P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This order will dispose, of 19 connected appeals in which the points for decision are common. In respect of safety matches which had been imported from abroad, the Customs Department charged duty at the rate of Rs. 3/15/0 per gross alleging that the previous duty of Rs. 3/7.2 had been altered by a letter of the Board of Revenue of 17th April 1950. Nineteen persons who had paid the duty filed these 19 suits claiming a declaration that the levy of duty at the enhanced rate of Rs. 3/15 per gross was illegal. All these suits were filed in the Chief Court of Sind on some dates between August to October 1952. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the defendant i.e., the Federation of Pakistan that the suits were barred by section 226 of the Government of India Act. That section relates to‑the original jurisdiction of the High Courts and provides that no High Court can exercise original jurisdiction in respect of any matter relating to revenue. This preliminary objection was given effect to by Inamullah, J. who dismissed all the suits. Against this order of dismissal an applica tion for review was filed on the ground that instead of suits being dismissed the plaints should have been returned under Order VII, rule 10, C. P. C. These applications for review were also dismissed. In these appeals the main contention on behalf of the appellants is that the plaints should have been returned. There are two preliminary objections by the respondent. The first is that no appeal lies and the second is that the appeal is time‑barred. As regards the first preliminary objection, it is to be observed that the order of Inamullah, J., was passed on 29th June 1955, as a Judge of the Chief Court of Sind. The present appeals were filed on 24th March 1956. The Chief Court of Sind had ceased to exist in October 1955, when, in accordance with the Establish ment of West Pakistan Act, the High Court of West Pakistan came into existence. The appeals were, therefore, filed in the High Court and the question is as to whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain them. The appeal against the order of Inamullah, J., lay under section 14 (1) of the Sind Courts Act which provided that against the decree or order of a Judge of the Chief Court of Sind sitting alone an appeal will lie to a Division Bench of that Court. That a right of appeal would be there cannot be denied or the question whether an appeal is competent against a judgment, decree or order is to be decided with reference to the law in force on the date when the judgment, decree or order was passed. However, the appeal lay to the Division Bench of the Chief Court of Sind and the Chief Court of Sind was no longer in existence. Even if the right of appeal be there if the tribunal which was to hear the appeal ceased to exist there will be no method of exercising the right. The result may be or rather should be that the judgment, decree, or order would not retain its validity for it was not final. The party had yet the right to challenge it by an appeal and that right of the party could not be taken away by the abolition of the Tribunal. If the Tribunal is abolished the only method of enforcing the party's right is to deprive the order of its effect. In the present case, however, this contingency does not arise. Although the Tribunal, which was to hear the appeal has ceased to exist the law has made provision for the hearing of that appeal by another Tribunal. Section 3 of the West Pakistan (Adaptation of Courts Acts) Order, 1955, passed by virtue of the powers conferred by section 2 of the West Pakistan Establishment Act runs :‑ "As from the date of the commencement of this Order all references in any existing law or in any instrument to any Court existing in any of the territories or areas including in the Province of West Pakistan which is a High Court within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 219 of the Government of India Act, 1935, or to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Baluchistan, or to the High Courts of Bahawalpur and Khairpur or to the High Court of any other territory or area included in the Province of West Pakistan shall be deemed to be references to the High Court of West Pakistan and references to a Judge of any such Court or to the Judicial Commissioner Baluchistan, shall be deemed to be, references to a Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan." In accordance with this section references to the Chief Court of Sind are to be regarded as references to the High Court. So in section 14 (1) of the Sind Courts Act we will have to read the High Court instead of the Chief Court and an appeal will lie to a Division Bench of the High Court. There is one difficult which should be mentioned here. Section 14 was by the (Adapta tion of Courts Acts) Order, deleted from the Sind Courts Act. This was done obviously because for the future appeals were to lie from the judgment of one Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench under the Letters Patent and not by virtue of section

14. But in spite of this deletion the rule in section 3 of this Order will be applicable to cases where the judgment, decree or order had already been passed and an appeal had not yet been filed. For those cases section 14 would still be in force and it will be quite proper to substitute the High Court for the Chief Court of Sind by virtue of section

3. As regards the preliminary objection that the appeals are barred by limitation, the contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that the appe4ls are within time if we exclude the whole of the time that was required for obtaining copies of the decrees. The orders under appeal, which amount to decrees were passed on 29th June, and were signed on 1st February 1956. Learned counsel for the appellants claims that the time taken by the Court in preparing and signing the decree should be regarded as part of the time spent in obtaining copy of the decree because till the decree was signed copy of it could not be obtained. Prima facie this contention would not seem to have much force because it should be the duty of the party to apply to the Court for the preparation of the decree sheet, but it appears that in the Chief Court of Sind decrees were being prepared a long time after judgment was delivered and considering the special circumstances a rule was evolved that if the party applied for a copy of the decree at any time before the decree was prepared then the time between the date of the judgment and the date of the decree was also to be regarded as time required for obtaining the copy of the decree. This was held in Tulsidas v. Parsram R. Thadani (A I R 1948 Sind 18), a judgment which deals at length with this point and which has always been regarded as good law in the Chief Court of Sind, Having regard to the fact that this judgment has always been accepted as good law in the Chief Court of Sind we propose following it. In two out of these 19 appeals i.e. First Appeals Nos. 13 and 14 of 1956, the applications for copies had been put in before the decree was signed and, therefore, these appeals cannot be held to be time‑barred. However, in First Appeals Nos. 23‑39 of 1956, the applications for copies had been made after the decree sheet had been prepared, and A I R 1948 Sind 18 does dot help the appellants. We would not go any further than A I R 1948 Sind 18 which really is indulgent towards the appellant. We would hold therefore that First Appeals Nos. 23‑39 of 1956, are time‑barred. Although the appellants had not raised any question as to the applicability of section 226 of the Government of India Act, we ourselves went into this question for it appeared strange to us that there should be a bar only for the exercise of original jurisdic tion of the High Court while there was no bar to the trial of the same suit by the Court of a Sub‑Judge or a District Judge. Section 226 runs:- "226 (1). Until otherwise provided by Act of the appropriate legislature, no High Court shall have any original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue, or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force. (2) A Bill or amendment for making such provision as aforesaid shall not be introduced into or moved in the Federal or Provincial Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor‑General or, as the case may be, of the Governor." The Chief Court of Sind was a High Court for the purpose of the Government of India Act, 1935, as provided in section 219 of the Government of India Act. If the suit out of which these appeals arise were matters relating to revenue, the Chief Court would have no jurisdiction to try them, and the result would be that the party would lose all right to recover revenue illegally realized, for the cause of action arose in Karachi, and in Karachi there was at the relevant time only one other Civil Court function ing, that is, the Small Causes Court, and this matter was excluded from the jurisdiction of that Court, on account of the subject matter as well as on account of the pecuniary limit of the jurisdic tion of that Court. But, if the cause of action had arisen outside the limits of the town of Karachi, the party concerned would be entitled to file a suit for refund of money illegally realized as land revenue, because the suit would be filed in the Court of a Sub -Judge and section 226 did not apply to a Sub‑Judge's Court. Such a state of the law was so unreasonable that one would not accept it as long as another interpretation was possible. After going thoroughly into the matter, however, we feel satisfied that learned counsel for the appellants was justified in not raising this point in these appeals. The point has been considered in a number of cases and it has been held in spite of the utter unreasonableness of this result that the High Court has no jurisdiction to hear a case relating to revenue. The provision that is contained in section 226 was not introduced in the Government of India Act 1935, for the first ~ time. It had existed in the various Acts pro viding for the Government of India from the earliest times. Probably the High Court was the only Court of civil jurisdiction (apart from the Small Causes Court) when it was introduced for the first time and in the later Acts it was retained in spite of the absurdity which it created. For the contention that the plaints should have been returned and the suits should not have been dismissed, reliance is placed on Order VII, rule 10 C. P. C. A perusal of that rule will show that a plaint is to be returned in order that it may be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. It is T, conceded that at the time when the suit was instituted in the Chief Court, or when the order under appeal was passed, there was no Court in which the suit could have been instituted. To such a case rule 10 does not apply, and the contention has to be repelled. It had also been urged before us that although the order under appeal was valid when it was passed and although there was no Court in which a suit could have been instituted even at the time when the present appeals were filed, we would accept these appeals and remand the suit to the Court of Sub‑Judge because after the creation of One Unit the law had been amended and now there are Court of Sub‑Judges and the District Court in Karachi who can hear and determine the suit. Reliance was placed on the proposition accepted in some other contexts that an appeal is only a continuation of a suit. We are not prepared to set aside a perfectly valid order. An appeal is a continuation of a suit only if the suit was validly instituted. In any case the matter' E would be one of discretion and we see no good reason for exercising our discretion in favour of the appellants. The appellants wane in this way to get over the bar of limitation. But if they have been diligent section 14 of the Limitation Act can very well help them if they institute new suits and if they have not been diligent we would not be prepared to help them. The appeals are dismissed with costs. A. H Appeals dismissed.