P L D 1964 Dacca 272 (PLP)

SATTAR, J.‑This application by Messrs Chittagong Engineer ing and Electric Supply Company, Ltd., a public limited company, against the Province of East Pakistan, the Deputy Commissioner, Faridpur, and the East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority is for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to withdraw, rescind and cancel the order, dated the 2nd February 1961, purporting to requisition the Faridpur Electrical under taking.

2. The petitioner‑company was granted a licence for the supply of electrical energy in the town of Faridpur by Notifica tion No. 4227. Com., dated the 19th June 1936, issued by the then Government of Bengal. The petitioner claims that ever since that time supply of electrical energy is being maintained in terms of the licence. The demand for supply increased since the partition and the company felt the necessity of installing a 160 Killo‑Watt Set and a 440 Volts 4 Wire type OB2 Air-circuit Breaker Switchboard and other necessary tools and machines. At the initiative of the Chief Electrical Inspector and Adviser to the Government of East Pakistan, an elaborate scheme for increase of supply was drawn up in January 1961, and the company was assured of all Government assistance in the matter of import ing necessary machineries and their installation. When the petitioner‑company was thus expecting the necessary import licence, the Deputy Commissioner, Faridpur, issued an order on the 2nd of February, requisitioning the Faridpur Electrical undertaking of the petitioner. A copy of the notice shown to the clerk of the Faridpur Electrical undertaking and his signature was obtained but no copy was left with him. The order of requisition, according to the petitioner, is illegal.

3. An affidavit‑in‑opposition has been filed on behalf of the respondents by M. Abdul Majid, Additional Deputy Commis sioner, Faridpur. It has been asserted in this affidavit that the petitioner‑company is incorporated in India, and ever since v, Independence the management of the company lost all interest in efficiently running the organisation. Repeated representations were made to the District Authorities by the Mill owners and leading citizens of Faridpur about frequent break downs and deliberate failure of the said company to im prove supply of electricity in the town. It also came to the notice of the District Authorities that the company, under instruction from its office at Rangpur, was trying to dis mantle some essential machines and despatch them to a place out side Pakistan in order to paralyse the electric supply of Pakistan. In view of the above facts, the movable and immovable properties of the company were requisitioned under the pro visions of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948. The allegation of non‑service of the notice has been denied, and it has been stated that a copy of the notice was issued and served on an employee of the company.

4. The petitioner did not file any copy of the order with the petition on the plea that no copy was served and in spite of repeated demands no copy was supplied. We have now on record a copy of the notice which was produced by the learned Advocate- General. The order of requisition, it appears, was passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Faridpur, under the provisions of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, and he has now been made a party in this petition.

5. The only point that has been urged in this case is that, in view of the special provisions contained in the Electricity Act, 1910, for purchase of a licensee's electrical undertaking, the provisions contained in the general Act, to wit, the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948, cannot be resorted to for the same purpose. Mr. Hamidul Huq relies on the well known rule of construction, namely, generalia specialibus non‑derogant. It cannot be questioned that there is a sound underly ing principle behind this rule. It has been very clearly stated by Wood V. C. in London and blackwell Railway v. Limehouse D. B. W. ((1856) 3 K & J 123 (128)). The relevant portion which runs as follows has been quoted in Craies on Statute Law (Fifth Edition at page 350) :‑

"The Legislature, said he, in passing a special Act, has entirely in its consideration some special power which is to be delegated to the body applying for the Act on public grounds. When a general Act is subsequently passed, it seems to be a necessary inference that the Legislature does not intend thereby to regulate all cases not specially brought before it, but looking to the general advantage of the community, without reference to particular cases, it gives large and general powers which in their generality might, except for this every wholesome rule of interpreting statutes, over‑ride the powers which, upon consideration of the particular case, the Legislature had before conferred by the special Act for the benefit of the public. The result of a contrary rule of construction would be that the Legislature, having authorised by a special Act the construction of some ,public work, would be supposed afterwards by a general Act to throw it into the power of a few persons to prevent that public work from being carried out."

6. The learned Advocate‑General does not dispute the soundness of the rule. He, however, contends that the Electricity Act, 1910, cannot be considered to be a special Act in relation to the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act. Provisions have been made in sections 5 and 7 of the Electricity Act, for purchase of an undertaking belonging to a licensee. While under the former section this can be done after revoking the licence for the failure to comply with the terms thereof, the latter section provides for purchase after the expiry of the term of the licence. The case of the respondents in the matter before us appears to be that the petitioner did not carry out the terms of the licence. In this view of the matter, it cannot be urged that the Electricity Act has made no provision for meeting the con tingency which arose in this case. Moreover, the argument that the Electricity Act does not provide for requisition is equally without substance in view of the fact that it is nobody's case that the undertaking in question has been taken over temporarily to meet an emergency. The argument, that as under the Electricity Act certain things appertaining to the undertaking cannot be purchased, the Requisition of Property Act should be allowed to prevail, appears to be unsound. This is rather an argument which supports the rule of interpretation to which reference has been made above. When an Act is passed in relation to a particular subject, the attention of the Legislature is focussed on it, particular needs and disabilities, but this cannot happen when a general Act is passed in reference to all such subjects generally. The learned Advocate‑General has argued that under the Electricity Act, there is no provision for immediate taking over. We do not think, that is a consideration which justifies deviation from the rule mentioned above. Moreover, provision has now been made for immediate taking over also by amendment of the Electricity Act (see East Pakistan Act XXXI of 1957). The case of the King v. Minister of Health, Ex parte Villiers ((1936) 2 K B 29) and In re, Smith's Estate elements v. Ward ((1887) 35 C D 589), fully support the contention put forward by the petitioner in the case. We are therefore, led to think that the Electricity Act is a special Act and the Requi sition of Property Act is a general Act within the meaning of the rule indicated above, and there is nothing in the latter Act to show that it meant to repeal or supersede the Electricity Act or that the provisions of this Act cannot be given effect to without holding that the Electricity Act has been repealed by this Act. The fact that section 5 of the Electricity Act has been amended as late as 1957 clearly indicates that by the provisions contained in sections 3 and 5 of the Requisition Act the provi sions of sections 5 and 7 of the Electricity Act were never meant to be repealed and also that the former provisions are absolutely not repugnant to the latter. We find no difficulty in holding that the provisions of both the statutes can be kept alive if the provisions of the Requisition Act are read subject to the provisions of the Electricity Act in respect of acquisition of electrical under takings of licensees. The learned Advocate‑General has relied on the decision of Gunepally Thammayya and others v. Sri Rajah Tyadapusapati Khandendu Dora and another (A I R 1930 Mad. 963 (968)), and contends that as the Electricity Act applies to whole of Pakistan while the Requisition of Property Act applies to East Pakistan only, the former is not a special Act in relation to the latter. The facts of reported case are distinguishable and the contention of the learned Advocate‑General, in our view, has no substance. "Electricity" is now a Provincial subject, and in that view of the matter, both these Acts apply to the whole of East Pakistan, and the fact that the Electricity Act also applies to West Pakistan does not make any difference in the application of the rule of con struction stated above. A special Act can be so not only with reference to area of its applicability but also to the subject dealt with therein. The Full Bench decision in the case of The Com missioner of Labour in Mysore, Bangalore v. The Mysore Iron and Steel Works Labour Association by its President Rammaswamy lyengar (A I R 1952 Mysore 21), does not help the learned Advocate‑General.

7. The petitioner's case before us is that the notice of requisition was not handed over to the clerk who was made to sign on another copy. This allegation has been denied by the Additional Deputy Commissioner in his affidavit‑in‑opposition. A copy of the service return has been filed and it appears that the clerk signed after endorsing "received copy" In view, however, of the assertion that as early as the 6th of February 1960, the petitioner‑company wrote to the Deputy Secretary, Planning and Development, Government of East Pakistan, stating that the order of requisition was not served and in fact there is no specific denial of this assertion in the affidavit‑in‑opposition, we find it difficult to reject the explanation of the petitioner that it did not know the circumstances under which the requisition under the amended provisions of the Requisition of Property Act. Regard being had to the fact that the undertaking was taken over the petitioner‑company made written and verbal representations to the authorities against it, we do not think that the delay of a little over three months in filing the present application disentitles the petitioner from getting the reliefs asked for. We may mention that, having regard to the petitioner's allegation about the service of notice, and as the copy of the notice filed during the hearing of the case, we allowed the petitioner to bring the Additional Deputy Commissioner on the record on the 28th of March 1962. The learned Advocate‑General did not object to this.

8. The result, therefore, is that this Rule is made absolute, and we direct that a writ of mandamus do issue upon the respondents including the added respondent, i.e. the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Faridpur, directing them to withdraw, rescind and cancel the order of requisition passed on the 2nd of February 1961. Having regard to the facts of this case, we direct each party will bear its own costs. Mr. Subhan on behalf of the respondents prays that issue of the writ be stayed for ten days so that the respondents may file a formal application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and for stay of the operation of our order, if so advised. In view of the facts of this case, we think his prayer should be allowed, and this issue of the writ is stayed for the time being for ten days. SIKANDAR ALI, J.‑I agree. S. Q./K. B. A. Rule made absolute.