1995 PLP 264 (PLC)

Representation

• Raja Shamsuz Zaman for Petitioner.
• SA. Channa for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
• The main contention raised by the learned counsel for petitioner is that this order is without jurisdiction and passed ex parte without giving any details or break‑up of the amounts involved and, therefore, the same can be challenged before this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The learned counsel has further urged that the present respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were not the persons working in the factory situate at Golimar and that the Head Office of the petitioner is situate at a different place not falling within the territorial jurisdiction of Central Division and, therefore, also the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction in. the matter. The learned counsel has further urged that the order was passed ex parte without the notice having been served on the petitioners. He has placed reliance on the following cases in support of his above contentions:
• Pre‑admission notice was issued to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 have filed their comments while other respondents have filed their counter‑affidavit. Mr. SA. Channa, Advocate is present on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 on pre‑admission notice.
• I have heard the learned counsel for petitioner. He has reiterated the above said contentions. Before proceeding further in the case on merits, as regards Katcha Peshi, it would be appropriate to advert to the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) which provides that "subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law " From this provision, therefore, it is obvious that the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is to be exercised where no other adequate remedy is available. Adequate remedy has also been defined to mean efficacious remedy in a number of judgments given by superior Courts. Now, therefore, before seeking the remedy under Article 199 of the Constitution, the petitioner has to show that he has no other adequate or efficacious remedy available to him. In the present case an appeal is provided under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and if an order is passed by the Authority which may not be according to law, the same can be challenged in the appellate forum as provided in section 17 ibid. The question, therefore, involved in the present petition would be as to whether the impugned order which can be challenged in appeal could not be efficaciously or adequately challenged in appeal and, therefore, this Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. At this stage, it may also be observed that it is established law by now that while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, this Court will not embark on an enquiry of facts. Keeping these provisions and legal position in view, I proceed to examine the present matter as to whether the Constitutional petition could be maintained.
• As regards the question of territorial jurisdiction the order of the Authority shows that the said Authority had been assigned the territorial jurisdiction of Central Division and according to the comments which are brought on record by the respondent No. 1, the area of Golimar, Karachi falls within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent No. 1. These comments also show that the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were working in the factory of the petitioner situate at Golimar which fact is also supported by the two letters produced by the respondent No. 1 alongwith comments. These two letters are signed by the Manager, Golimar Factory and are rubber stamped below the signatures which read "Asmat Trading Company Ltd., Old Golimar (Rexer)". These letters are signed by the Manager of Factory which show that the services of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are no more required. This obviously implies that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were working under the control of the Manager Factory at Golimar and, therefore, the Authority exercising territorial jurisdiction over the area of Golimar, Karachi was a competent Authority to entertain such applications. There is nothing on the record brought by the petitioner to show that the area of Central Division for which the respondent No. 1 is the Authority does not include the area of Golimar, Karachi. The burden is on the petitioner to prove such facts which has not been shown prima facie. The first three judgments cited by the learned counsel for petitioner above have no bearing in the present case as in these cases the fact under consideration was that the Authority had no jurisdiction in the matter, whereas in the present case, in view of above discussion, the petitioner has not brought any material on record to show that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction. The fourth case cited by the learned counsel for petitioner is a Division Bench judgment of this Court wherein it was held that even if the Authority concerned exhausted the alternate remedy then also Constitutional petition would be maintainable subject to conditions that the alternate remedy is not convenient, speedy or equally efficacious; and that there was want of jurisdiction or that the exercise of power was colourable on interpretation of serious question of law which was involved touching the Statute under which the jurisdiction was exercised. In the present case, there' is no such question, rather the matter is very simple and plain one allowing compensation to the workers on the basis of the benefits available under Labour Laws. The learned counsel for petitioner has argued that since the appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act cannot be instituted unless the amount is deposited in Court and, therefore, the remedy of filing an appeal would not be an efficacious and adequate one. I am afraid I cannot subscribe to such contention. If this contention of the learned counsel is to be accepted then the entire scheme of law shall not only stand redundant but defeated. In almost every law a provision of appeal is provided and this contention of the petitioner would render the same at naught. The law provides for an appeal and the Constitutional provisions do make a further provision that such jurisdiction could only be exercised when no adequate remedy is available. In the present case the amount involved is only about Rs.30,000 which would be too small an amount for such a big concern as the petitioner is and, therefore, certainly payment of Rs.30,000 before appellate Court cannot be held to be a remedy not efficacious enough. In these circumstances, I am of the view that respondent No. 1 has exercised the jurisdiction vesting in him; and that the appeal would be the appropriate remedy against the impugned order.
• The next question on the point of jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for petitioner is that the head office of the petitioners is situate at a place other than Golimar, Karachi and, therefore, it does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent No. 1. It may be observed that as the facts show the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 worked in the factory of the petitioner situate at Golimar, Karachi, which is within the jurisdiction of respondent No.l and, therefore, cause of action, if any, accrued to them at Golimar also arid, therefore, the respondent No. 1 had territorial jurisdiction in the matter. The two judgments at Serial Nos. 5 and 6 above, as cited by counsel for petitioner, therefore, would not be applicable to the present case.

Headnotes / Summary

Judgment & Decree