P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

The learned Judges have come to the conclusion with reference to the offending letter that the single intention of the writer was " to strongly object against the action of this Court and its officers for commanding his personal appearance in this Court and if the High Court does not desist from so commanding his personal appearance in Court, then it may be clearly told by the Government to withdraw all liquidation proceedings from him ". It was written by the appellant to the Government, without his having made the slightest attempt to place his difficulties, if any, before the High Court. He had raised the plea that his purpose in writing the letter was " to point out to the Govern ment how hard his work was and to seek for the appointment of a legal adviser to the Official Receiver in the same way as a legal adviser is appointed by the State Bank of Pakistan ". The parallel is of course wholly inexact. The learned Judges have pointed out that under section 4 the Calcutta Official Receivers Act 1938, it is clearly contemplated that the Official Receiver is under a duty to appear personally in the High Court as often as may be required. The words of that section lay down that an Official Receiver. " may be appointed receiver by the Court in respect of any property, and save as otherwise provided in this Act, he shall have the same powers, duties and liabilities, shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges and shall be subject to the same control by the Court as any other receiver ". The view of the learned Judges is clearly sustained by the terms of this section. They have also pointed out that under section 181 of the Companies Act, 1913, an Official Liquidator such as the appellant, can only appoint a 'lawyer to appear on his behalf before the Court, if the Court specifically permits him to do so, on an application made. Therefore, the explanation that the appellant was seeking the aid of a retained legal adviser clearly cannot meet the charge. Both as Official Receiver as, well as in the capacity of Official Liquidator, the appellant's presence in Court was probably necessary fairly frequently for the purpose of receiving instructions, reporting on action taken, furnishing accounts and a great many similar matters in which his actions are rendered by law subject to the control and superin tendence of the Court. The complaint upon this point, made by the appellant to the Government was, briefly, as follows. He said he had to work " tremendously " hard to clear a great volume of arrears, which had been built up in his office during the period of a year and a half that it had remained vacant before he was appointed. In addition to this, he " had also to appear before a Company Judge in person " and " on the top of it " he found himself being called by the Deputy Registrar and the Assistant Registrar to their offices " for discussion on ordinary routine works ". He found it " too difficult to respond to so many‑sided calls demanding my presence here there and every where ", and therefore tried to ascertain his " legal and consti tutional position, and the corresponding duties ". He went on to say that the terms of his appointment did not mention that he would " have to appear before the Company Judge in all matters ". It could not be regarded " as a routine duty " that he should appear prepared on facts and law in every case. His administrative duties were so heavy that it was not " humanly possible for (him) to appear before the Company Judge in the hearing of legal matters ". Declaring that his predecessors had never been asked so to appear, he went on to pronounce upon his duties in the following words: " I am not to appear in the hearing of the matters of any kind before the Company Judge ". This attitude is repeated in the following paragraph where he mentions certain correspondence and concludes with the following declaration: " I am even now too frequently to appear before the Company Judge and I find it impossible to continue the same any longer ". ' He concluded the letter by asking the Government to " write to the Honourable High Court that the Official Receiver shall not appear before the Court as Advocate according to the, tradition and condition of service ". The sentence following this line in the printed paper book reads as if the writer were contending that he could not be called to appear before a Judge for clarification of points which could not be clarified by his counsel. In a type written copy, which Mr. Asrar‑ul- Hossain has provided, the sentence reads as if the writer were admitting that he could be called by a Judge for such clarification. Mr. Asrar‑ul‑Hossain has argued that his client had never complained of being required to appear personally before a Company Judge, so long as the appearance was for the purpose of clarifying matters, which his counsel was unable to clear. That explanation, whether it be available or not does not any means amend the grave mischief of the letter. Indeed, in the very next line the writer makes an obnoxious suggestion to which the learned Judges have rightly, taken serious exception. It is in the following words: " If the High Court is not agreeable to this, the High Court may be requested to withdraw the liquidation matters from the Official Receiver and make some other arrangements ". The duties of Official Liquidator attach to an Official Receiver by the operation of section 171‑As Companies Act, which says that: " On the making of a winding up order, the Official Receiver shall become the Official Lijuidat61r of the Company and shall continue to act as such until his further continuance is terminated by an order of the. Court ". By section 175, the Court is empowers in 'a particular, case to, appoint a person other than an Official Receiver to act as Official Liquidator in the winding‑up of a ' Company. If therefore, the appellant had indeed felt oppressed by the weight' of his duties, it teas open to him to move the Court under, section 171‑A aforesaid, and 'the Court might then, if it agreed to relieve him ' of the duties of the Official Liquidator in a particular case ' or cases, have appointed a substitute or substitutes. These functions are functions of the Court to be performed by the Court independently 'the' of any other authority, and exclusively upon consideration of circumstances of the cases before it.. To invite the Government, upon whose special protection the appellant seems to have placed an unwise‑ degree of reliance, to influence the High Court to exercise its powers in law in the manner suggested, was certainly an attempt to interfere with the working of the Court and as such a calcu lated contempt. If the Government of their own accord had taken such action as was suggested by the appellant they would undoubtedly have been in gross contempt. Where such an invitation is issued by‑"a person who besides being an Advocate, is associated with the actual working of the High Court in matters relating to the preservation and distribution of valuable property, there is clearly an inexcusable contempt of the most serious character. We consider that in all the circumstances, the appellant has indeed been very lightly dealt with. For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal with costs. . K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.