P L D 1979 Karachi 246 (PLP)

The petitioner has challenged the above termination order on the ground that the alleged inquiry was not conducted in accordance with the Regulation No. 25 of the Regulations, and that he was not provided an opportunity as was required under the Regulations. The respondent No. 1 has filed a counter‑affidavit in which the petitioner's above allegations are denied. It has been asserted that the termination of the services has been done as per rule 10 of the Regulations which was termina tion simpliciter. 2. (a) When the above petition came up for hearing the learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that there is a direct ruling of our Supreme Court in respect of respondent No. 1's employees, namely, R. T. H. Janjua v. National Slipping Corporation (PLD1974SC146), wherein it has been held that the constitutional safeguards available to the civil servants against the arbitrary dismissal or removal from service are not available to the servants of a registered company or a statutory corporation and that the general law of master and servant is applicable and that the only remedy available to the aggrieved servant in such cases is to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and not for a writ of mandamus or certiorari. It was further held in the above case that the essence of the matter always is whether the aggrieved incumbent could not be regarded as holder of a public office. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the above case is distinguishable and that the petition is competent. He has relied. upon the case of Ikramul Haq v. West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore (P L D 1974 Lah. 82), the case of Sind Industrial Trading Estate Ltd., Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue (P L D 1975 Kar. 128), the case of Muhammad Salimullah v. Trustee of the Port of Karachi (P L D 1975 Kar. 758) and the case of Syed Akbar Ali Bokhari v. State Bank of Pakistan (P L D 1977 Lah. 234). (b) In the first case a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court was pleased to take the view that WAPDA is a person within the meaning of Article 201 of the Constitution functioning in connection with the affairs of the province in vital and important public spheres, namely, supply and co‑ordination of resources of water and power and, therefore, an employee of WAPDA was competent to maintain a writ petition if there has been violation of the statutory rules. However, the petition was dismissed inter alia on the ground that the post which the petitioner was holding was abolished. (c) Referring to the S. I. T. E. case of Karachi it may be stated that a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Sind & Baluchistan was pleased to take the view that the S. I. T. E. though clothed with juristic personality more or less had performed essential provincial function to develop trade and industries and that the income of such corporate body amounts to an income of Provincial Government hence not liable to Income‑tax under the Income‑tax Act, 1922, sections 46(5‑A) and 4 (iii). It may be observed that the above two rulings are not applicable to the instant case. The fact that a corporation performs the functions relating to the provincial affairs will not simpliciter entitle an employee of such corporation to file a petition for the relief of re‑instatement. (d) In the case of Lt: Col. Shujauddin Ahmed v. Oil & Gas Development Corpn. (1971 S C M R 566) it was contended by the appellant that the respondent corporation was in all respects a Government Department for the Government contributed the entire capital of the Corporation, appointed all its directors and could remove them at its discretion, and that the Board of Directors of the Corporation also functioned subject to the instructions of the Central Government, and that it had no power even to borrow or to raise funds without the consent in writing of the Central Government. It was further urged in the above case that the respondent Corporation being under executive control of the Government was performing functions of the Government and. therefore, everyone who was employed by the Corporation was, under Article 176 of the Constitution of 1962, a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Centre, and was entitled to the guarantees given by Article 177 of the Constitution. But our Supreme Court was pleased to repel the above contention and was pleased to hold that the consistent view of the Supreme Court hitherto-fore has been that the employees of such statutory corporation do not acquire the status of a Government servant nor are the guarantees given by the Constitution applicable in their case. (e) Referring to the case of Mohd. Salimullah v. Trustee of the Port of Karachi, it may be stated that the petitioner in the above case challenged the order of the respondent Trustee of the port of Karachi, whereby he was compulsorily retired after holding an inquiry in respect of the alleged irregularities committed by him. A Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Sind & Baluchistan was pleased to hold that as the petitioner was holding the post of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer which was the post specifically mentioned in 'Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, and that his duties were also specified in the Act and, therefore, he was holding a public Office. The judgment was delivered by Dorab Patel. J. (as he then was). His Lordship was also pleased to make a distinction between the violation of a rule and contravention of a section of an Act. It was held that as there was contravention of section 24 of the K. P. T. Act inasmuch as that prior approval of the Central Government was not obtained before issuing the show- cause notice proposing to impose penalty, the above show cause notice and the subsequent action taken in pursuance thereof were without lawful authority. The above case is distinguishable from the instant case in-as-much as the petitioner admittedly does not hold a public office. (e) Referring to the case of Syed Akbar Ali Bokhari v. State Bank of Pakistan, it may be stated that Karam Elahi Chauhan, J. (as he then was) while dealing with the petition filed by an employee of the State Bank of Pakistan was pleased to hold that the State Bank was performing the functions relating to the affairs in respect of the numerous items of the federal list mentioned in the Constitution and that as Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act LIII of 1952 is applicable to the employees of the State Bank of Pakistan, such service cannot be regulated by the law of master and servant. However, the writ petition was dismissed as his Lordship was pleased to observe that no jurisdictional defect in the impugned order was brought to his Lordship's notice. The above case is also distinguishable inasmuch as the Court was pursuaded to take the view that the law relating to master and servant was not applicable for the reason that the employees of the State Bank were subject to the Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. No such plea has been taken in the present petition. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Wadood submitted at the Bar that in fact the above Act of 1952 is also applicable to the employees of the National Shipping Corporation. As the petitioner has not made any assertion to that effect in the petition and as the respondents had no opportunity to meet the above plea, we did not consider it proper to presume that in fact Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 was applicable to the employees of the National Shipping Corporation.

3. We had asked the learned counsel for the petitioner to point out any distinction between the present case and the aforesaid case of R. T. H. Janjua, decided by the Supreme Court, he was unable to point out any distinction except that he submitted that their Lordships of the Supreme . Court had not taken into consideration the effect of the application of the provisions of the Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. As the petitioner had not taken any such plea in the petition we cannot distinguish the above Supreme Court's ruling on a plea, which does not even find any place in the petition. We are, therefore, of the view that the case of R. T. H. Janjua is applicable to the instant case. We may also observe that our Supreme Court has consistently held that the relationship between a corporation and its employee is that of master and servant. In this regard we may refer to the case of Malik and Haq v. Shamsh-ul-Islam (PLD1961SC531), the case of Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and another. v. Rustam Ali and another (PLD1966SC848), the case of Zainul Abidin v. Multan Central Co‑operative Bank Ltd., Multan (PLD1966SC415), the case of Abdus Salam Mehta v. Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority and another (1970SCMR40), the case of Shahid Khalil v. P.1. A (1971 S C M R 566) and the case of Lt: Col. Shujauddin v. Oil & Gas Development Corporation. In view of the above discussion we are of the view that the petition does not merit and, therefore, the same is dismissed but with no order as to costs. S. Q. Petition dismissed.