P L D 1952 Baluchistan 19 (PLP)

A I R 1941 Oudh 268 ref to. Sh. Manzoor Ahmed, for Petitioner. Ch. Abdul Haq, P. P., for Crown.

This is a revision petition under section 435 of the Criminal P. C., against the order of the District Magis trate, Chagai, dated 28th February 1951, in which, on appeal, he upheld the sentence passed by the Tahsildar and Magistrate II Class Dalbandin who had convicted the convict‑petitioner of an offence under section 189, P. P. C. and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 100, or in default to undergo one month's further rigorous imprison ment. In considering the exercise of the powers of revision of a High Court, it is an accepted principle that a High Court will be reluctant to interfere with a finding of fact, especially in a case where there are two concurrent findings of f act of lower Courts; and it is also an approved principle that there must be some substantial error of law to justify a High Court in exer cising its exceptional powers of revision in such cases. In the light of these principles I propose to deal with this revision petition. The facts of the case are that a Sub‑Inspector of Police at Dalbandin was holding an inquiry and that he was in the pro cess of recording the statement of the brother of the convict- petitioner. The petitioner himself then appeared on the scene and claimed that his brother's statement should be recorded at his (the petitioner's) dictation. On the refusal of the Sub‑Inspector to agree, the petitioner is alleged to have abused him, after which both he and his brother left the shop in which the Sub‑Inspector was holding the inquiry. Before leaving the shop, it is further alleged that the convict -petitioner also threatened the Sub‑Inspector. The wording of section 189, P. P. C. is clear and can only have one interpretation ; for the essence of this section is that threat of injury to a public servant must be held out to him. While therefore I do not propose, in the light of this revision petition to substitute a different view of the facts from the view held by the two lower Courts, it is equally necessary for me, in examining the record, to see whether in fact a threat 'of injury was offered. If I were to find that no such threat of injury had been offered it follows, as a matter of course, that an error in the interpretation of this section has been com mitted and that the convict‑petitioner has been improperly convicted. A study of the prosecution evidence discloses that the Sub‑Inspector himself, as the first prosecution witness, states that the convict‑petitioner used the following words to him "Mails tum ko dekhunga". "Aur tumhari khair nahin hogi", "Main thik kar lunga". The evidence of the Government servant himself is supported by a Constable immediately subordinate to him (P. W. 3) and, to some extent, by the evidence of P. W. 3 and P. W. 4 who have respectively stated that the petitioner used the following words :‑ Main Sub‑Inspector Sahib ko dekhunga " and " Main tum ko sidha karunga." In considering whether the words used can be taken as a threat of injury, it has been held that effusion of passion without any formal intention of wrong should be distinguished from threats really calculated to cause the person to whom they are held out to be in fear of the injury threatened. In the light of these general principles with which I am in entire agreement, I cannot accept that the actual words used can be considered as a threat of injury falling within the purviews of section 189, P.P.C. for their portent is extremely vague and can only mean that the convict‑petitioner, in the heat of passion, offered a threat to the Sub‑Inspector concerned. It is, in my view, essential that when threats are offered to Government servants some, specific injury, whether implied or direct, must be present in the words of the threat offered. For instance, if a person threatens that he will beat a Government servant unless he will or will not do some act, or that he will lodge a false case against him or implicate him in some criminal proceedings falsely, such threats would undoubtedly be threats of injury which might influence the Government servant concerned through fear to act in the manner required by the person who threatened him. 'But the words "I will see about you" cannot possibly be considered as indicating a specific threat of injury. Moreover, this type of threat is one which is of very common application indeed and is nothing more than a means of giving vent to a person's immediate feelings without carrying with it any intention of a specific threat of injury. It is apparent that the objection underlying section 189, P. P. C. is to protect a Government servant from a real fear of injury though whether that injury is or is not caused is immaterial. Unless the Government servant is in fear that some specific injury is likely to be caused to him, it would normally be improper to convict a member of the public of an offence under this section. In the circumstances of this case I must take into consi deration other evidence on record. Dalbandin is a very small place and I cannot, for a moment believe that the Sub‑Inspec tor could have been in fear from the convict‑petitioner as a result of the actual words used. In the light of these circum stances I do not consider that there is any element of doubt at all in this case but that the convict‑petitioner has been impro perly convicted. The reasons I have given disclose that I have not taken the opposite view of the evidence so much as to show that in fact no offence at all has been committed. In the light of these circumstances I accept the revision‑petition and direct that the conviction shall be set aside and convict- petitioner should be released immediately. The fine, if paid, will also be refunded. The Public Prosecutor, who appeared on behalf of the Crown, has mainly directed his arguments to the provisions of section 435, Cr. P. C. claiming that since the powers of this Court are concurrent with those of the Court of I Session the revision application should, in the first instance; have been submitted to the lower Court. He has drawn my attention to A I R 1941 Oudh, p. 268, but in this‑connection I observe that the judgment in this case was based on a rule of practice pre vailing in that High Court, namely that the High Court's time should not be wasted in entertaining revision petitions when such petitions could be submitted to a Court of Session in the first instance. This rule is not a rule of law and cannot be interpreted as a mandatory provision of law, since section. 435, Cr. P. C. does not preclude a High Court from entertaining a revision petition direct. As a rule of practice which, in future I propose to follow, it will be expected that such petition will be presented to the lower Court in the first instance except where there may be special circumstances requiring presenta tion of such petitions direct to this Court. The object of the rule of practice will be similar to that expressed in the above ruling where it was felt that this would give opportunity to the High Court to obtain an expression of opinion by a Court of the superior jurisdiction such as the Sessions Judge if ultimately the case carne before the High Court for decision. There will still be opportunity, if circumstances are exceptional, for aggrieved persons to approach this Court in revision even though a similar petition may have been presented in the lower Court and rejected by it. 1 K. M. A. Petition accepted.