P L D 1959 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

Jamil Hussain Rizvi, Advocate‑General, West. (M. Z. Kitchlew, Advocate, Supreme Court with him) instructed Ijaz Ali, Attorney for Respondent. Date of hearing: 22nd December 1958. CORNELIUS, J.‑--This petition is brought before this Court by one Javaid Hashmi, who having obtained the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of the Punjab in 1958., applied to the High Court of West Pakistan and was admitted as a pleader under section 6 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. He was rated a certificate in a form prescribed by the High Court under its power derived from the same section which declares that a person who has been admitted as a pleader "is entitled to practise as such subject to the provisions of the Act . . . . . and to the rules made thereunder". One rule which was made as recently as the 3rd October 1956, provides that:‑ "Every person enrolled as pleader in or after 1957 shall unless specially exempted by the High Court, before commencing to practise on his own account, furnish a certificate writing by a senior legal practitioner on the rolls of Court of West Pakistan, Lahore and practising in Pakistan, that he has read with such senior for a period of a six months and that he has attended regularly in Courts and chambers with his senior and has worked diligently". Chapter 6 in Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the High Court relates to Legal Practitioners and in Part F of this Chapter, under the heading "Training of Pleaders" there is found the following provision regarding the capacity of a newly‑enrolled pleader during this period of six months' training which he has to spend with a senior. The rule reads as follows:‑ The newly‑enrolled practitioner during the course of his training, may in the absence of his senior, hold the brief of the senior and may appear, plead and act in any case in which the senior is engaged and in which the senior permits him to do so, but he is not allowed to practise independently on his own account, and to accept fees during his period of training. Any plaint presented by the newly‑enrolled practitioner must bear the signature of the senior to whom he is attached for training." This rule makes it clear that, under certain conditions, a newly enrolled practitioner may during the course of his training perform all acts which can fall within the scope of legal practice. What is disallowed during the period of training is not practice at large but the right "to practise independently or on his own account". The point that during the first six months, a newly enrolled practitioner is not allowed to charge fees appears immaterial, when it is borne in mind that, historically, the payment of fees for such assistance rendered in the Courts of the country was at the option of the party assisted. What is important for the purposes of the present case is that these rules distinguish between practice at large, and practice " independently or on his own account" by the practitioner. A similar distinction might be thought to appear plainly where, under the rules of a Court, a senior advocate 'is required to be supported by the presence of a junior advocate at a hearing. The junior advocate is not, in such a case, practising independently, but under the control and superintendence of his senior. He is never theless properly engaged in the practice of the law. The position of a newly‑enrolled practitioner of the High Court working in accordance with the rule which has been quoted above is in practical respects similar to that of a junior advocate working with a senior in a case. Mr. Javaid Hashmi when faced with the bar against independent practice operating under the rules of the High Court, applied for an exemption, putting forward as his principal ground that he had for, some seven years been working as an Income‑tax practitioner. The request was refused on the ground, which was communicated to him that he had "no experience of judicial work". In his petition before this Court, Mr. Javaid Hashmi has been at pains to present an argument to the effect that his work as an Income‑tax practitioner was of a quasi‑judicial nature. Yet, it is clear that it was not strictly judicial work, in the sense of that term as used in the letter of the High Court, for he bad had no experience of procedure and practice in the Courts. The larger argument presented is that the rule, which stands in the way of Mr. Javaid Hashmi immediately commencing inde pendent practice upon gaining admission as a pleader, is ultra vires of the Legal Practitioners Act and reference is made in particular to section 8 thereof which ' entitles every pleader holding a certificate under section 7 of the Act to apply to be enrolled in any Court or Revenue Office within the local limits of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction, and directs further that the presid ing Judge or officer shall enrol him "subject to such rules consistent with this Act as the High Court or the Chief Controlling Revenue‑authority may, from time to time, make in this behalf". Mr. Javaid Hashmi further contended that any restricting provisions could only operate prior to the issue of a certificate to him. In our opinion, sections 6, 7 and 8 when read together clearly invest the High Court with power to impose a condition of the relevant kind upon persons who are placed in the situation in which Mr. Javaid Hashmi finds himself. By section 6, the High Court is empowered to make rules as to the grant of certificates to proper persons to be pleaders, and as to the form of such certificates and these rules, upon publication in the official Gazette, are declared to acquire the force of law. The certificate which has been prescribed provides for the holder to practise as a pleader subject to the rules made under the Act, and one of the rules made is that which prevents independent practice until a period of six months training with a senior lawyer has been undergone, and duly certified. We cannot see that the making of such a rule is inconsistent with anything contained ini the Act. Under section 7, when a pleader has been admitted, the High Court is required to direct the issue to him of a certificate authorising him to practise. Such a certificate is itself issued under section 6, and consistently with the law, which declares that its issue is subject to the rules. Therefore, under section 7, the expression "a certificate" must be understood to mean a certificate issued under section 6 and subject to rules made under that section consequently, it is impossible to construe section 7 as meaning that a certificate giving freedom to the holder to practise independently on his own account must be issued to every pleader, once he has been admitted by the High Court. The reason for the restriction is not far to seek. It ensures that no legal practitioner shall handle the affairs of any litigant in the Courts upon his own independent responsibility until he has received instruction in the art and practice of his profession under an experienced senior lawyer of standing. By this method an assurance is held out to the members of the litigant public that when they entrust their affairs for prosecution in Courts to a lawyer who is declared competent to practise independently, they may do so with some degree of confidence in that lawyer's capacity to render the necessary service, by proper appreciation of the law and correct use of procedure, without which the rights which the litigant is asserting may well be placed in jeopardy. The rule which has been applied to the detriment of Mr. Javaid Hashmi is clearly one which is within the powers of the High Court, and possesses the force of law. There is con sequently no force in Mr. Javaid Hashmi's petition, which we hereby dismiss. At the same time we wish to make it clear that we must not be understood, in this judgment, to have said anything relevant to the question whether a writ of the kind sought can at all be issued to a Superior Court. That is an important question which was not raised in the arguments before us. We make no order as to costs. K.B.A. Petition dismissed.