P L D 1978 Karachi 617 (PLP)

Z. A. CHANNA, J.‑This acquittal appeal by the Provincial Government under section 417, Cr. P. C. is directed against an order of the learned Special Judge‑cum‑Enquiry Offcer, Hyderabad, passed on ‑1‑4‑1975, whereby he acquitted respondent Khaliqur Rehman, who was the manager of the Urban Co‑operative Bank Ltd., on the ground that the Manager of a Co‑operative Bank is not a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 65‑B of the Sind Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925. It may be stated here that respondent Khaliqur‑Rehman was challaned before the learned Special Judge‑cum‑Enquiry Officer under section 151, C. P. C. read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for allegedly accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 200 from one Amir Ali as consideration for setting him remission of an amount of interest of Rs. 2,993‑91 on the loan outstanding against him.

2. In reaching the conclusion that respondent Khaliqur Rehman was not a public servant and therefore was not triable by a Special Judge, the learned Special Judge relied upon the provisions of section 65‑B of the Sind Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925, as well as the definition of "officer" as contained in the said Act and the functions entrusted to respondent Khaliqur Rehman as Manager of the Bank under the by‑laws of the Bank. In order to appreciate these points it would be appropriate to set down in extenso not only section 65‑B of the Act, but also the definition of Officer" as also the duties assigned to the Manager of Urban ‑ Co‑operative Bank under the bye‑laws of the Bank. .

3. Section 65‑B of the Act reads as follows:‑ "Every Officer of a society, including a Co‑operative Bank, shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)." The word `officer' has been defined in clause (d) of section 3 of the Sind Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925 as under‑ "'Officer' includes a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Member of Committee or other person empowered under the rules or under the by‑laws of a Society to give directions in regard to the business of such society."

4. The impugned order of the learned Special Judge itself states the functions assigned to the Manager of the Urban Co‑operative Bank and the same are as follows:‑ 2‑(a) to carry on correspondence on behalf of the Bank Bank; (D) to maintain accounts of the Bank; (c) to receive, disburse, and invest money on behalf of the Bank and pass receipts and voucher for all transactions; (d) to receive application for admission, share loans and advance and place them before the Board; (e) to convene meetings of the Board of Directors and to work as Secretary of the Board; and (f) to attend all other business. entrusted to him and to exercise such powers as may be delegated to him by the Board of Directors."

5. The view taken by the learned Special Judge was that since only officers of Societies and Co‑operative Banks could be deemed to be public servants for the purposes of section 65‑B of the aforesaid Act, and since an officer could only be such person who was empowered to give directions regarding the business of a Society, respondent Khaliqur Rehman cannot be deemed to be a public servant as in his view the functions assigned to the said respondent did not include the giving of directions to a Society or a Bank which function was reserved exclusively to the Board of Management of the Bank.

6. We have heard Mr. Imdadally Agha, who appears for the Provincial Government. So far as respondent is concerned both he and his learned counsel have remained absent in spite of issue of repeated notices to them which have been duly served. It was urged by Mr. Imdadally Agba that the respondent clearly was an officer, being the holder of the high office of a Manager. In support of his contention that the respondent was an officer the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Ashfaq Ahmad v. State (P L D 1968 Lah. 1124). In that case, Ashfaq Ahmed, who was Wasil Baqi Navis and as such charged with the responsibility of realisation of land revenue from the Lambardars, was convicted under section 406, P, P. C., read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. On appeal to the High Court the . question which arose for consideration was whether the appellant Ashfaq Ahmad was on officer for the purpose of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code. It was observed by the Lahore High Court that "although the word `officer' as used in the common parlance connotes the holder or incumbent of an office of authority, yet the definition has been interpreted by judicial authorities to include all incumbents of offices high or low irrespective of their status," it may, however, be pointed out that these observations were made in relation to the provisions of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which Code does not, define the expression `officer' unlike the Sind Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925.

7. It may be observed that under section 65‑B of the aforesaid Act every officer of a Society, including a Co‑operative Bank is to be deemed a public servant for the purposes of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

8. In Craies on Statute Law, Sixth Edition, page. 212, it has been stated as follows:‑ "There are two forms of interpretation clause. In one, where the word defined is declared to `mean' so and so, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. In the other, where the word was defined is declared to `include' so and so, the definition is extensive, e.g., sheriff' includes `under sheriff'. Sometimes the definition contains the words `mean and include', which inevitably raised a doubt as to interpretation."

9. In Dilworth v. Stamps Commissioners, Dilworth v. Land & Income‑tax Commissioners (1899 A C 99 (P C)), the word `include' has been construed as follows:‑ "The word `include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statutes, and whemit is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word `include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely implied for the purpose of adding to the natural signifi cance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and includes', and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions."

10. A Full Bench of the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court, in the case of Emperor v. Jiand, considered the connotation of the word 'includes' in the interpretation clause. D'Souza, AJC, while interpreting the word ‑'includes' in section 26, Cr. P. C., observed as follows:‑‑ "It is a well‑known rule of interpretation that the word 'includes' is used as a word of enlargement and ordinarily implies that something else has been given beyond the general language which precedes it; to add to the general clause a species which does not naturally belong to it."

11. In the same judgment Watson AJC, while referring to Dilworth's case in connection with the connotation of the word 'includes' observed as follows:‑ "The phrase shall 'include' is, as said by Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Newzealand Commissioner of Stamps used in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and where it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include."

12. The above judgment of Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court was relied upon in the case of Hibibullah v. Province of West Pakistan (P L D 1967 Lah. 533) where it was observed that "it is well settled that when in any statute word 'include' or 'includes' is used, then it is intended to enlarge the ordinary meaning of that word.

13. In view of the extended meaning which the word 'include' or 'includes' is intended to connote in legislation, it is clear that for the purposes of section 65‑B of the Sind Co‑ operative Societies Act, 1925, both an officer of a Society as well as the officer of a Co‑operative Bank are deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

14. No doubt, the definition of 'officer' as contained in the Sind Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925, does not specifically refer to an officer or Manager of a Bank, but again in this definition the word 'includes' is used. As such the definition is not exhaustive but will also include other categories, including Officers of the Bank. Keeping in view the functions and duties assigned to the Manager of the Urban Co‑operative Bank Ltd., under the bye‑laws of the Bank, we are clear that he has important functions and duties to perform in connection with the Bank, including the giving of directions with regard to the working of the Bank acid the investment and disbursement of its monies. In this connection, reference may be made to clause (i) if his functions which empowers the Manager to attend to all other business entrues to him and to exercise such powers as are delegated to him by the Board of the Bank. A Manager, without doubt, is an important functionary of the Bank, being its head and it cannot be said that he is not an officer of the Bank. The definition of 'officer' as contained in the Sind Co‑operative Socities Act, 1925, is to be construed with reference to the context and in the context of the present case we are satisfied that the Manage is an officer of the Bank for the purposes of section 65‑B of Sind Co‑opera tive Societies Act, 1925, read with section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Moreover, the Urban Co‑operative Bank Ltd., was a Society registered under the aforesaid Act, its registration number being No. 3103. As such, they Manager of the Bank was an officer of a Co‑operative Society.

15. In the result, we are unable to agree with the view of the learned Special Judge that respondent Khaliqur Rehman at the relevant time was not a public servant for the purposes of section 65‑B of the Sind Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925. We would accordingly accept this appeal and set aside the order of acquittal in respect of the respondent. S. Q. Appeal allowed.