P L D 1956 (W (PLP)
Subedar MUHAMMAD FAYAZ KHAN‑Petitioner Versus Raja AKHTAR ZAMAN KHAN and others Respondents
| Citation | P L D 1956 (W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Habibullah Khan, J |
| Parties | Subedar MUHAMMAD FAYAZ KHAN‑Petitioner Versus Raja AKHTAR ZAMAN KHAN and others Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1956 (W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1956 (W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Habibullah Khan, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1956 (W (PLP) (Subedar MUHAMMAD FAYAZ KHAN‑Petitioner Versus Raja AKHTAR ZAMAN KHAN and others Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Kazi Abdur Rashid for Respondents 1 and 2.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Revenue Auction sale‑Of estate of dead Lambardar
For default in payment of land revenue of his village for period subsequent to his death‑Violation of provisions of Chapter VI, Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1887)‑Civil suit to set aside sale‑Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1887), S. 158 (2). A civil suit is competent, wherein the plaintiff (son) claims to set aside a revenue auction‑sale of the estate of his deceased father, a Lambardar, for default in payment of land revenue of his village for a period subsequent to the Lambar dar's death. The sale is a violation of a mandatory provision of law, viz., Chapter VI of Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1887), which prescribes notices and proclamations etc. against the defaulter. The Civil Court therefore has jurisdiction to enter tain the suit. An allegation of fraud in the plaint is not necessary. Baggu Khan v. Ghulam Mustafa Khan P L D 1951 Lah. 360, A I R 1923 Cal. 428 and Syed Shah v. Khuda Bakhsh P L D 1954 Lah. 606 ref. (b) Pleading‑Fraud‑Use of specific word in pleadings not necessary‑Allegations of facts amounting to fraud enough. It is not necessary for a plaintiff to specifically allege fraud. It is enough if he alleges facts, which, if proved, would make out a case of fraud.
Judgment & Decree
HABIBULLAH, J.
‑This revision petition is an off shoot of an auction‑sale of agricultural land held under the Land Reve nue Act. The facts of the case are not in dispute, and the point involved is one of law, namely, whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit for possession, whereby the validity of such a sale is challenged. One Raja Safdar Zaman of Khanpur was a Lambardar of village Hattar, and as such, his duty was to recover land reve nue from the villagers, and deposit it into the Government Treasury. It is alleged that he did not pay to the Government the land revenue in respect of the period from Kharif 1946 to Rabi 1949. As a result his property in village Khanpur was put to auction and sold to Subedar Muhammad Fayaz and Raja Gauhar Zamir, on 4th April 1949. Raja Akhtar Zaman, a son of Raja Safdar Zaman, brought a suit for possession of his share in the property against the Provincial Government, Subedar Muhammad Fayaz, and Raja Gauhar Zamir. The suit was vehemently contested on various grounds, which gave rise to a number of issues. Without going into the merits of the case, the trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that a Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it, in view of section 158, subsection (2) of the Land Revenue Act. The plaintiff went up on appeal to the Court of the District judge, who held that the case of the plaintiff was substantially based on allegations of fraud, and as such, a Civil Court was competent to try the suit. He accordingly remanded the case to the trial Court under section 151 Civil P. C., for decision on other issues. Subedar Muhammad Fayaz, the purchaser of the suit property, has now preferred a revision petition to this Court. The Provincial Government has also been impleaded along with Raja Akhtar Zaman as respondent. In order to determine the question whether the suit is based on an allegation of fraud, it is necessary to give briefly the history of the proceedings, which resulted in the auction- sale. The most striking factor in the case is the death of Raja Safdar Zaman Lambardar, which admittedly took place on 8th July 1946, long before the period for which the land revenue is alleged to have fallen due. Inheritance mutation in the name of his other son, Raja Asif Jah, was entered on 3rd September 1946, and attested on 22nd November 1946. Later, on the representation of Raja Akhtar Zaman plaintiff, the property of his father was mutated in his name also. In spite of the fact that Raja Safdar Zaman had already died he was shown alive in the revenue records and a defaulter of land revenue for the subsequent period from Kharif 1946 uptil Rabi 1949. Now, it is quite obvious that the Lambardar, being dead, could not recover land revenue from the land‑owners, and as such, he could not have been treated as a defaulter. The learned counsel for the petitioner was at great pains during the course of his arguments to explain as to why Raja Safdar Zaman Lambardar was shown alive in the revenue records when the revenue officials knew perfectly well that he was dead and the land revenue was not recoverable from him in his capacity as a Lambardar. The position is that the property of Raja Safdar Zaman has been sold in an auction under the Land Revenue Act, for the recovery of imaginary land revenue, which could not have and has not been realized by him, from the people. The proceedings for the sale of his property were taken under Chapter VI of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. Section 81 requires that a copy of the proclamation shall be served on the defaulter and be pasted in a conspicuous part of the office of the Tahsildar of the Tahsil in which the property to be sold .is situate. The provision is mandatory and the service of a copy of the proclamation on the defaulter cannot be dispensed with. The Lambardar, being dead, it is quite clear that this provision of law has not been complied with. Again section 84 provides that "if at any time before the bidding at the auction is completed the defaulter pays the arrears in respect of which the property has been proclaimed for sale, together with the costs incurred for the recovery thereof, to the officer conducting the sale, or proves to the satisfaction of that officer that he has already paid the same either at the place and in the manner prescribed under section 63, or into the Government Treasury, the sale shall be stayed". From the above it is obvious that if the defaulter is served with a notice, and he pays the arrears of land revenue in the manner prescribed in the section, the sale shall be stayed, but in the present case, the Lambardar, being dead, could not have been afforded any opportunity by the revenue officials to get his property released from the attachment and sale by the payment of the arrears. It is as clear as broad day‑light that the whole proceedings from the beginning to end in respect of the auction and sale of the property were conducted in flagrant violation of the manda tory provisions of law and without the least regard for the fact that the property of a dead man was being sold, a measure not contemplated by law. It has been contended on behalf of Subedar Muhammad Fayaz petitioner that the plaintiff did not specifically mention fraud in his plaint or evidence. The omission of the word "fraud" in the plaint, or in the evidence, would not advance the case of the petitioner. It is not necessary for a plaintiff to specifically allege fraud. It would be quite sufficient for him if he alleges certain facts, which, if proved, would make out a case of fraud. In my opinion, the plaintiff has given in his plaint those particulars and elements, which, when considered together, would amount to an averment of fraud. In para. 4 of the plaint, Raja Akhtar Zaman plaintiff alleged the following: ‑ "The auction of the property in suit is illegal and liable to cancellation. Land revenue for Kharif 1946 to Rabi and Kharif 1947, and Rabi and Kharif 1948 has been wrongly shown as due and the land sold for its recovery, though the father of the plaintiff had died before Kharif 1946. Therefore, his father was not a defaulter of land revenue . . . . . . " The above allegations clearly mean to suggest that Raja Safdar Zaman, being dead, could not have been a defaulter of the land revenue for the succeeding years, and as such, his land had been fraudulently and illegally sold in auction. It is not quite understandable as to what else the plaintiff was required to say in order to make out a case of fraud. The plaint and the evidence considered together make it abundantly clear that the proceedings in respect of the sale of property were fraudu lent. Apart from what has been stated above, it may be pointed out here, that if a Civil Court finds that a certain act has been done in clear contravention of some mandatory provisions of law, it is vested with jurisdiction to interfere at once and redress the wrong. This is now an established principle of law recognized on all hands. The auction‑sale in question is a glaring instance of negation of law and the proce dure laid down by the Punjab Land Revenue Act. The authorities reported in Baggu Khan v. Ghulam Mustafa Khan (P L D 1951 Lah. 360) A I R 1923 Cal. 428 and Syed Shah v. Khuda Bakhsh (P L D 1954 Lah. 606), support the view, that where an authority acts in contravention .of the provisions of law, a Civil Court can interfere and take cognizance of the suit. I am strongly of the opinion, that in the present case, the revenue authorities have not only acted in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of the Land Revenue Act, but have also conducted themselves in a most irresponsible manner by concealing the death of the Lambardar, and showing him alive in the revenue records, though they knew fully well that he had died, and they had actually attested the inheritance mutations of his estate in the name of his son, Asif Jah, long before the land revenue became recoverable. Consequently, I concur in the order of the learned District Judge, and dismiss the revision petition with costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.