P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

"The Commission shall have all the powers necessary for the implementation of this Regulation." As the implementation was meant to 'go on at a fast .pace unfettered by any shortcoming of law, a provision was also made in sub‑paragraph (5) of paragraph 4 of the Regulation as follows :‑ "Where any matter is not provided for in this Regulation, or any difficulty arises in giving effect to the purposes of this Regulation, the Commission may, by order notified in the Official Gazette, make such provision in respect thereof as it thinks fit, and such order shall be deemed to form part of this Regulation and have effect accordingly." The need for extensive powers, thus envisaged in the Regulation, further demanded that interference with the work of the Commis sion from any outside authority should be prevented ; therefore, jurisdiction of Courts was effectively barred by paragraph, 27 of the Regulation which is as follows:‑ "Bar of Jurisdiction.‑(1) No provision of this Regulation or of any rules or orders made thereunder shall be called in question in any Court including the High Court and the Supreme Court, or before any authority other than an authority appointed under this Regulation, and no such Court or authority shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Commission or an officer acting under 'he authority of the Commission is empowered to determine. (2) No such Court or authority as aforesaid shall be com petent to grant any injunction or other order in relation to any proceeding before the Commission or before dray officer exercising any power or discharging any function under this "Regulation or the rules or order made thereunder, or in, relation to anything done or intended to be done by or at the instance of the Commission or such officer."

3. Sub‑paragraph (2) of paragraph 27 should be noted because it applies directly to the relief of injunction claimed by the applicant. No Court is competent under it‑‑‑ "to grant any injunction or other order in relation to any proceeding before (lie Commission . . . , or in relation to anything done or intended to be done by or at the instance of the Commission."

4. This provision and particularly the expression "in relation to" left but a narrow margin for the applicant in this revision to contend that he could obtain the desired order of injunction from civil Courts. Mr. Pirzada, counsel for the applicant tried to make use of the marginal field open to him by arguing that the desired injunction was not "in relation to any proceeding before the Commission" or "in relation to anything done or intended to be done" by the Commission. He tried to steer away from the restrictions contained in the sub‑paragraph by adopting the course of argument that the dispute between the applicant and respondent was of a private nature in which the Land Commission was not interested, and that the Commission could riot be expected to do anything or to intend to do anything to affect their private dispute. He supplemented this argument by referring to the following amendment of the Regulation made in March 1960, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub paragraph (5) of paragraph 4 of the Regulation: "Where any land is the subject‑matter of civil litigation, the surplus area shall be provisionally resumed but shall not be disposed of under paragraph 19 of the said Regulation until the decision of the civil suit." He inferred from this amendment that the Commission had indirectly modified paragraph 27 of the Regulation by which the jurisdiction of Civil Courts was barred so as to enable the Courts to decide disputes between the private parties relating to the title and possession of land. This being his interpretation, he completed his argument by saying that the order of injunction claimed by the applicant was merely to protect private rights of the applicant against unauthorised acts of the respondent. An injunction of this nature according to counsel, had no "relation" in terms of paragraph 27 of the Regulation with the proceedings that were pending before the Commission to verify the applicant's declarations, and that whatever doubt that existed in this respect was removed by the amendment of paragraph 27 that was made in March 1960.

5. The weakness of counsel's argument is that the so‑called amendment of paragraph 27 is in reality a new procedure laid down by the Commission for its own guidance. It does not take away anything from the prohibitive force of paragraph

27. The mention of "civil litigation" in the amendment is not enough to curtail the jurisdiction of the Commission to decide during the verification of the declarations as to which land or how much of the declared land should be accepted by the Commission to be the property of and in possession of the declarant. This jurisdiction being exclusively of the Commission, Civil Courts, are not expected in law to give decisions relating to the title or possessory right of a person whose declarations are under the consideration of the Commission. In elucidation of this aspect, consider the order of injunction, if one were to be issued, in this case against the respondent. Such an order will be based on the conclusion of the Civil Court that the applicant is the owner and in possession of the land which is in dispute. The order will not be against the Commission and will not be aimed at stopping the proceedings of verification and resumption of excess land by the Commission but will relate to those proceedings because the questions of title and possession of the applicant are to be finally decided by the Commission.

6. Mr. Pirzada considered the expression "in relation to" which is used in sub‑paragraph (2) of paragraph 27 to be equivalent to the words: "which may interfere with"; but there is no warrant for reading the expression in this restricted sense. The expression is very wide because the word "relation" includes the sense of association, connection, comparison as well as contrast. The expression "in relation to" is tided in section 4 (1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1938 of England which enacts that Trade Mark is deemed to be infringed by the use of an identical or similar mark "in relation to" any goods in respect of which it is registered, and has been interpreted in Bismag v. Amblins ((1940) 1 Ch. 667) to include the use of a trade mark in the advertisement of an object although there was no impression of the mark on the object itself.

7. Counsel nevertheless emphasised that the amendment would be useless if Civil Courts declined to assume jurisdiction to decide disputes between private parties. This argument is not founded on the comparison of the provisions of the amendment and of paragraph 27 of the Regulation but is based on the apparent purpose of the amendment. It sets forth a philosophical con sideration. The purpose of the amendment, however is not clear and cannot be accepted to be as wide as has been contended by counsel to be because the Commission cannot be expected, in view of the provisions of the Regulation, to allow anybody else besides itself to decide the correctness of declarations made by land‑holders. If it did so, then any declarant or his friend would file a civil suit and tie down the hands of the Commission in the performance of its work of resuming the excess land. This is not intended by the Regulation. What may be the purpose of the amendment is that in some matters, the Commission thinks it to be useful to be assisted by the views of Civil Courts in making its own decisions. There is a clear, clue to this disposition of the Commission in the following passage at page 86 of Volume I of Land Reforms in West Pakistan: "Alienations as a result of decrees obtained from revenue or Civil Courts before the 8th October 1958, should be accepted, but decrees passed after the 8th October 1958, should be scrutinized in order to determine whether or not the same have been obtained to defeat the object of the Regulation." One can understand that the Commission would like to be assisted by the decisions of Civil Courts in complicated questions of Civil disputes and would, therefore, like to wait for the conclusion of a civil litigation, but the decisions of Civil Courts are not binding on it nor can Civil Courts be guided for assuming jurisdiction by considerations of a possible convenience of the Commission. They are to be guided by the language of the law and not as against it by problematic philosophical considerations. Paragraph 27 of the Regulation bars the jurisdiction of Courts in all matters which fall within the ambit of its prohibition, excepting as explained in Messrs Pahlomal Motiram v. The Chief Land Commissioner (P L D 1961 Kar. 384). The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. K. B. A./A. H. Appeal dismissed.