1998 PLP 1666 (CLC)

"(3)All the Tobacco Companies and other pruchasers shall issue vouchers to the growers having printed book No., Voucher No. and name/ place of the purchaser centre and a copy of each voucher issued to the growers shall be supplied by the Tobacco Companies/purchasers to the Pakistan Tobacco Board and the concerned Bank branch. "

2. The sale, purchase and all the relevant business of tobacco is governed by one Federal Law namely, Pakistan Tobacco Board Ordinance, 1968 and another Provincial Law namely, Martial Law Order No.487 of 1985. The aforesaid rule impugned through the present two writ petitions is made with reference to the rule‑making power of the Government under M.L.O. No.487. The basic purpose behind the making of the rule is to protect the rights of the growers of tobacco, lest they are exploited in any manner by the Tobacco Companies and any other purchaser/s.

3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners challenged the newly‑added sub‑Rule (3) on four grounds to the effect that it is unreasonable, unwarranted, unnecessary and impermissible and hence violative of the provisions of Article 18 of the Constitution.

4. So far as the warranty and necessity of this subordinate legislation is concerned, both amount to one and the same thing. To justify the implementation thereof, one should revert to the background under which the enforcement was deemed necessary. In this behalf, learned Additional Advocate General produced before us the minutes of the meeting of Pakistan Tobacco Board held with and under the Chairmanship of Minister for Commerce and Anti‑Corruption, N.‑W.F.P. at Maneshra on 23‑11‑1994. In such meeting various problems between the growers and the purchasers were identified and it was decided that all the Tobacco Companies shall supply copy of voucher to Pakistan Tobacco Board and the concerned Bank branch. Somehow or the other the matter could not be materialised and no step could be taken in furtherance of the decision made therein.

5. The grievances of the growers continued multiplying and so a meeting of the growers with the Board was held on 2‑4‑1996. A copy of minutes of such meeting was provided for our perusal. It was observed in the meeting that certain Tobacco Companies had still not paid dues of growers for tobacco crops, 1994 and 1995 in violation of the provisions of law. Agreements were not issued to genuine growers in time but are issued to non‑genuine grocers. One of the companies i.e. Pakistan Tobacco Company had closed its purchase Depots at numerous places which required to be reopened. That since 1995 crop, the above Company had started making purchases in the name of F.S. Tobacco Company though the Staff and premises were those of Pakistan Tobacco Company. That the weighted average prices paid by the said F.S. Tobacco Company during the last two years was much lower than those of the Pakistan Tobacco Company and thus the growers were hard hit through payment of low weighted average prices. In this background and for various other reasons, the genuineness whereof cannot be doubted, the Board resolved to receive a copy of voucher issued to the growers by the Tobacco Companies so that accurate record of tobacco purchases and that of prices could be maintained at the Board's end.

6. In this background, we are at loss to find out as to how the condition laid down through the impugned rule was unwarranted, unnecessary or impermissible. The Board was fully authorised to control the affairs of tobacco and, thus, in such background it recommended to the Government the implementation of impugned rule. The Government had the power under M.L.O. No. 487 of 1985 to make rules in order to check the genuine payments and in order to protect the larger interest of the smaller grower/s, who in such conditions, are always exploited. The implementation of such rule was, thus, fully permissible.

7. Last, we adhere to the ground of unreasonableness raised by the petitioners. Having given the aforesaid background and having appreciated the necessity of the enforcement of such rule, we feel that simply asking by the Board of a copy of voucher of each transaction is not at all unreasonable. By receipt of this one copy of the Board shall be in a position to observe the transactions and to check any fakeness of transactions. From the point of view of not only the Board but that of the growers as well, the matter is perfectly reasonable. If it does not suit the mere subjective interests of the petitioner companies, it can be unreasonable but subjectively alone and not objectively at all.

8. The next objection was that there are other purchasers of the tobacco as well, leaving aside the companies but no such restriction is placed on such purchasers/middle men/commission agents and hence the rule was discriminatory as well. First of all, we really disagree with the word "restriction" because the demand of a copy of voucher is not a restriction on trade but a mere qualification or condition in furtherance of that transaction which is entered into with the growers. It does not at all restrict or even qualify (the expression used in Article 18 of the Constitution) the trade professioned by the petitioner ‑companies. It is a mere condition in order to properly get the trade regulated. Rather, the word "Trade" used is of wider import and the correct purpose is to regulate the prices alone.

9. Coming to the question of discrimination, the objection is answered by the mere reading of the impugned rule which laid down the condition of issuing of vouchers to the Board against Tobacco Companies as well as any other purchaser/s. The word 'Tobacco Companies' obliqued with purchasers in sub -Rule (3) is sufficiently clear to include all the purchasers in the field. The rule is not at all discriminatory either.

10. Chintamanrao and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 was produced in support of the argument that the reasonableness of a statute can be gone into by the Courts of superior judiciary and was so scrutinized in the aforesaid case. A persual of the case indicates that therein a complete restriction was laid down on the manufacturing of Bidis which, in the circumstances of that case, was considered unreasonable. It has no relevance with the present circumstances. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row (AIR 1952 SC 196) an amendment in Indian Criminal Law was declared unreasonable because a society called the People's Education Society was declared as an unlawful association. This also has no nexus to the facts of the present case. In Messrs Dwaraka Prasad Laxami Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 224 the provisions of clause 4(3) of U.P. Coal Control Order, 1953 was declared void as imposing an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom of trade and business guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. We have already seen that the condition laid down in sub‑Rule (3) impugned before us is not a restriction on trade and hence not unreasonable like the restriction in the above case.

11. Abdul Hakeem v. State of Behar AIR 1961 SC 448 and all the aforesaid rulings from Indian jurisdiction have laid down the principle of the test of reasonableness or otherwise of a Statute. In all, it was observed, that the principle is to be applied to each individual Statute impugned before the Court and no abstact standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as a standard principle for all. In order to make the principle of reasonableness applicable to each case alone one has to see the nature of the right infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the time; shall all enter into the judicial verdict.

12. In view of the above principle and the yardstick provided in the aforesaid rulings, we believe that the infringement of right through the impugned sub‑Rule (3) is altogether inconceivable. No such right of the petitioners is infringed with regard to the freedom of trade. The underlying purpose of the condition imposed is also very clear and certain. The evil sought to be remedied thereby is the exploitation of tobacco growers and hence is of wider import and also involves the urgency. The imposition is not at all disproportionate and is the urgent requirement of the prevailing condition. We have no doubts in holding that the impugned rule is not at all unreasonable.

13. The last point taken from the petitioners' side was that the printing of pro formas under sub‑Rule (3) in question and the supplying of copy thereof to the Board is a matter of hardship and involves an expenditure of millions of rupees. We believe, that the involvement of expenditure regarding the promulgation of a Statute is not a ground for striking off the Statute. Anyhow, this problem was solved almost to all extents when the learned counsel for the Government Mr. Taalat Qayyum Qureshi, Additional‑Advocate General and when Mr. Mohibullah Kakakhel, counsel for the department made an offer with full responsibility that the Government will feel contented and the purpose of the Statute as well as that of Pakistan Tobacco Board shall be served if one copy of the pro forma already submitted by the purchasers, is submitted in addition to the Board. The copy of such pro forma is already available as Annexure ' G' on Writ Petition No. 707 of 1996. If a spare copy of this pro forma/voucher is furnished to the Board, it would serve the purpose of the rule in dispute.

14. The whole crux of the challenges brought about by the petitioners ultimately boiled down to the argument that the imposition of rule has caused unreasonable expenditure to the petitioner‑companies. One can refer to Anumati Sadhukhan v. Assistant Regional Controller (AIR 1953 Calcutta 187) where a Division Bench of a Court held that the fact that the imposition of a rule renders the running of the Rice Mills uneconomical cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction. This supports our view taken aforesaid that the mere fact of monetary burden cannot be pressed into service for challenging the reasonableness of a law or rule imposed.

15. Consequent upon what has been discussed above, both Writ Petitions Nos. 672 of 1996 and 707 of 1996 are hereby dismissed with direction that a copy of vouchers already submitted by the petitioners (Annexure ' G' on Writ Petition No.707 of 1996) prior to the addition of impugned sub‑Rule (3) of Rule 6 in Tobacco Marketing Control Rules, 1993; if submitted to the Pakistan Tobacco Board shall serve the purpose of impugned rule/notification. H.B.T./47/P Petition dismissed.