch as, and we tend to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard that, the language of section 10 is distinguishable from such other provisions of I.R.O. as 3 for example the one contained in section 23-F which runs thus:-- "23-F. Penalty for contravening section 23-B or 23-C, etc.-- (1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 23-B or section 23-C shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to two thousands rupees, or with both. (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under subsection (1) except upon a complaint in writing made by the Register. For, when the intention is to oust the power of authorisation to someone else I than the person himself, the provision containing such prohibition is also couched in negative phraseology like "No Court shall take cognizance " as appearing in section 23-F which is not what is envisaged in section 10, I.R.O. Such being the case we cannot escape the conclusion that in entertaining and deciding the complaint filed by N.R.T.C. through its General Manager, after duly receiving authorisation from the Registrar in this behalf, both the learned lower forums have proceeded in right direction by repelling the objection raised by the petitioner union on the point of its in competency. We, on our part, also endorse the view taken by both the respondents 1 and 2 in this behalf.

20. Regarding the applicability of section 1(3)(a), I.R.O., in the case of the petitioner union, again we find that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the light of the factual aspect referred to in the impugned judgment of the learned Labour Court, has no substance inasmuch as from the material brought on the record, there is no doubt in our minds that notwithstanding the fact of registration of N.R.T.C. as a Private Limited Company, the Organisation in certainly connected with an incidental to the Armed Forces as is evident from the Constitution thereof as also the total financial and complete administrative, control of Government of Pakistan through Minims of Defence and Communications. It is also undisputed fact that the N.R.T.C. does manufacture electronic equipment for the supply to and for the use of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

21. In this context of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that the persons employed in, or working for, the N.R.T.C. which is an installation connected with the Armed Forces of Pakistan, or even remotely connected therewith, cannot avail of the provisions of I.R.O. in matters of enforcing their rights otherwise conferred on them thereunder by way of forming, or getting registered, a trade union. We are, therefore, of the firth opinion that both the learned lower forums have rightly held the de-registration of the petitioner union as valid in view of the provisions of I.R.O. being inapplicable thereto under section 1(3)(a) (ibid). We drew strength; in this view of ours, from decisions in cases United Builders and Associates v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 1 and others 1975 P L C 855, Din Muhammad alias Dona v. Manager, Army Stud Farm, Dipalpur, District Sahiwal 1978 P L C 261, Rehmat Gill and others v. Quetta Cantonment Board P L D 1983 S C 113; Wah Bofors Workers Trade Union v. Registrar, Trade Unions, Rawalpindi Region, Rawalpindi 1980 P L C 828 and an unreported judgment of this Court in Civil Revision No. 26/86. (Government of N.-W.F.P. etc. v.14RTC and others decided on 4-3-1986).

22. Viewed the matter in the perspective of the foregoing discourse, we find that this writ petition is not maintainable in its present form nor has it any merits otherwise, with the result that we dismiss the same hereby, leaving the parties, however, to bear their own costs. M.B.A./958/P Petition dismissed.