P L D 1964 Dacca 12 (PLP)

"A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration."

6. It is thus clear that a document that has been registered relates back to the date of its execution so that the question of title as between two contestants claiming on the basis of successive documents executed by the self‑same vendor or vendors must be determined with reference to the title of the latter on the dates of execution and not of registration thereof. In this connection reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Fazar All and others v. Afzal Mia and others already mentioned above. The relevant proposition has been laid down therein as follows :‑ "A document executed earlier but registered later will have precedence over a document which though registered earlier in point of time was in fact executed later on the principle that it is execution and not registration that determines the precedence of one document over another." Mr. Abdulla, however, disputes the soundnesses of this proposition and contends that section 47 contemplates one single transfer and has no application to such cases as involve more than one transfer, i.e., successive transfers. In other words, he seeks to restrict the operation of the said section to the parties to the same document or those claiming through them on that basis and contends that purchasers under different kabala, even though executed by the same vendors, are third parties with respect to the documents of one another, to whom, therefore, the principles of section 47 cannot be extended. It appears to us clear that section 47 is intended to safeguard the interest of a bona fide vendee under an instrument, which though only executed, is waiting registration by ensuring that he is not deprived of the property in case his vendor turns round to take advantage of the fact that the said instrument is still unregistered and executes a fresh kabala and gets it registered as well purporting to convey the self‑same property in favour of another. To accept the aforementioned argument of Mr. Abdulla and hold that section 47 operates as between the vendor and vendee in respect of a single transfer only and is inapplicable to successive transfers, therefore, would be defeating the very purpose of that section. The consensus of the authorities on the point, too, is that in the case of successive transfers of the self‑same property in favour of different persons by a common vendor by registered documents, the dispute as to the precedence of one document over the other has to be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in section 47 and the learned Advocate failed to lay his hand on any decision laying down a contrary proposi tion. As to the second branch of his argument on the score of third parties, the learned Advocate has referred to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court, to wit Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar (44 CWN 802) and Gosto Behari Das v. Razabala Del and another (60 CWN 57) both of which, it may be borne in mind, related to cases under section 26‑F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is true, as has been observed therein, that the date of registration is the material date as transfer can only be made by registered document and title cannot possibly pass to the transferee till registration effected but a‑sale under a document registered after another kabala has been registered in the meantime is also a sale by a registered document or in other words cannot be said to be a sale other wise than by a registered document for the reason that regis tration happens to be effected some time after execution of the deed of conveyance and in a conflict between such documents, as has already been observed, section 47 shall apply. In support of his contention to the contrary, however, Mr. Abdullah relied particularly upon the observations appearing in the following passage in Gosto Behari Das v. Rajabala Del :‑ "Where different properties have been transferred by different instruments or where the contest is with a third party the decisions have been in accordance with the plain meaning of section 40 of the Registration Act or the relevant section of the Transfer of Property Act. Those decisions proceed on the view that where title to immovable property cannot be effected except by a registered instrument an instrument purporting to affect title can only operate when registration has been com pleted and, therefore, when there is competition between two documents executed on different dates, but concerning different properties, each should be taken as taking effect from the date of its registration. Decisions which have taken this view are the cases of Gobardhan Bar v. Gunudhar Bar 44 C W N 802 and Naresh Chandra Dutt v. Girlsh Chandra Das 61 C L J

360. In fact the former followed the latter. The case in 61 C L J 360, is in its own turn based, so far as this point concerned, upon decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Veerappa Chetly v. Kadirsan Chety (1913) 24 M L J

664. I confess that the question is not free from difficulty. If section 47 of the Registration Act is treated as limited to successive transfers of the same property the difficulty un doubtedly disappears, but the language of the section is sufficiently wide to cover transfers of different properties as well. Again, if the principle of the section is to apply as between the vendor and the vandee, there must be some good reason as to why it should not apply as against third parties. I invited the learned Advocates to furnish the reason, but they were unable either to find it in the reported cases or to supply it themselves. The difficulty to my mind remains unsolved."

7. Having regard to the context it appears to us unambig uously clear that the expression "third party" occurring fn the above passage has been used in the sense of strangers claiming on some basis other than successive transfers of the self‑same subject matter by a common vendor e.g., purchasers of different properties by different instruments. The learned Judges have merely posed a question without actually deciding as to why the operation of section 47 instead of being limited to successive transfers of the same property by common vendor should not be extended to such third parties as well. So far as applicability of section 47 to successive transfers of the same property is concerned the learned Judges do not appear to have entertained any doubt at all. On the other hand, they appear to have referred with approval to the construction to that effect uniformly put upon section 47 in all the decided cases and have actually adopted the same themselves. For our present purpose that suffices and it is not necessary for us to attempt a solution of the difficulty that the learned Judges in the above case have left unsolved i.e., why the principle of the said section should not be extended to the third parties, such as have been indicated above, as well. The only other observation we would like to add in this connection is that the case of Gobardhan v. Gundha cited by Mr. Abdullah is, also clearly against him, as may be seen from the following extract therefrom :‑ " . . . . It is undoubtedly true that as between the transferor and the transfree the registered document takes effect from the date of execution, and if there is a competition between two documents relating to the same property both of which are registered, the one executed earlier in point of time will have priority, but as regards a third party, the point of time at which the deed is to be effective is when it is registered."

8. It may be mentioned that the learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff‑opposite‑party also placed his reliance upon the above case and further referred to another authority, i.e., Jeo Narayan Matho v. Budhan Matho and others (A I R 1941 Pat. 247). Like the present case before us, that case, too, appears to have come on reference by a Single Judge to a Division Bench. In the judgment delivered by Harris, C. J., the relevant proposition has been laid down as follows "Where a land is sold to A by executing a sale deed which is unregistered and subsequently the same land is sold to B by registered deed, and sale deed executed in favour of B, the sale deed in favour of A operates not from the date of its execution. Hence sale in favour of B which is subsequent to execution of sale deed in favour of A does not give B good title against A."

9. Thus on a consideration of the authorities cited before us together with the language of section 47, we are in agreement with the principle enunciated in Fazar Ali and others v. Afzal Miah and others and other earlier cases on the point. The contention urged by Mr. Abdullah has, therefore, no force or substance at all.

10. It follows that the dispute has been correctly decided by the learned Courts below and there is nothing to call for any interference. The second appeal, which has since been converted into a revision, is, therefore, dismissed with cost. HASAN, J.‑I agree. s. B./g. B. A. Appeal dismissed.