2011 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, J.

The. petitioner has challenged show-cause notice dated 31-8-2010 issued by Chairperson TEVTA (respondent No.1) on the following grounds:

(a)?? That the show-cause notice has not been issued by competent 'authority as no power has been delegated by the Authority to the Chairperson (TEVTA). (b)?? That the show-cause notice has been issued without giving any reasons for not holding an inquiry under section 5(1)(b) of PEEDA Act, 2006 ('Act')

2. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner is a contractual employee under section 13 of the Punjab Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority Act, 2010 (the "Act") and was appointed vide letter dated 3-5-2002 by respondent No.1. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the show-cause notice has been issued by the Competent Authority and has referred to Notification dated 16-11-2006 issued by the Services and General Administration Department (Regulation Wing), Government of the Punjab wherein the competent authority of the petitioner is the "Appointing Authority" which in the case of the petitioner is respondent No.1.

3. Arguments heard. Record perused.

4. Perusal of Notification dated 16-11-2006 issued by Services and General Administration Department (Regulation Wing), Government of the Punjab shows that competent Authority under PEEDA Act, 2006 in the case of the petitioner is the Appointing Authority, i.e., respondent No.1. Further, section 6(4) of the Act states that the Chairperson shall be responsible for the management, administration and day to day affairs of the Authority (i.e., TEVTA).

5. Show-cause notice furnishes the following reasons which are as under:

"Daily attendance report has shown that you remained absent from duty without permission for 259 days on various dates from November, 2009 to 31st 2010. Besides, the record shows that during the same period, you arrived late in the office on 33 different occasions and departed early on 5 different dates".

6. The impugned show-cause notice has clearly furnished reasons and provided sufficient ground for initiating proceedings against the petitioner under section 5(1)(a) of the PEEDA Act. Further the show-cause notice has been issued by the competent authority, therefore, the contentions raised by the petitioner have no force.

7. In the absence of any jurisdictional defect or illegality, mere issuance of a show-cause notice does not give rise to any grievance or qualifies the petitioner to be an "aggrieved person." James L.J. in ex parte Sidebotham1 attempted a definition of the term "person aggrieved" in the following words:-- 1. (1880) 14 Ch. D.458 "a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." This definition was quoted with approval by Lord Esher M.R in ex parte Official Receiver2 who went to expand upon it, by observing: 2. (1887) 19 QB 174 "a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him something which he had a right to demand." Show-cause notice on its own is not an adverse order and therefore cannot generate any cause of action or equip the petitioner with the status of an "aggrieved person" to maintain a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

8. Issuance of show-cause notice does not mean that the case will be invariably decided against the petitioner and there is always a possibility that the same may be decided in favour of the petitioner. Laying challenge to a show-cause notice is therefore no different than filing a petition on the basis of an apprehension or a speculation. Such a petition is premature and not ripe for adjudication. "Just as a case can be brought too late, and thereby be moot, it can be brought too early, and not yet be ripe for adjudication...until the controversy has become concrete and focused, it is difficult for the Court to evaluate the practical merits of the position of each party.3 The basic rationale behind the ripeness doctrine is "to prevent the courts through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties4.

3. Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law, Second Edition West Publishing Company (Volume I, pages 188-189)

4. Rogers, Healy, Krotoszynski, Administrative Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2008 (page 686).

9. Hamood-ur-Rehman, C.J. (as he then was) in Asma Jilani's case PLD 1972 SC 139 observed:-- "the courts do not decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions or give mere declarations in the airs5.

5. Justice (R.) Fazal Karim, Judicial Review of Public Actions, Pakistan Law House 2006 (page 981) The determination of an abstract question of constitutional law divorced from the concrete facts of a case, as observed by Muhammad Munir, C.J., in The Province of East Pakistan and others v. M.D. Mehdi Ali Khan PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 387 floats in an atmosphere of unreality; it is a determination in vacuo and unless it amounts to a decision settling rights and obligations of the parties before the court it is not an instance of the exercise of judicial power

6. Further support for the above contention is drawn from Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 2004 SC 583, Union of India and another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana AIR 2007 SC 906, Special Director and another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467, Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh and others AIR 1996 SC 691, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahm Datt. Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943, Chief of the Army Staff and others v. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety AIR 1985 SC 703, Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-op. Societies, Punjab and others AIR 1976 SC 1821, Zeal Pak Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi v. Regional Commissioner, Income Tax, Karachi and 2 others 2009 PTD 712, Mehboob Ali Malik v. The Province of West Pakistan and others PLD 1963 Lah. 575, Shaheen Asad, Assistant Manager Finance/Accounts, Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmill Corporation, Muzaffarabad v. Azfar Yaseen, Assistant Manager, Finance and Accounts, Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmill Corporation, Muzaffarabad 2001 PLC (C.S.) 93 and Dilshad Kausar v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government (Prime Minister) through Chief Secretary and 2 others 2005 PLC (C.S.) 1048. 6. (ibid) 9-A. Interference at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice stultifies and retards the inquiry process provided under the relevant law (in this case PEEDA Act, 2006). This unduly stalls the investigative machinery of the quasi judicial authorities and hampers discharge of their statutory duties which are to be done with a free hand independent from outside control. The petitioner has an opportunity to place his case before the authority concerned and there are elaborate procedures by way of appeal or revision against order passed in such proceedings.

10. There is another aspect of this case. Relationship of the petitioner is contractual in nature and is not governed by any statutory rules of service. Therefore, the relationship of the petitioner with the respondent Authority is governed by the principle of master and servant for which remedy lies before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and not under the constitutional jurisdiction of this court. Reliance is placed on Pakistan International Airline Corporation and others v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others PLD 2010 SC 676 and Chairman, State Life Insurance Corporation and others v. Hamayun Irfan and 2 others 2010 SCMR 1495 and Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others PLD 2011 SC 132.

11. For the above reasons, instant petition has no force and is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. M.H./N-19/L?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petition dismissed.