1981 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).‑In this case the appellant is aggrieved of the order of his compulsory retirement passed by the Member (Revenue Establishment) Board of Revenue dated 17‑8‑1976 and the appellate order dated 24‑11‑1976 of the Full Board of R4venue reducing his punishment to reversion to the post of Naib‑Tehsildar and stoppage of his promotion for two years.

2. The facts as stated before us relevant to the controversy under adjudication are that the appellant was charge‑sheeted signed by the Member, Board of Revenue on 25‑7‑1974 for misconduct, inefficiency and gross negligence and corruption arising out of the following allegation I. That while posted as Naib‑Tehsildar, Vehari, District Multan in the years 1971 and 1972, you attested Mutations No. 64,65 and 71 in Chak No. 3i3/W. B. with reference to Letter No.476/W/1235‑11, dated 7‑101970, and Mutation No. 476 /W 1735 WI‑11 dated 27‑11‑1971 Mutation No. 48 in Chak No. 45/K B and Mutations Nos. 113 and 114 in Chak No. 317 K b with reference to letter No. 476/W/1230‑111, dated 8‑1‑1971, transferring State land held by the P. W. R. in favour of private persons on the basis of forged letters of authority as was pointed out by P. W. R. authorities vide their letter No. 476/W/1244, dated 21‑3‑1979. II. The secutiny of the relevant record has revealed that you failed to exercise the requisite check before sanctioning the mutations as eleborated below-- (a) You took the so‑called letters from the P. W. R as if they were documents, registered under the Registration Act, because you did not care to summon the representative of the P. W. R. at the time of sanctioning the mutations to ensure if the transaction had actually taken place and that the two essential ingredients thereof, viz. payment of consideration money and transfer of possession had already taken place. (b) The provisions of section 42(7) of the Land Revenue Act were not complied because the transaction being other than recorded in a registered document the person whose rights were being acquired had to be identified by two respectable persons whose signatures or thumb‑impressions had to be obtained on the mutation sheet. This was not done by you. (c) You were supposed to know that the State land having been acquired for the Railway Department under the Land Acquisition Act, the said organization was not competent to dispose it of to anybody else or release it to the persons from whom it was acquired. The contents of para. 100 of Standing Order No. 28, are clear on the subject, wherein it is clearly laid down that in cases where land under occupa tion of any department is no longer required, it would be handed over to the Deputy Commissioner for further disposal under orders of Commissioners. It also lays down that for permanent disposal of such land for its release to the original owner previous permission of the Provincial Government is necessary' Thus there could be no question of the mutations being decided in the said manner. ' (d) You also failed to notify gist of the order passed on the mutations to the Railway Authorities and in doing so you negated the provisions of subsection (11) of section 42 of the Land Revenue Act 1967. (e) In the Revenue record viz. the Register Haqdaran Zamin whereon the mutation was based, the area was shown to be the ownership of the Provincial Government and not the Central Government or the P. W, R. There could, therefore, be no question of a mutation being entered transferring ownership right, which on the basis of entries in the record did not vest in P. W. R. The P. W. R. Department was simply shown in the cultivation column.

3. The appellant submitted his reply to the charge‑sheet on 9‑8‑1974 and the Additional Commissioner, Revenue who was the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 25‑3‑1976 holding the appellant guilty of inefficiency, negligence and misconduct. The appellant was issued a show‑cause notice for removal from service by the Member Board of Revenue on 29‑3‑1976. Appellant submitted written reply and was heard by the Member Board of Revenue who passed ,the impugned order dated 13‑8‑1976 imposing penalty of compulsory retirement upon the appellant. The appellant submitted an appeal to the Full Board of Revenue which was decided by the two Members of the Board vide order dated 24‑11‑1976 reducing the punishment to reversion to the post of Naib‑Tehsildar and stoppage of his further promotion for two years.

4. The appellant's plea before us is that he was a victim of forgery. It is stated that he received three letters purporting to be issued by the Land Control Officer, Railway Headquarter. Lahore which were received by the Deputy Commissioner, Multan and after being passed through the G. A. R., Assistant Commissioner, Vehari and Tehsildar, Vehari, were forwarded to the appellant for compliance. The letters purported to communicate the sale of land which was said to be the property of the Railways to certain individuals indicating also that the price had been deposited by the purchasers. These letters were on the printed pad of the Railway Department and purported to bear the signatures and seals of the relevant officials and prima facie were genuine documents and appellant had no ground to doubt the same particularly ‑when he was not the first recepient of the same and the letters had passed through so many hands before reaching him. The appellant pleads that the entire forgery was so masterfully cammuflaged that it could not be seen through in the course of exercise of ordinary prudence. The appellant thus pleads that he acted in good faith and was not a party. He has cited examples of number of other Naib Tehsildars who had received similar forged letters and had taken action upon them by sanctioning the relevant mutations, same of whom had been exonerated. The main emphasis in his defence by the appellant is on the extenuating circumstances arising out of the forgery. Appellant has not been able to point out only legal or procedural defect: The appellant pleads that under the circumstances he was innocent and should be exonerated of the charges levelled against hire.

5. The learned Government Pleader raised the question of limitation. The appellate order was passed against the appellant on 24‑11‑1976 in his presence. He applied for copy of the same on 10‑12‑1976 which was ready on 1‑2‑1977. Thus the appeal filed before us on 13‑6‑1977 is time barred being beyond the limitation of 30 days prescribed in section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974.

6. The learned Government Pleader has further submitted that the appellant sanctioned mutations in question on the basis of forged authority letters purporting to be issued from the Railway authorities but he did not comply with the legal requirements at the time of sanctioning, the aforesaid mutations. His procedural lapses which have resulted in the sanction of the mutation have been set out in the charge‑sheet against him to which he has given no specific defence. The Government Pleader presses that the appeal be dismissed as it has no merit.

7. From the circumstances as narrated before us we are of the view that the appellant could have been led in to error for some time by the forged documents but the fraud or the forgery could have been prevented if he had followed the instructions and rules on the subject as eluded to in the charge‑sheet to which he has not rendered any satisfactory reply. 1n fact the chain of lapses on the part of the appellant as described in the charge‑sheet have allowed the forgery to be carried through to its designed end. Had the appellant been vigilant and acted according to the rules, the forgery could not have matured into sanctioning of the mutations. He did not even ensure the presence of the representatives of P. W. R. at the time of sanction of the mutations and if they were present they were further required to be identified by two respectable persons whose signatures and thumb impressions were to be obtained on the mutation sheets. The appellant even did not care to notice that in the Register Haqdaran Zamin wherein the mutations were based, the area was shown to be the ownership of the Provincial Government and not the Central Government or the P. W. R. No mutation could have been sanctioned if the appellant had been vigilent even in these elementary procedural matters.

8. The plea of ignorance of rules/law and lack of experience had been rightly turned down by the departmental authorities, the appellant having 8/9 years' service at his back at the relevant time. We are of the view that one important purpose of the procedural rules in such matters is to obviate the possibility of illegal tampering with the rights of the parties So that the rules are meant to be followed and the official concerned cannot absolve himself from the responsibility of results following from ignoring the prescribed procedure. We do not find any merit in the appeal.

9. On the question of limitation also, the appeal merits dismissal. The appellate order was announced to the parties on 24‑11‑1976 and the limitation of 30 days as prescribed in section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974 started running against the appellant from that date. Even if the time falling between the date of application for the copy of the order (10‑12‑1976) and the date on which copy was ready for delivery (1‑2‑1977), be excluded, the appeal filed on 2‑3‑1977 is still badly barred by time. The application for the condonation of delay filed before us is grounded on the misconceived notion that the appellate order was announced on 18‑2‑1977 is still badly barred by time. This contention stands repelled by the attested copy of the order supplied by the appellant which clearly indicates that the order was announced on 24‑11‑1976. This contention is further conclusively belied by the fact that according to the certified copy of the order and the appellant's own assertion in the application for condonation of delay, the appellant applied for a copy of the order on 10‑12‑1976. How could the appellant apply on 10‑12‑1976 for a copy of an order announced on 18‑2‑1977 The application for condonation of delay is thus self‑defeating and is rejected. The appeal is thus dismissed on merits as well as on the point of limitation. There will, however, be no orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed.