P L D 2001 Karachi 1 (PLP)

‑‑‑‑S. 115‑‑‑Revision‑‑‑Concurrent jurisdiction of High Court as well as of District Court‑‑‑Effect‑‑‑Where concurrent jurisdiction .is conferred on two different Courts then the subordinate or lower Court to be approached in exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution v. Habib Sugar Mills Limited PLD 1993 Kar. 61 and Karachi Building Control Authority v. Muhammad Arif Qureshi 1992 CLC 1904 ref. Abdullah Chandio for Applicant. Nazar Akbar for Respondent No.

1. Date of hearing: 18th May, 2000. This revision application has been filed against the order dated 6‑8‑1998 of the IV Senior Civil Judge, Karachi South in Suit‑No.2837 of 1996, rejecting the application under section 151, C.P.C. wherein objection was raised with regard to the maintainability, of the suit on the ground that the trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this revision application are that respondent No. 1 filed a suit in this Court in 1984 for administration and rendition of account in‑respect of assets/estate left behind by late Wajid Ali son of Ali Akbar Hassan Ali Effandi. Respondent No.1 had tentatively assessed the value of her share at Rs.1,01,

000. Written statement was filed by applicant No.2 wherein the total amount/money left behind by late Wajid Ali was shown to exceed Rs.6,00,

000. However, in view of the amendment made in the. Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, of the Sindh Civil Courts (Amended Act) 1996 raising the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to Rs.5 lacs the suit was sent to the District and Sessions Judge, Karachi South for onward transmission to the concerned Senior Civil Judge. The suit was ultimately sent to the Senior Civil Judge and renumbered as Suit No.37 of 1997. An application was filed on behalf of the respondents objecting to the jurisdiction of the IV Senior Civil Judge to proceed with the matter as the assets/money left behind by late Wajid Ali exceeded Rs.5 lacs and praying that the same be sent back to the High Court. This application was reacted by the Senior Civil Judge hence this revision application. I have heard the arguments of M/s. Abdullah Chandio and Nazar Akbar the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the material on record and the relevant law. The suit was filed in 1984 for administration and rendition of accounts of the estate/assets left behind by late Wajid Ali, brother of opponent No.1. It is pertinent to note that vide letter of Official Assignee dated 28‑8‑1998 the value of the assets/estate left behind by late Wajid Ali, were encashed and were of the value of Rs.8,36,210, the said amount was invested in the Special Saving Certificates and as on 28‑8‑1998 it had increased Rs.38,23,

150. Section 7 of the Court Fees Act provides that for purpose of determination of. court‑fee and whether the suit is properly valued or not, the Court must confine itself to the plaint and is not required, to look into the circumstances which may subsequently influence its judgment as to the true value of the relief sought. In order to decide the question of court‑fee in a particular suit the Court has to take into consideration the allegations made and the prayers sought in the plaint and to assume the allegations, to be correct. It is also an established principle of law that the allegations made by the defendant in the written statement or by means of a counter‑affidavit or by any other document are not to be considered and are immaterial for determining the category/nature of the suit for the purpose of payment of court‑fee. It is also to be noted that the payment of court‑fees is to be looked at with reference to facts at the time of institution of the suit prevents subsequent to the institution of the suit cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of valuation of the suit for payment of court fees. Section 7 of the Court Fees Act also authorises the plaintiff to value the suit and pay court‑fee thereon as framed by him and is not open to the Court to object that the suit has not been properly framed. The Court can interfere relating to the question of valuation of the court‑fee in the event that the plaintiff has arbitrarily or without any plausible basis fixed the valuation of the suit which is not acceptable in any manner of valuation of suit and payment of court‑fees. If the Court is of the view that the valuation given by the plaintiff is fictitious or that the plaintiff under‑valued or overvalued the suit with mala fide motives then the Court has the power to interfere. Coming to the facts of the case, it is to be seen that the plaintiff had filed a suit for administration and rendition of accounts in respect of her share out of the assets/estate left behind by her late brother Wajid Ali. At the time of his death the value of the total assets/estate left by late Wajid Ali was Rs.8,36,210 and respondent's No. 1/plaintiff's share therein was to the extend of Rs.1,01,

000. This fact was mentioned by her in the suit filed by her and she had made a prayer to the extent of Rs.1,01,

000. In the circumstances it could not be said that opponent No. 1/plaintiff had given wrong valuation o: the suit and had not paid proper court‑fees thereon. It was submitted that the value of the assets/estate left behind by late Wajid Ali was Rs.38,23.150 as per letter dated 28‑8‑1998 and even if it be admitted that according to section 7 of the Court Fees Act opponent No. 1/plaintiff was entitled to value the suit according to her share out of the assets/estate left behind by her brother late Wajid Ali, the share/amount which opponent No.1/plaintiff would be entitled to receive would be more than Rs.5 lacs. This contention is without any substance inasmuch as from the letter of the Official Assignee, it transpires that at the time of the death of late Wajid Ali in 1984 the value of the assets/estate left behind by him was Rs.8,36,

210. This amount was invested in 1984 in Special Saving Certificates and in August, 1998 it had increased to Rs.38,23,

150. This amount of Rs.38,23,150 would not be material for the purpose of valuation of the suit and payment of court‑fees as according to section 7 the material date for valuation of the suit the payment of court‑fee would be the date of institution of the suit. The objection raised by the applicant with regard to the jurisdiction of the trial Court to proceed with the butt as the value of the assets/estate left behind deceased Wajid Ali was in excess of Rs.5 lacs and/or the share of opponent No. 1/plaintiff out of the assets/estate left behind her brother late Wajid Ali would exceed Rs.5 lacs has no substance and is overruled. It is also pertinent to note that the impugned order was passed by Senior Civil Judge, under section 115, C.P.C. Revisional jurisdiction has been conferred on the District Court, which now enjoys concurrent jurisdiction of revision with this Court. Whenever concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on two different Courts then the subordinate or lower Court is to be approached in exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction. Reliance for the above is placed on the case of Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution v. Habib Sugar Mills Limited, reported in PLD 1993 Kar. 61 wherein this Court held that if the value of the subject‑matter of revision was within the jurisdiction of the District Judge then the same should have been filed before the District Judge and not before this Court. A similar observation was made in the case of Karachi Building Control Authority v. Muhammad Arif Qureshi, reported in 1992 CLC 1904, wherein it was held that when the valuation of the suit was not above the pecuniary limit prescribed for filing an appeal in District Court, revision petition should have been filed in the District Court and not in this Court. It is not disputed that the suit at the time of filing was valued at Rs.1,01,000 and falls within the pecuniary limit of jurisdiction of the trial Court. Upon the above discussion I am satisfied beyond any doubt that this revision application is neither legally maintainable nor has any substance on I merits and does not require consideration. Accordingly, it stands dismissed in limine together with miscellaneous applications pending therein. The suit is to be sent back to the trial Court for proceedings according to law. Q. M. H. /M. A. K./A‑79/K Revision dismissed.