P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

H. T. RAYMOND, J.‑

This Letters Patent Appeal is from the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court decreeing with costs and interest at six per cent. per annum on the principal sum from the date. of the decree until payment a suit filed by the respondents‑plaintiffs against the appellants‑defendants for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,58,278.

2. The respondents‑plaintiffs are the Trustees of the Port of Karachi being a Statutory Body under the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886. The appellants‑defendants are a Firm of Merchants doing business at Karachi. They had ' imported a consignment of 252 packages of mild steel plates which arrived at the Port of Karachi on board the ss "BERKENFELS" on 22‑12‑1951. The appellants‑defendants took some time to prove their title to the said consignment and obtain clearance thereof so that it was only on 18‑10‑1952 that they cleared this consignment from the premises of the Port Trust. The Port Trust demanded storage and wharfage fees as per their Schedule of Charges sanctioned by Government and after allowing the appellants‑defendants credit for the periods specified in the two Delay Certificates obtained by their from the Customs Authorities they claimed the balance of Rs. 1,58,278 and on 26‑10‑1957 filed a suit against the appellants‑defendants for the recovery of this sum of money. According to the respondents‑plaintiffs the cause of action arose on 26‑8‑1955 when the amount of their dues was finally determined on the basis of the two Delay Certificates. In the alternative, it was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiffs that this suit is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. Several defences were taken to this suit by the appellants‑defendants and as a result of the pleadings in this matter a number of issues were raised: but, for the purposes of this present appeal, it becomes unnecessary to set out here or to consider the defences taken by the appellants‑defendants because their Advocate Mr. Abdul Aziz has urged only one issue concerning limitation before us and has based his entire argument on this one issue as to whether the suit is barred by limitation.

3. It is the contention of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants that it is Article 110 and not Article 120 of the Limitation Act that governs this suit. Article 110 provides that a suit for arrears of rent must be filed within the period of three years from when the arrears become due. Article 120, of course, is the residuary Article which provides that where no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule that suit shall be filed within six years from the date when the right to sue accrues. It was contended by Mr. Aziz that the word "RENT" has a technical meaning and that the learned Single Judge has erred in his judgment in limiting the meaning of this word to the sense in which it is used in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Aziz submitted that apart from the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, there are other Acts of about the same period in which the term "RENT" has been used and he referred us in this connection to section 92(b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, section 499 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 and to .the Central Excise Rules which also make provision for payment of rent and warehouse dues. He pointed out that the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) was introduced after the Sea Customs Act (1878), the Transfer of Property Act (1882), the Karachi Port Trust Act (1886), the Merchant Shipping Act (1894) and argued that the word "RENT" as used in the last of these Acts namely the Limitation Act should be given the same interpretation and should be taken in the same sense as 'in the preceding Acts. He said that these Statutes are all in pari materia and referred us to a passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes: "Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system and as explanatory to each other." He also relied upon a passage from the Interpretation of Statutes by N. S. Bindra at page 249‑ "It is, therefore, an established: rule of law, that all Acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were on law; and they are directed to be compared in the construction of statutes, because they are considered .as framed upon one system and having one object in view." Mr. Aziz also referred us to the K. P. T. Scale of Charges and to the word "RENT" used therein and he contended that the K. P. T. acts as a warehouseman when it stores goods and is entitled to warehouse rent for the period of this storage which rent accrues from day to day and is solely dependent for its quantum upon the length of the period of storage. The second contention put forward by Mr. Aziz was that there is an implied contract between the Importers of goods and the K. P. T. and therefore, the liability on the part of the Importer to pay rent for storing his goods is contractual and not a statutory liability.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Ajmal Mian the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents‑plaintiffs has urged that the Karachi Port Trust which is a Statutory Body created and ‑governed by statute has certain functions to perform as set out in the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886. One of these functions as explained in section 32 is to provide and maintain Wharves, Quays, Jetties, Piers, Warehouses, Sheds and Appliances for the expeditious and convenient shipment and landing of goods in and from seagoing vessels within the port and for the storing of such goods. Section 43 empowers the Board of the K. P. T. to frame a Scale of Charges for the landing and shipment of goods and for the storing and keeping of any goods stored in any premises belonging to the Board. Section 43(B) makes imperative for the Board to submit every scale framed and every alteration of such scale to Government for its sanction and goes on to state that‑ "When so sanctioned and published in the official Gazette, it shall have the force of law." The learned counsel pointed out that it is this term of storage and wharfage fee that has been used by his clients in their plaint as well as by the defendants in their written‑statements. He referred us to the exchange of correspondence between the parties in which the word "RENT" nowhere appears but instead the words "DEMURRAGE CHARGES", "DEMURRAGE BILL" and "HEAVY DEMURRAGE" have been used with no suggestion at any time that these demurrage or storage charges are, in fact, arrears of rent. Referring to Order VI, rule 7, C. P. C. the learned counsel submitted that the point now urged by Mr. Aziz was a complete departure from the correspondence, the pleadings and the evidence recorded and that he was precluded from doing so by the language of Order VI, rule 7, C. P. C. Mr. Ajmal Mian, finally, pointed out that the Importers of goods by Sea have no option but to store their goods in the Port Trust Sheds until they are cleared and therefore, the liability of such Importers to pay storage charges is a statutory liability created by the Karachi Port Trust Act under section 84 of which arrears of such charges can be recovered upon a summary proceeding before a Magistrate in the manner provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the recovery of fines.

5. It seems to us that the first point of importance for decision in this appeal is whether the moneys recovered by the Port Trust Authorities from those who use their Sheds or Plinths for storing their goods can be considered as or termed rent or rather as the Act itself states storage charges. We observe that the respondents‑plaintiffs in their plaint have used the term `storage and wharfage fee and that the appellants defendants have done likewise in their written‑statements. The correspondence exchanged between the parties preparatory to the filing of this suit also used the words "DEMURRAGE CHARGES", "DEMURRAGE BILL" but nowhere the word "RENT". From a perusal of the correspondence and the pleadings in this case it is manifest that the main argument urged by Mr. Abdul Aziz before us on behalf of the appellants and also pressed into service by him before the learned Single Judge is not reflected therein. This point may have occurred to him after the recording of the evidence in this case and at the time of arguments and as it is a point of law he may have been permitted to urge it. But, the fact remains that the basis that should have been laid in the pleadings for urging such a point is lacking in this case and this omission does detract from the weight of this argument as urged before us by Mr. Aziz.

6. Nor, are we impressed by the contention of Mr. Aziz that the word "RENT" finds place in the Booklet entitled "Scale of Charges" prepared by the Port Trust and framed under sections 43 and 43‑A of the Karachi Port Trust Act. Mr. Aziz referred us to Note 1 and Note 6 in which the word "RENT" appears but it is of importance to note that these charges have been framed under sections 43 and 43‑A of the Karachi Port Trust Act and that the word "RENT" nowhere appears in these sections of the Act. Therefore, when the main Act refers to the storing charges and empowers the Board of the Port Trust to frame and from time to time to alter a scale of such charges, if the word "RENT" has crept into the language used when determining this scale of charges, surely, no significance can be attached to this word on the well known principle that the rules framed under an Act cannot go beyond the Act itself.

7. We have also considered the sections of the Karachi Port Trust Act to which our attention has been invited by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents and we observe that they all refer to charges, rates, dues to be recovered from those who store their goods in the Port Trust Sheds or Plinths. These charges require Government approval after which they acquire the force of law and, therefore, they are in the nature of statutory payments which the Importer or Store is bound to make and which can be recovered from him through a Criminal Court under the same procedure provided for the recovery of fines. Moreover, the Importer has no option but to store his goods in these Sheds until he is able to establish title to the goods and obtain clearance for them. Thus, his liability is a statutory liability and not one based on contract. As between the Port Trust and the Importer who stores his goods in their premises there is no relationship as of landlord and tenant and this is a further circumstance which would go to show that the dues recovered from such Importers are storage charges or demurrage fees and not rent in the sense in which the term is used as between lessor and lessee. Our attention was invited to a recent decision of the Madras High Court reported in A I R 1962 Mad. 415 in which it was held by the Officiating Chief Justice of that High Court that‑-- "The right of Madras Port Trust Authorities to recover the fees and charges for services rendered and for accommodation in their godowns is a statutory right conferred upon them by the Madras Port Trust Act. A suit for such charges cannot be regarded as one for rent and would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and not by Article 110."

8. We have also considered the contention of Mr. Aziz that the word "RENT" as used in Article 110 of the Limitation Act must be construed in the same sense and must be taken to have the same meaning that it has in the Acts that came into existence at or about the time of the Limitation Act such as the Sea Customs Act (1878), the Transfer of Property Act (1882) and the Merchant Shipping Act (1894) on the principle of the Statutes all being in pari materia. Now this argument, such as it is, may be well‑founded but the point remains that we are not satisfied that the charges levied by the Port Trust for storage in their Sheds and on their Plinths can be called rent. To us it is plain that these are storage or demurrage charges or wharfage fees to be paid by an Importer of goods for storing his goods on the Port Trust Wharves or Premises. We have already pointed out in the preceding paragraphs that these charges are of statutory origin creating a statutory liability on the part of the Importer to pay such charges and therefore, they cannot be considered as rent in the sense in which this word is used in Article 110 of the Limitation Act. Hence, while we are in agreement with the contention of Mr. Aziz that all Acts in pari materia should be taken together as if they were one law, we are constrained to say that this argument can be of no avail to him in this matter because‑the term rent cannot be applied to the storage charges or demurrage or wharfage fee recovered by the Port Trust from the Importers of goods by Sea who use their premises for storing their goods.

9. In the course of their arguments in this appeal both the Advocates have referred us to a wealth of Case‑Law. During the hearing of this appeal in Court we have read every reported case cited before us and we have also noted down the references. But, we consider it unnecessary to burden this judgment with this long list of reported cases. The point for decision before us in this appeal is a short one, namely, whether the suit out of which this appeal arises is governed by Article 110 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act. This, in turn, is dependent upon whether the storage charges levied by the Port Trust can be termed as rent. We have shown above that this cannot possibly be so and as a result of this conclusion arrived at by us it must follow that Article 110 of the Limitation Act can have no application to this case.

10. We, therefore, find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs. K.B.A. Appeal dismissed.