1990 PLP 1901 (MLD)

5. We have heard the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and also got written arguments from them.

6. The question calling for determination in all these review petitions is as to whether a new exposition of the law by the Supreme Court of Pakistan as well as the High Court shall be constituted as a sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of review applications riled after the expiry of time provided in Article 173 of the Limitation Act.

7. As already indicated, these petitions are awfully barred by time. We thereon propose to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

8. It may be repeated that the question raised before us has engaged the attention of the superior judiciary in a number of cases before. In Onoop Chunder Paul and others v. Ekkowree Singh and others (Civil Weekly Reporter Vol.VI page 167), the Division Bench refused to accept the contention that modification of law or the practice by the Supreme Court shall be constituted as a sufficient cause for admitting the review application.

9. In Shama Churn Chuckerbutty and others v. Bindabun Chunder Roy and anothcr.(Civil Weekly Reporter Vol.IX page 181), the Full Bench came to tire same conclusion as enunciated ibid. In this case the suit for resumption was filed, it was decided against ryot on his failing to establish his Lakhiraj. Two years later the Full Bench of the Court propounded different law then followed in suit for resumption. On the basis of the judgment of Full Bench the ryot instituted a review application before Sudder Ameen. The Sudder Ameen admitted the application, reviewed its decision following the new exposition of the law. On appeal the Principal Sudder Ameen came to the conclusion that the new exposition of law, was not good reason for condoning the delay in tiling the review application. The decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen was challenged before the Division Bench. The Division Bench referred the following questions to the authoritative opinion of the Full Bench:‑‑ (i) Who is the authority to decide what is just and reasonable cause for admitting an application for review after the prescribed 90 days have elapsed. (ii) The application being admitted, is not the case in all respects a new one, and liable to be governed by any exposition of the law by a Full Bench Ruling of High Court, which may have been published since the date of the original decision. (Abaid Ullah Khan, J) After reviewing the case‑law the Full Bench followed the rule laid down in Maharaja Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government (3 Weekly Reporter, Privy Council page 45), that a new exposition of law was not just and reasonable cause for condonation of delay in review application filed after the prescribed period of 90 days. The Full Bench held that if this course was followed then the cases decided and acted upon for a period of 50 years would be re‑opened which was not intended by the law; that if this course was not followed it would lead to all the finality and limitation.

10. This view was followed in Pran Kishen Bhuttacharjee v. Bukshee Cazee (Civil Weekly Reporter Vo1.X page 26).

11. So, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it has been a well‑established law that new construction of law by the superior judiciary including the Privy Council or the new exposition of law by the superior judiciary A is not a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in review application instituted after the prescribed period of 90 days. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid enunciated view.

12. Yet there is another aspect of these cases. We do not feel necessity to change the view on the basis of the principle of stare decisis. The classic statement on this principle was given by Lord Buckmaster in 1919 in following words:‑‑ Firstly, the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning once laid down and accepted for a long period of time ought not to be altered unless your Lordships could say positively that it was wrong and productive of inconvenience. Secondly, that the decisions upon which the title to property depends or which by establishing principles of construction otherwise form the basis of contracts ought to receive the same protection. Thirdly, decisions affecting the general conduct of affairs, so that their alteration would mean that taxes had been unlawfully imposed or exemption unlawfully obtained, payments needlessly made or the position of the public materially affected; ought in the same way to continue:' Lord Westbury stated:‑‑ "We must bow to the uniform interpretation which has been put upon the statute of Elizabeth and must not attempt to disturb the exposition it has received. If we Find a uniform interpretation of a statute upon a question materially affecting property, and perpetually recurring, and which has been adhered to without interruption it would be impossible for us to introduce the precedent of disregarding that interpretation. Disagreeing with it would thereby be shaking rights and titles which have been founded through so many years upon the conviction that that departed from."

13. The rule of stare decisis has been consistently followed by our Courts. In Mehr Allah Ditta and another v. Muhammad Ali and another P L D 1972 S C 59 the Supreme Court while dealing with a case of plaintiff in suit joining a stranger as a co‑plaintiff observed as follows:‑‑ "Apart from this, the decision in the case of Sharaf and another v. Pir another has held the field for the last 78 years and has been the Courts in Punjab. On the principle 'stare decisis" also it is not desirable to change this view unless it is unreasonable that it cannot be followed under any circumstances. In my opinion, the reasoning given in Sharaf s case is based on cogent grounds and there is no reason to depart from it."

14. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants proceed on distinguishable facts and different principles and are hardly relevant to the facts of these cases. There is no necessity to comment upon these authorities. However, we pause to say a few words about Muhammad Hasham's case decided by the Division Bench of this Court. In this case the applicant's suit for pre‑emption on the ground of being collateral was decreed by the first Court vide a judgment and decree dated 4‑6‑1983. The appeal by respondent‑vendee succeeded before the first appellate Court vide a decision dated 24‑5‑1987. The pre‑emptor's revision was dismissed on the basis of rule laid down in Said Kamal's case. The application for review was instituted on 28‑8‑1988 within the prescribed period of limitation. The Division Bench of this Court accepted the review petition in view of rule laid down in Sardar Ali and others v Muhammad Ali and others P L D 1988 S C 287, that if decree was passed before 31‑7‑1986 the crucial date fixed by Said Kamal's case the pre‑emptor had a right to defend the decree. Even after the decision of Said Kamal's case as shown above, the review application was filed within time and the order of this Court rested upon an incorrect view of law. However, ratio in this case is not an authority for the proposition that a new construction of law by the superior judiciary is a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in review application filed after the prescribed period of limitation.

15. In the light of foregone analysis, we are of view that the new construction of law or the new interpretation of law by the superior judiciary cannot constitute a sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in respect of review application filed after the prescribed period of limitation.

16. In result these petitions are, found to be without any merit and are dismissed in limine. M.B.A./G‑340/L Petitions dismissed