P L D 1971 Lahore 952 (PLP)

(ii) forging another's signature on any document ; (iii) refusing to obey the Superintendent of an examination in the examination hall; (iv) refusing to obey any instruction issued by the Board in connection with the conduct of the examination ; (v) disclosing his identity or making peculiar marks in his answer‑book with a view to disclosing his identity.

3. Learned counsel argued that under the above provisions of law, orders could be passed only before the declaration of the result and any order passed thereafter would be without lawful authority. The point was of far‑reaching importance and we, therefore, heard the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore, as well as the Controller of Exami nation, who appeared before us along with their learned counsel. After hearing all concerned, we are of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be correct and our reasons in this respect are as follows:‑

4. Firstly, the very language of the rule shows that the order which is to be passed is to direct that the "candidate shall be disqualified from passing the relevant examination and from appearing in the immediately following Examination (annual or supplementary)". This is a bar from passing the relevant examination and must, therefore, be invoked before the candidate has actually passed the Examination. If he has already passed the Examination by the time, the officer concerned is pleased to pass the order under this provision of law, then that order will be too late in the day and at that stage some other provision will have to be invoked for quashing or cancelling the result as the case may be provided the case is again covered by some relevant rule but in no case can rule 7 (i) be applied. When confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the respondents argued that this interpretation will lead to great mischief, inasmuch as, many cases will go unpunished if the orders in disciplinary matters are not passed before the declaration of the result. We really do not appreciate this approach. The difficulty contemplated will arise only if the Administration does not work with care and caution and we have no presumption to make that the adminis tration will so work. Again the difficulty can be avoided by another safeguard and that is that the result of the disciplinary cases should not be declared and can be shown under the head, "later on after decision of the disciplinary matters or cases". If the Administration feels difficulty and inconvenience in taking up even this little care, then law must have its course and we will have to act on the dictum, "let justice be done though heavens may fall"‑though in the instant case, there is no question of the falling of the administration but only of its streamlining. Secondly the interpretation we have made, finds support from the Calendar of the Board itself. In rule 18 occurring in Chapter 5, Head "Examination" at pages 163‑164 it is written as follows: "

18. The Board shall have the power to quash the result of a candidate after it has been declared: (1) if he has been disqualified for using unfair means in the examination or (2) if a mistake is found in his result; or (3) if it is found that he was not eligible to appear in the examination] or (4) for any other reason that may be determined by the Board: Provided that the order of quashing the result is issued not later than four years from the date of declaration of result of the examination concerned: Provided further that Win quashing the result of a candidate under (2) and (3) above, the Board declares a candidate as failed who was previously declared to have passed, in an examination, the Board, may after considering the circum stances of the case, take such action as it may deem necessary to give to the candidate the benefit of any privilege that he may have acquired by studying in the next higher class in a recognised Institution or taking an examination conducted by the Board." This shows that disqualifying a person from passing any examination before hand, is process different from cancelling and quashing his result after he has passed the same and his result has been declared. The words "after it has been declared" underlined above, are very significant in this respect. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondents argued that since under rule 13 (1) the result can be quashed if the candidate has been disqualified for using unfair means in the examination etc., it shows that orders of disqualification can be passed even after the declaration of the result. This is not correct. Sanction for disqualifying a candidate for passing any relevant examination is to be gathered from other rules which provided for passing disqualification orders. If any order within the scope of those rules has independently been passed in a proper case at a proper time and stage and by a proper authority, but in spite of that disqualification order, the result has been declared, then the same can be quashed under rule 18 (1) but this does not by itself give authority for passing disqualifying orders after the result. Another suggestion made by the learned counsel for the respon dents was that whether a candidate was disqualified before hand or his result was quashed afterwards, the matter remains at one and the same plane because in any eventuality he will remain "disqualified". Apart from the doubtfulness of the use of the word "disqualified", in this example, we have not been able to appreciate the argument. Question is not of the ultimate fate of the matter but as to how and in what manner the said fate is to be reached and concluded. A jailer under a warrant of a competent authority may bang a man and a person in a street may kill another. The ultimate result in both cases is the same, namely, the death of the deceased, but one is justified while the other may amount to murder. Thirdly, in rule 18, there are certain restrictions and prohibitions even in the matters of the quashment of the result. The power to quash a result is, therefore, not absolute and cannot be exercised ad in-finitem. Rule 18 itself says that the orders for quashing the result cannot be issued later than two years‑ now four years)‑from the date of declaration of the result of the examination concerned. This suggests that the jurisdiction to quash a result is not unfettered. If it is fettered in respect of time‑factor, then it is reasonable to hold giving effect to the same factor, that it is fettered in cases of disqualifying a person from passing the relevant examinations. Fourthly, the emphasis is on the words "from passing" which indicate the type of the punishment provided. We cannot by putting a different interpretation provide a different penalty from that which is laid down in the rule itself. Penal laws are to be strictly construed and their scope should not be unneces sarily extended. Fifthly, rule 7 contemplates two kinds of punishment; (a) one is to disqualify from passing the relevant examinations; and (b) the other is to disqualify from appearing in the immediately following examination (annual or supple mentary). Now there are two stages for a candidate from the points of view of an examination. The first is to appear and the second is to pass therein. If a candidate is disqualified from appearing in an examination, he is disqualified to pass the same. The rule‑making Authority has not used the words like "dis qualified from appearing in the relevant examination and from appearing in the immediately following examination annual or supplementary; because by the time the order disqualifying from appearing in the relevant examination could be passed, the student could have had already appeared therein. To remain consistent and reasonable, therefore, the rule was worded as it is, which shows that the order inflicting the relevant punishment is to be passed before the candidate has actually crossed that stage, that is before he has passed the concerned examination or appeared in the immediately following examination. This time factor is of the essence of the whole of this rule and it cannot be said that it is of importance for latter stage and not the first. Sixthly, we may refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Disciplinary Committee of the University of the Punjab, Lahore, and another v. Malik Abdul Majid (Civil Appeal No. 256 of 1969), decided on 7‑5‑1970. In that case, a student was alleged to have copied the answer to a certain question from a paper which he had in his possession in the examination hall. He was disquali fied by the University "from passing any examination for a period of two years" under Regulations Nos. 13 and 18 (3) of the University of Punjab printed at pages 196 and 197 of the Calendar of the University for the year 1963‑64 (Volume I). The student filed a writ petition bearing No. 1513/ 1967, which was accepted by this Court on 5‑7‑1968 and the impugned orders were declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, leaving the authorities to proceed with the matter in accordance with law after holding a proper enquiry. See Malik Abdul Majid v. Disciplinary Committee of the University of Punjab and another (P L D 1970 Lah. 416). The Disciplinary Committee of the University of the Punjab, Lahore and another filed an appeal in the Supreme Court being Civil Appeal No. 256 of 1969. It so happened that by the time the appeal became ripe for hearing, the University declared the result of the candidate where he was shown as having passed. Taking note of this situation, the Supreme Court held that the appeal of the Disciplinary Committee of the University of the Punjab Lahore and another, had become infructuous and dismissed it as such keeping the points of law decided in the High Court's judgment as live issues to be examined in some more appropriate case in future. It is to be reiterated that under Regulation No. 13 of the Punjab University Calendar, the punishment which could be imposed was to disqualify a candidate "from passing any examination for a period of two years." The Supreme Court's view that the appeal before them had become infructuous, lends support to the view which we have taken that if by the time the punishment of the kind involved herein is levied, the candidate is declared as having passed the examination, then the stage for disqualifying him from passing that exami nation is over. Respectfully adopting the same view we are B of the opinion that the impugned punishment which was awarded in the instant case after the declaration of the result is without jurisdiction.

5. What has been written above is sufficient to hold that the impugned orders are without lawful authority and of no legal effect against the petitioner. We accept the writ petition; grant the aforesaid declaration and quash the impugned orders. Before parting however, we may mention that learned counsel for the petitioner raised certain other subsidiary points but we do not feel the necessity of referring to them because the ground mentioned above is sufficient to grant relief to the peti tioner. There will be no order as to costs. K. B. A. Petition accepted.