P L D 1957 W (PLP)

" There shall be a Board of Revenue and the following classes of Revenue Officers, namely (a) omitted (b) the Commissioner (c) the Collector (d) the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade (e) the Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade". The heading of section 6 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act is " classes of Revenue Officers". It is, therefore, clear that the Board of Revenue is a Revenue Officer. As a matter of fact, there is complete agreement on this point and there is no difference of opinion whatsoever that the Board of Revenue is a Revenue Officer. It is true that section 15 does not find a place in Schedule III to the said Ordinance but we are of the view that it was not necessary to make any mention of section 15 in Schedule III because the term "Financial Commissioner" does not find a place therein at all. The provisions of section 15 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act are, however, quite clear that a Revenue Officer can review an order passed by himself or by any of his predecessors‑in‑office. Here again, there is unanimity that the Board of Revenue can review its own order but there is difference of opinion as to whether the Board of Revenue can review an order passed by a Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab. Under section 15 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, a Revenue Officer can review the order of any of his predecessor‑in‑office and the main question for determination, therefore, is whether a Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab was a predecessor of the Board of Revenue or not. As has been mentioned above, the term "Financial Commis sioner" has been replaced by virtue of section 3 (2) of the Ordinance and has been substituted in Schedule II attached thereto by the Board of Revenue. This substitution or replacement should be deemed to be replacement with all its implications. In this connection, a partinent question would be that, if the Board of Revenue is not a successor‑in‑office to the Financial Commissioners of the former Punjab who is the successor. In our view, the answer is obvious and there can be no justification for entertaining any doubts that the legislature intended to place the Board of Revenue in the position of a successor of the Financial Commissioners of the former Punjab. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Board of Revenue is a successor to the Financial Commis sioners of the former Punjab. Conversely, therefore, it is established that the Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab was a predecessor of the Board of Revenue. We feel further fortified in our view that the Board of Revenue can review the order of the Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab by the fact that the expression used in section 15 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act is "any of the predecessors‑in‑office". Under the provision of the Ordinance mentioned above, the functions of the Financial Commissioners so far as section 6 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act is concerned, have been entrusted to the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue is, therefore, a successor‑in‑office to the Financial Commissioners of the former Punjab. Con versely, therefore, it must be deemed to have been established that the Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab is the predecessor‑in‑office of the Board of Revenue. It has been contended before us that, unless there was a specific order passed by the Governor of West Pakistan under section 5 (i) of the above mentioned Ordinance, clearly laying down "that the Board of Revenue can review the orders of the Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab," the Board of Revenue would not be competent to review an order passed by the Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab. We have carefully considered this question but find ourselves unable to agree with this view. Sections 5 (i) and 5 (ii) of the Ordinance are meant to cover cases for which no specific provision exists. In the case of Board of Revenue and the Financial Commissioners, there are specific provisions in section 3 (2) and Schedule II of the said Ordinance. Again, section 6 (1) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act has specifically been mentioned in column 4 of Schedule III of the said Ordinance. In view of these specific provisions, there can be no question of the applicability of sections 5 (i) and, 5 (li) of the said Ordinance and no order can either be passed nor is necessary. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the Board of Revenue is competent to review and, on so reviewing, modify, reverse or confirm any order passed by the Financial Commissioner of the former Punjab. We have heard the parties on the point of limitation. The counsel on the two sides are both agreed that it is for the plaintiffs to prove that the mortgage in dispute subsisted on the date on which the suit was put in for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged land or, in other words, the suit was within time This view was announced in P. P. S. Memon v. K. R. Sanku's son and others (A I R 1940 Mad. 639) and also in 154 1 C

773. When the Financial Commissioner (Sir James Anderson) stated in S. Partab Singh and another v. Anwar Khan and others (1945 L L T 11=P L D 1950 Pb. (Rev.) 279), that "the defence given by Article 148 is still open to mortgagees and if they succeed in proving the application of Article 148, the defence must prevail", he did not lay down that the onus of proving the suit as time‑barred lay on the defendants, nor that the onus of proving the suit within time could be laid on the plaintiffs. In the above circumstances, we are satisfied that the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, was not justified in declaring on 20th November 1951, that if the mortgagee did not produce good evidence on the subject of limitation, his case would fail. Incidentally, we have found another statement in the remand order dated 20th November 1951 which requires correction. The statement in question is that the relevant date for determining whether the mortgage subsists is the date on which the Act (Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act) came into force and not the date on which the application under section 4 of the Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938, was presented. This view is based on Mr. Ram Chandra's decisions in Sarwan Singh and others v. Daula Singh and others (1946 L L T 6=P L D 1950 Pb. (Rev.) 297) and "Sharaf v. Kanshi Ram and others (1947 L L T 13=P L D 1950 Pb. (Rev.) 306) and is clearly opposed to the view expressed by Sir James and Anderson in S. Partab Singh and others v. Anwar Khan and others (1945 L L T 11=P L D 1950 Pb. (Rev.) 279). We have heard the counsel of the parties in this case and they are both agreed that the view expressed by Mr. Ram Chandra was erroneous. This opinion finds support in the decision of S. A. Rahman, J., in Atta Muhammad and two others v. Muhammad Din and three others (P L D 1952 Lah. 73). Having decided that the onus of proving the suits to be in time lay on the plaintiffs‑appellants, we have examined the matter on the merits and have come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to give the plaintiff‑appellant another, opportunity of showing whether their suits were within time: This opportunity is deserved by them because they have at no stage been informed by the Revenue Officers that they leave to discharge this onus. It appears that 25 kanals 12 marlas of land out of one of the three mortgaged holdings were not shown as mortgaged in the year 1891‑92 but were first shown as mortgaged in 1907‑

08. The parties did not bother to ascertain from the official who prepared the excerpts from the Revenue Records what was the date on which this mortgage occurred between 1891‑92 and 1907‑

08. The suit in relation to these 25 kanals 12 marlas would appear to be within time provided the mortgage transaction relating to them occurred before the 8th June 1901. In the above circumstances, we would accept these three appeals and direct that the cases should be remanded to the Collector who will give a fresh decision after giving the plaintiffs‑appellants an opportunity to prove that their suits are within time and naturally after allowing an opportunity to respondents to rebut such evidence. Per H. A. MAJID.‑

I agree with my three learned r id brothers that the correct legal position in cases under the Restitution of Mortgaged Land Act is that the plaintiff should prove his case to be within time and that the period of limitation should be determined in relation to the date on which the suit is filed without any regard of the date on which the Act had come into force. To this extent, the order of the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, dated 20th November 1951, is erroneous in my opinion. I however, find that the law does not permit the Board of Revenue to alter the order for purposes of correcting it. There is no doubt that in adapting the Punjab Land Revenue Act, the term " Board of Revenue" has been substituted for the term " Financial Commissioner". But this does not mean that the former are successors‑in‑office of the latter. The adapted Act makes reference to the Board of Revenue at a number of places and is completely silent about the Financial Commissioner. We cannot import any outside knowledge in interpreting a Statute. There is no doubt that the Board of Revenue can review its own order. Similarly, the Board of Revenue as a constituted on a particular day can review an order passed by the Board of Revenue as constituted on an earlier date, but there is no support in the Statute for the statement that the Board of Revenue can review an order which had been passed by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, before the date on which the West Pakistan Province was established. There is no doubt that the Financial Commissioner could have himself reviewed that order upto the date of the establishment of West Pakistan. The adaptation of the Statute did not provide for this power of the Financial Commissioner for reviewing his previous order being transferred to the Board of Revenue, which was being set up for the new Province. A provision in this behalf can be made by an order of the Governor in clause (i) of section 5 of the Adaptation and Repeal of Laws Ordinance, 1956. Until such an order is made by the Governor, I would hold that the Board of Revenue has now got no powers to review an order which had been passed by the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, before the establishment of West Pakistan. This view was recently expressed by me in review Case No. 14 of 1955‑56, Allah Ditta v. Roora and others of Chak No. 153/Murad, Tehsil Hasilpur, District Bahawalpur) decided on 6th August 1956. If my learned brothers had agreed with my views, we would have merely looked at the question whether the Collector has, in passing his order dated 22nd April 1955, disregarded the directions given to him by the remand order dated 20th November 1951. Since the mortgagees had not produced any definite evidence to prove that the suits were time‑barred, we would have declared that their defence had failed. The result would be that the Collector's original order dated 21st November 1944, declaring that the mortgages were extinguished and directing that the mortgagors be put in possession forthwith, would be restored. K. M. A Case remanded.