P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

This is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. S. A. Haque, District Judge, Karachi, in Civil Appeal No. 93 of 1957 dated 21‑12‑1957 dismissing the appellant's appeal against the judgment of Mr. Mehdi Ali Siddiqi, Sub‑Judge, First Class, Karachi. The appellant is the owner of a race horse called Tezgam. On the 23rd of December 1956 this horse participated in the Quid‑e‑azam Gold Cup Race at Karachi and was declared first by hoisting a white cone. The appellant was called into the paddock and Miss Fatima Jinnah presented him Qaid‑e‑Azam's Gold Cup. It is alleged that after about 15 minutes of the announcement of the result, the appellant's horse was called back under the orders of the Stewards of the Karachi Race Club while on the way to the stables and samples of its sweat, saliva and urine were taken for testing. These samples were later on sent for analysis to the London Chemist of the Jockey Club of Pakistan. On receipt of the report of the Chemical Analyst, the Stewards of the Karachi Race Club held an inquiry and referred the matter to the .lackey Club of Pakistan for necessary action. The Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan by a resolution dated 23‑12‑1956 found that drugs had been administered to Tezgam prior to the Qaid‑e‑Azam's Gold Cup Race to affect its courage, speed and stamina in the race and took disciplinary action. They deprived the appellant's horse of its first prize of Rs. 13,888‑2‑0 in the Qaid‑e‑Azam's Gold Cup Race and disqualified it from future races, withdrew the licence of the trainer of the horse and warned off the appellant's syce. The appellant challenged the validity of this order in Suit No. 284 of 1957 on the ground that the entire action was taken at the instance of Mr. Tawawalla who was then the President of the Stewards of the Karachi Race Club and whose horse had come second in the said race. The action of the Jockey Club of Pakistan was also challenged on the ground that it was opposed to the principles of natural justice, was discriminatory and without jurisdiction and was based on a wrong interpretation of the relevant rules applicable to the case under consideration. Mr. Mehdi Ali Siddiqi, Sub‑Judge, First Class, Karachi dismissed the suit on 8‑11‑1957. On appeal also the District Judge, after considering all the arguments advanced before him, came to the conclusion that the respondent Club had acted in accordance with its rules, that no principles of natural justice had been violated, that it was not proved that the action of the Club was mala fide or dishonest and no unjust discrimination had been practised against the appellant. He refused to interfere in the matter on the ground that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to interfere with the action of the club which had its own rules arid procedures and expected its members and constituents to follow them. He did not find any condition which would justify the Civil Court to interfere in the matter. The appellant has attacked these findings before me inter alia on the grounds that the samples of sweat, saliva and urine were taken without his consent after the horse had been declared successful outside the race course, that the Qaid‑e‑Azam's Gold Cup Race being a classic race, the stewards were bound to take the samples of the first four winners, that malpractice was committed at the instance of Mr. Tawawalla when the appellant's horse was sampled out, that the principles of natural justice were violated inasmuch as appellant's request to send a second set of samples of the sweat, saliva and urine at his expenses to another analyst at Australia was turned down at the instance of Mr. Tawawalla, that the decision of the Jockey Club of Pakistan was without jurisdiction because the Stewards of the Karachi Race Club had assumed jurisdiction in the matter and the appellant had been deprived of his valuable right of appeal and seriously prejudiced. Before considering the points raised before me it will be observed that it is well settled law that Courts generally refuse to interfere in the decision of a club on disciplinary matters if given without any irregularity in procedure unless it is proved either that the rules were opposed to natural justice or that they were not properly followed or that there was malice or mala fides in arriving at the decision or that principles of natural justice were not being followed Thus, the jurisdiction of the Court in such f cases is limited within a very narrow compass and if the Managing Committee of a Club or an association has acted bona fide and honestly, followed the principles of natural justice and has reasonably construed its rules in their application to the aggrieved party, the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere in a matter where disciplinary action is taken against its members. It was admitted before me by Mr. Nathulal that the appellant's horse participated in the Qaid‑e‑Azam's Gold Cup Race in the year 1956 under the rules of the Jockey Club of Pakistan and these rules are applicable to this case. Both the Courts below findings, on all the controversial points, are against the appellant. In such circumstances in this second appeal he shall have to satisfy me that the view taken by them is erroneous and not in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the finding of facts of the Subordinate Courts in this case is not based on proper appreciation of evidence and I should review the whole evidence and arrive at my own conclusion. I am afraid in cases where there is concurrent finding of fact, the High Court as a rule does not interfere with it unless it is shown that it is not supported by any evidence on the record. Mr. Nathulal failed to satisfy me in this respect and I shall therefore proceed on the assumption that the samples of sweat, saliva and urine of Tezgam were.properly taken and that Mr: Tawawalla did not manipulate it. We are thus left with the legal aspect of the case and the question for consideration is whether the impugned order is in disregard of the rules of the Jockey Club of Pakistan' or in violation of the principles of natural justice or based on malice. The first contention raised by Mr. Nathulal is that the Qaid‑e‑Azam Gold Cup Race is a classic race and under the resolution of the Jockey Club of Pakistan it was incumbent on the respondent club to take samples of all the four winning horses in the said race. The learned District Judge and the Subordinate Court rightly pointed out that the classic race is not defined in the rules. The evidence on the point also shows that the said race is not a classic race. D. W. 2 Shah Noor Khan, the acting Secretary of the Jockey Club of Pakistan, stated in unequivocal terms that there are four races in Pakistan which are treated as classic races viz. Pakistan Derby, Pakistan St. Leger, Colts and Fillies Trial and Fillies Trial at Lahore. This witness was not cross‑examined on this point and for this reason alone it would be sufficient to hold that it was not a classic race. But Mr: Nathulal referred me to the dictionary meaning of "classic races" in Webster's Dictionary. In Webster's it is stated :‑ Horse Racing.. Five English races‑the Oaks, One Thousand Guineas, Two Thousand Guineas, Derby and St. Leger confined to three‑year‑old horses." On this statement Mr. Nathulal argued that the Qaid‑e‑Azam Gold Cup Race is also one of the most important races in Pakistan and should be treated as a classic race. The argument is fallacious as in the said dictionary no particular meaning . is given to "classic races". The statement only shows that certain English races are treated as classic races. The question, therefore shall have to be decided on the evidence in this case. The appellant has failed to show me that Qaid‑e‑Azam Gold Cup Race is a c classic race and I am of the opinion that the view taken by the lower Courts is correct and cannot be interfered with. It was next contended by Mr. Nathulal that on previous occasions: the Karachi Race Club has taken samples of all horses whose owners have been guilty of malpractices. The evidence on this point is conflicting. In some cases the respondent Club has taken samples of more than one horse and in other cases they got the samples of only one horse who was suspected of malpractice. In the absence of any such established practice, it is difficult for me to hold that .the respondents club treated the, appellant's case discriminately or acted mala fide. Merely because the respondent Club turned down the appellant's request in this behalf will not show that they acted mala fide: The request of the appellant was turned down by all the stewards as they suspected his horse alone of fraudulent practice. In the absence of any rule or resolution of the respondent Club that samples of all the winners should be taken for examination, I am of the opinion that the view of the Courts below on this aspect of the question is sound and in accordance with law. The third point raised in this appeal is that the Jockey Club of Pakistan had no jurisdiction to decide the question in dispute. The answer to this question depends on the interpreta tion of Rules 9, 10 (a), 25 and 76 of the Jockey Club of Pakistan. Mr. Nathulal, however, contended that Rule 76 could not be applied in this case as the appellant's horse participated in the Qaid‑e‑Azam Gold Cup Race on the basis of the prospectus of the race meeting. According to the learned counsel, under condition 20 of the prospectus "All enquiries, disputes, claims and objections arising out of such entry or race or otherwise, however, shall be decided by the Stewards of the meeting. An appeal shall lie to the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan. The decision of the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan on an appeal shall be final. All such decisions shall not be capable of being questioned in a Court of law" and therefore the matter in dispute should have been decided by the Stewards of the meeting. The learned District Judge's observation on this aspect of the question is as under :‑ "I have not dealt at length with the interpretation of condition 20 of the prospectus of the Race Meeting in question, as it was freely agreed between the parties that' the govern ing rules are those of the J. C. P., and the conditions of the prospectus of the meeting concerned are only a reflection of these rules." Mr. Nathulal, however, contended that these observations are not justified and his position throughout has been that this condition governs the appellant's case and the matter should have gone before the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan only on appeal. But this contention has no substance as the race in question was held under the "Jockey Club of Pakistan Rule of Racing" and the terms and conditions laid down in the prospectus could not oust the jurisdiction of the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan if they could interfere in the matter and decide the question in dispute. I therefore endorse the view of the learned District Judge that the conditions of the prospectus of the Race Meeting are only a reflection of the rules of the Jockey Club of Pakistan and these rules apply to the QUaid‑e‑Azam Gold Cup Race. The scheme of the "Rules of Racing" of the Jockey Club of Pakistan is that some matters are decided by the Stewards of the meeting and other important questions are decided by the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan. Rules 8, 94and 10 (a) deal with those cases where disciplinary action is proposed to be taken against the owners, nominators, trainers, jockeys, riding boys and persons attendant on horses but they don't deal with those cases where the disciplinary action is to be taken against the horse for future meetings. It will be noticed that in this matter the impugned order disqualified the appellant's horse from future meetings and there is no doubt that this action could trot be ,taken under the above‑mentioned rules. Mr. Nathulal, however, contended that once the inquiry was initiated by the Stewards of the meeting, they should have concluded it, come to a conclusion and then referred it to the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan. This contention also is without any substance. The appellant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. On the one hand his contention is that the Stewards of the Meeting were under the influence of Mr. Tawawalla and their decision to sample the appellant's horse was mala fide, and on the other hand that the whole enquiry should have been conducted by them. In my view the Stewards of the Meeting were fully justified in bringing the malpractices to the notice of the Jockey Club of Pakistan and in not taking a final decision in the matter as they were not competent to disqualify the appellant's horse from future meetings. This decision can also be justified, although they do not say so, as the appellant was suspecting their bona fides on the ground that Mr. Tawawalla was the President of the Stewards Meetings. Now so far as the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan are concerned, they are empowered under Rule 25 (h) : "to make enquiry into, finally decide and deal with any matters relating to racing, whether or not referred to them by the Stewards of a meeting", and under Rule 76 to take disciplinary action against any horse subject of fraudulent practice. Rule 76 is reproduced below "Any horse which has been the subject of fraudulent practice may, at the discretion of the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan, be disqualified for such time and for such races as they shall determine." A perusal of these rules clearly shows that the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan had jurisdiction in the matter and were competent to decide the question in dispute. It was contended that the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan did not take action on their own initiative but on the complaint of the Stewards of the Meeting. But there is nothing wrong with it. Under the rules there is no bar to it. I find no substance in the appellant's counsel's contention that the Stewards of the Meeting could refer the case only under Rule 10(b). They could refer the matter to the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan not only under this rule but otherwise also. Rule 25 (h) and Rule 76, in the absence of any bar, contemplate such cases. Having regard to the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan were within their rights to deal with the dispute in question and rightly decide the matter. In my opinion the appellant has not been deprived of any vested right of appeal and has not been prejudiced in any way. On this view of the matter the next question for consideration is whether the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan violated any principle of natural justice or unreasonably construed the rule applicable to the appellant's gasp. Mr. Nathulal admitted that the appellant was given full hearing and he had no grievance on this ground, but he urged that the finding that the appellant's horse was doped is based on very flimsy evidence and should not be upheld. The learned counsel took me through the report of the Analyst for showing that the drugs found in the sweat, saliva and urine of the appellant's horse were in negligible quantity and could not be attributed to any fraudulent practice. He also urged that if the appellant's request for sending the second set of samples at his expense to Australia would not have been turned down, it could easily be demonstrated that the appellant was not guilty of any fraudulent practice. I have already stated the principles of law applicable to such cases. Neither the rules nor any resolution of the Jockey Club of Pakistan enjoins any such procedure. Discretion entirely rested with the Stewards of the Meeting and it cannot be said that they wrongly exercised it. The appellant could on his own send the second set of samples to Australia and use the report in defence. In my opinion there is nothing on the record to show that the London Analyst's report is not reliable. Under the rules the sole judge of the question whether the appellant's horse was subject to any fraudulent practice are the Stewards of the Jockey Club of Pakistan and I am afraid the Civil Court cannot sit in judgment on their findings and come to an independent conclusion. As such, I find no force in this contention and this ground also fails. On the whole I find no ground to interfere in this appeal. For the reasons given above the appeal is dismissed with costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.