P L D 1954 Lahore 366 (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑Mushtaq Ahmad respondent in this civil revision filed an application against the petitioner Dr. Aziz Rasul under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that the respondent required it for his own residence. The petitioner is a doctor who is admittedly carrying on a dispensary in the building in dispute. The building belongs to Mushtaq Ahmad respondent and the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted. In reply to the application, Dr. Aziz Rasul petitioner pleaded firstly that the respondent did not require it for‑his personal occupation, secondly that the respondent had ;another residential house in the same urban area, and thirdly that the property in dispute was not a residential building at all. The Rent Controller found that the respondent required the house for personal occupation that the building was a residential building and that the respondent was not occupying any house in the urban area concerned. The petitioner filed an appeal against this decision to the District Judge. The learned District judge agreed with the Rent Controller on all the three points and dismissed the appeal although his finding with respect to the question of the nature of the building is not quite clear. The point urged before me by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the building in dispute being a scheduled building the only ground available to the respondent under sec tion 13 (3) (a) was requirement of 6e building as a scheduled building and not for mere residence. That the building is in fact a scheduled building may be conceded although the Rent Controller found it to be a residential building. The Rent Controller and the learned District Judge have not held that the petitioner was not carrying on the profession of a doctor in this building. All that the Rent Controller meant to say was that this had been used by the petitioner for residence as well. He was only rejecting the plea of the petitioner that it was anon‑residential building. Mushtaq Ahmad respondent has in his statement as a witness admitted that, the petitioner was carrying on the business of a, doctor in the building in question and this fact is not denied before me by the learned counsel for the respondent. All that is urged is that the building is being used by the respondent for both purposes. I will, therefore, proceed on the basis that the building in dispute is scheduled building. In order to appreciate the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner it is necessary to refer to some provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The definitions of different kinds of buildings and of rented land are contained in section 2, the relevant portions of which are :‑ "non‑residential building' means a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade ; `rented land' means any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade ; `residential building' means any building which is not a non‑residential building; and `scheduled building' means a residential building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in the Schedule to this Act, partly for his business and partly for his residence". It is section 13 which provides the grounds on which a landlord may apply for the ejectment of the tenant. Sub section (3) of this section deals with the ground with which we are concerned. It runs :‑ (3) "(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in posses sion‑

(i) in the case of a residential or a scheduled building if‑ (a) he requires it for his own occupation ; (b) he is not occupying another residential or a scheduled building, as the case may be, in the urban area concerned ; and (c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area ; (ii) in the case of a non‑residential building or rented land if‑ (a) he requires it for his own use ; (b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land as the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act in the urabn area concerned: Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the land lord shall not be entitled to apply under this subsection before the expiry of such period ; Provided further that where the landlord has obtained possession of a residential, a scheduled or non‑residential building or rented land under the provisions of sub‑paragraph (i) or sub‑paragraph (ii) he shall not be entitled to apply again under the said sub-paragraph for tile possession of any other building of the same class or rented land. (b) The Controller shall, if lie is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate". The building in dispute is a scheduled building because it is being used by the petitioner for residence as well for business as a medical practitioner, that being one of the professions mentioned in the schedule. It will be observed that clause (i) of subsection (3) (a) provides for ejectment in case of residential and scheduled buildings, and it is under this clause that the respondent had applied. The respondent does not belong to any of the scheduled professions and requires the building only for his residence. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the words 'requires it for his own occupation' refer to occupation as scheduled building and that unless a landlord belongs to one of the scheduled professions he cannot apply under this clause in respect of a scheduled building. There is no doubt that the above‑mentioned words contain no qualification with respect to the object of occupation, and it is possible to argue, if we do not have regard to the other parts of the subsection, that the only requirement of the sub section is the need of landlord for its occupation. If we carefully consider the whole subsection, however, this inter pretation does not appear to be correct. It is to be noted that the condition precedent for an application in respect of any kind of building is the non‑occupation of a building of the same kind in the urban area concerned. If a person has a non‑residential building or rented land in an area, he cannot, according to (ii) (b), get possession of a non -residential building or rented land. If a person has a scheduled building he cannot, according to (i) (b), get possession of a scheduled building, and the same is the case with a residential building. The words `as the case may be' in (i) (b) and (ii) (b) make it clear that the possession of one kind of building is no bar to an application in respect of a building of another, kind. Another provision in this subsection which needs attention is the proviso in accordance with which a successful application for one kind of building bars another application for the same kind of building. The intention is that a landlord should not have in his possession two buildings of the same Class. At the same time his possession of building of one class is no bar to a possession of building of the other class. It is clear that the Legislature intends to prevent the occupation by one landlord of more than one building in a particular urban area for same purpose for the classification of buildings is based on purposes, a use partly for residence and partly for business being regarded as a purpose of a different kind than use for mere residence or business. If we do not accept the interpretation which is put upon this subsection by the petitioner and do not limit occupation to occupation as a scheduled or residential building the result would be that a person who has got in his possession a residential building will be able to get another building merely for the purpose of residence, and a person who has got a scheduled building shall be entitled to acquire a residential building for the purpose of its use as scheduled building. As I have stated above it is not the intention of the Legislature that a person should have two buildings put to the same use in the same urban area. That a landlord cannot apply for a residential building for use as a non‑residential and vice versa is clear from section 11 of the Act which runs: "Conversion of a residential building into a non‑residential building.‑No person shall convert a residential building into a non‑residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller". At the same time the Legislature has in section 13 (3) used the word "occupation" in reference to residential buildings and the word "use" in reference to non‑residential buildings and rented lands. Here the word Fuse" is employed in contradistinction to occupation and does not include occupation for residence. The object of the Legislature in employing two different words in relation to residential and non‑residential buildings obviously was that they may not be required by the landlord for purposes other than those for which they were being used. Section 11 leads to the inference that the word "occupation" used in section 13 (3) when used in respect of a residential building can only mean occupation `as such'. If the words 'as such' have to be added to the word occupation in (1) (a) they will also govern the case of a scheduled building. It may be argued that whereas section 11 prevents conversion of a residential building into a non‑residential building and vice versa, it makes no mention of a scheduled building. But this may be due to the fact that the Legislature could not force the tenant to stick to the profession he is carrying on. If a doctor used a building for his residence and business it is a scheduled building. But if he gives up his profession it automatically ceases to be a scheduled building. The most important argument in favour of the petitioner's interpretation is this. The phrase "scheduled building" after its definition in section 2 occurs only in section 13. (I am dealing with the Act of 1949). If the Legislature has taken the trouble of creating a separate class of buildings and has even provided a special schedule for this purpose, it must have done so with some object. It cannot have defined "scheduled building" merely for the sake of definition. I have gone through the whole Act and I can find no object for this definition except that of protecting such a building from being taken by the landlord for purpose other than use as a scheduled building. If I do not accept the interpretation put upon this phrase by learned counsel for the petitioner the result would be that there will be a superfluous definition and schedule existing in the Act with no purpose at all. It appears to me ' that intention of the Legislature in classifying certain buildings as scheduled buildings was to afford a special protection to members of certain professions. I hold that the landlord, cannot apply under subsection (3) of section 13 in respect of a scheduled building unless he requires it for use as a scheduled building. Admittedly the respondent does not require the building in dispute for use as a scheduled building. This application for revision is accepted and the order of ejectment is set aside. The parties will bear their own costs throughout. A. H. Petition accepted.