1971 PLP 388 (PLC)

They are as follows :‑ I have heard at length the preliminary arguments of the petitioner's counsel Mr. Riaz Anwar, Advocate in support of the application under consideration. My derision in regard to this application is as recorded below. The exact provisions of section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as amended by the Industrial Relations Amend ment Ordinance, 1970 are worded as follows:‑ "

34. Application to Labour Court.‑Any Collective Bargain ing Agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement." It is abundantly clear from the above‑cited provisions of the law, under which the present application purports to have been instituted in this Labour Court, that the only party that can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, as amended with effect from October 17, 1970, is a party that is either a Collective Bargaining Agent or an employer or a workman. Given this position of the matter it may aptly be remarked that the present petitioner is neither a Collective Bargaining Agent nor an employer nor has he himself claimed to belong to either of. these two categories of persons. It remains to be considered whether or not the petitioner is a workman within the definition pf that term as set‑forth in clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. That definition is phrased as follows :‑‑ " `Worker' and `workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or ; through a contractor whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and, for the purpose of any proceedings under, the Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay off, or removal has led to that' dispute." I have examined minutely the contents of the application under consideration. In the entire text of that application the petitioner has `not uttered a single word to indicate that he was employed by the respondent for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor. Indeed, the petitioner, has, apart from mentioning his profession as that of a Sub‑Editor, not taken the trouble of describing in detail the exact nature of the duties that he was performing as an employee of the respondent. The petitioner has also omitted to stated in his application the exact date with effect from which and the terms and conditions on which he was first employed by the respondent. In any vase there is absolutely no material in the application itself to justify the supposition that the petitioner was workman employed, by the respondent for either hire or reward. On the other hand it has explicitly been stated in the above‑cited definition of the term workman, vide clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, that the expression workman denotes a person who has been employed in an establishment or industry. The term establishment has been defined in section 2(ix) of that very Ordinance in the follow ing terms :‑ "Establishment" means any office, firm, industrial unit under -taking shop or premises in which workmen are employed for the purpose of carrying on any industry." The expression `industry' has been defined in the below- reproduced terms in section 2(xiv) of the same Ordinance :‑ "Industry" means any business trade manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation." Keeping in view as clearly as possible all the above‑cited definitions of relevant and important legal terms enunciated in the text of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969, it has to be ascertained whether the respondent, who has been described as Rana Allah Dad Khan, Managing Director, Ittehad Publications Limited Kohistan, Lahore, falls within the definition of either an `establishment' or an `industry' It stands to reasons that an individual employer cannot be regarded in the s legal sense ~as either an establishment or an industry. Neither the petitioner nor his counsel has explained to this Court the exact nature or structure of the organisation described in the application itself as Ittehad Publications Limited Kohistan, Lahore. There is, therefore, no factual or legal justification for assuming readily that the organisation in question is either an establishment or an industry within the legal meanings attached respectively to those two terms in the Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969. Lastly, it would be fitting to comment upon the nature of the prayer set‑forth in the concluding portion of the application under consideration. Under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a party can apply to a Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement. In the present case the petitioner has prayed that this Court might summon the respondent Rana Allah Dad to the Court and take punitive action against him personally after inquiring into the grievances of the petitioner. The nature of this prayer is' such as to leave no room for doubt as to its being inconsistent with the requirements of section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In this context it may also be mentioned expressly that under the amended provisions of section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 a Labour Court can no long adjudicate any industrial dispute. After the promulgation of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1970, and industrial dispute can be adjudicated by a Labour Court only if such a dispute is referred to it for adjudication by the Provincial Government under section 32(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, Be that as it may it is transparently clear that the petitioner has not specified in his application under consideration the exact right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement, which he would like this Labour Court to enforce against the respon dent. If the purpose of this application was to challenge the termination of the petitioner's employment by the respondent on the ground that the petitioner had been deprived by he respondent of any benefits accruing to the petitioner under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, then the petitioner, who is obviously not an office‑bearer of any registered Trade Union as distinct from an ordinary member, should have instituted a complaint under Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordi nance, 1968 in this Labour Court. In such a complaint he should have indicated the exact benefits accruing to him under that afore‑mentioned Provincial Ordinance which he would like to be granted to him by the respondent through the intervention of this. Labour Court. It goes without saying that the petitioner did not avail himself of that lawful means of obtaining redress of his grievance but chose to submit the present application a under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in disregard of the provisions of that section. The above reference to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial, Employ ment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 should not however be taken to imply that the petitioner can legally be deemed to be a workman even within the scope of the definition of that term in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. For all the above‑recorded reasons this application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is hereby dismissed. In view of the provisions of subsection (4) of section 37 of that Ordinance this decision of the Labour Court (Central Zone), Lahore "shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority". Consequently no appeal lies against this decision to any Court or any other authority,