2000 PLP 2032 (MLD)

2. The facts, in a nutshell, behind the controversy are that the appellant, the landlord of the building No.SOL‑B‑1/67, Bahadur Yar Jang Road, Karachi, rented out a shop on ground floor of the said building to the respondent somehow in the year 1986. In the year 1996, the appellant needed the shop for his own use to run a business therein owing to his retirement from employment and consequently served legal notice upon the respondent under section 14 of the Sindh Rented, Premises Ordinance, 1979. The said notice remained unattended and unresponded which resulted in the ejectment application under section 14 of the Ordinance, 1979.

3. The respondent contested into the matter and filed his written statement before the Rent Controller; whereby he admitting his initial status as tenant, disclosed that the shop in question stood purchased by him through sale agreement dated 18‑9‑1995, from the appellant for amount of Rs.5,00,000 and a civil suit to that effect titled as suit for specific performance of the contract was filed by him before the High Court which is pending adjudication.

4. The parties led their respective evidence before the Rent Controller and after termination of trial the order was delivered whereby the ejectment was declined by the Rent Controller on the ground of pending suit of the respondent in the High Court.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant during his arguments mainly urged that the Rent Controller halo framed issue of relationship between the parties and by adjudicating that issue, he dismissed the case of the appellant as a. whole which is violative to the relevant provisions of law and the Authority of the Supreme Court propounded in 1983 SCMR 1064 and PLD 1991 SC

242. The main emphasis of the counsel was laid on the proposition that mere agreement does not suffer in entirety to believe the same to confer any right of ownership upon the respondent within the meaning of sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act. With regard to civil suit filed by the respondent in the High Court, the counsel's argument was that the burden to prove the transaction of sale within purport of Articles 117 and 118 of Qanun‑e‑Shahadat was upon the respondent to prove and then produce the' same before the Rent Controller to substantiate his contention.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and strongly urged that the suit shop was purchased by the respondent through agreement and sale‑deed to that effect was to be executed with payment of balance consideration amount of Rs% 1,50,

000. He next argued that the appellant did not perform the agreement but launched rent proceedings before the Rent Controller. The reference of suit for specific performance of contract has also been made in the arguments and unless the controversy to that effect is decided the judgment of the Rent Controller has been urged to be maintained. The learned counsel placed his reliance upon 1986 MLD 1986, 1990 CLC 584 and 1983 SCMR 1064.

7. It is settled position of law that agreement simpliciter does not create a title as it is an initial document. It is completed in legal perspective when sale‑deed to that effect is executed. The provisions of sections 17 and 19 of the Registration Act, will not apply on the agreements of sale and therefore the legality cannot be attached to such transactions to hold that mere agreement confers title and thereby all the proceedings before legal forums should be handicapped. Under the impugned judgment the Rent Controller seems to be convinced with the pending proceedings of the same subject‑matter before High Court, notwithstanding the High Court proceedings had different significance and no such order was passed to stay the rent proceedings. What multiplicity of controversy could be caused as is held by the Rent Controller. The issue of relationship had been declined by the Rent Controller to be dismissed with for which he had no reasonable justification. .

8. Appraisal of material available on record leads to infer that the civil ' suit of the respondent is a counterblast to the rent application; as the latter wanted to hinder the rent proceedings by filing that suit. The appellant served that statutory notice dated 13‑5‑1996, upon the respondent demanding for possession of the shop on the ground that he was retiring within six months from his bank employment. The respondent did not reply the notice and the appellant finding no other alternative filed the rent application on 5‑8‑1996, and on the very day a notice was issued for the respondent. The respondent thereafter took active steps and replied the notice on 7‑8‑1996, inter alia, incorporating that the premises was purchased by him through agreement. In the reply of notice there was no mention as to reference of civil suit before High Court and the rent application was preceded to the civil suit.

9. The contention of the appellant for bona fide use of the shop in the wake of his retirement was a substantial ground which was to be dealt wish and decided separately without reference of decision on the issue of relationship of the parties. The issue of landlord and tenant was to 1e discussed and examined by the Rent Controller on the basis of material whatever placed before him and he was not bereft of power, to discuss the evidence and documentary references produced before him to decide the issue of relationship vis‑a‑vis another issue of personal bona fide‑need of the landlord. Of course, the Rent Controller could have been termed devoid of power, had the issue of ownership and entitlement much complicated to such a level that documents if were produced thereto by the tenant, attracted declaration muchless covered the Registration Act. In case of such complication the Rent Controller should have avoided to decide 'the declaratory controversy with direction to the parties to seek such declaration from competent .Court and then seek for remedial action from the Rent Controller. Suffice it to say that reference of only agreement which had not been established even within requirements of Qanun‑e‑Shahadat was not to be taken to the culminative level of credence that whole the rent proceedings were mainly concluded as vitiated. Even otherwise the Rent Controller ought to have looked into the legality and propriety of the agreement if the same contained the signature within section 10 of the Contract Act in absence of registration.

10. Both the learned Advocates in support of their respective arguments have also relied upon case‑laws. The appellant's counsel referred case‑law reported as PLD 1991 SC

242. The main thrust of the citation was that the ejectment proceedings could not be stayed or stopped in a case the tenant was holding agreement of sale of any suit of specific performance of contract was filed by him. The respondent's counsel referred the case‑law, namely, (1) 1990.CLC 584, (2) 1983 SCMR 1064. In the case reported as 1990 CLC 584, the issue of relationship was disputed as the tenant had denied the relationship due to purchase of the house and filed suit for specific performance of contract. The R.C. had dismissed the ejectment application on the aforesaid ground. The finding and conclusion of the R.C. were reversed in the reported case (ibid) on the ground that mere filing of civil suit by tenant to challenge title of landlord would not divest jurisdiction of, R.C. to proceed with case or to decide question of relationship. The object of the ruling does not support the respondent's case. In another citation namely 1983 SCMR 1064, the landlord had not established the relationship and was not allowed he affirmative finding on the issue. The crux of these citations was that in a case of doubt of entitlement the tenant was to be ejected. However, he was made to invoke the jurisdiction of Civil Court on question of title or fraud. The referred cases bear no nexus with the facts and features of the instant case. The same cannot be held useful for the respondent.

11. Be that as it may, the judgment/order of the Rent Controller has not f been found to be passed within the jurisdictional authority conferred upon him under the statute. Sufficient evidence was led by the appellant within C requirement of section 14 of the Ordinance, 1979 by which the landlord was going to retire within four months' time after filing his rent application. The significance and purport of section 14 of the Ordinance, 1979 was omitted by the Rent Controller and he confused his scope to decide issue of relationship and related issues to the rent application.

12. In the event of the circumstances, the judgment of the Rent Controller does not sustain. Resultantly, the impugned judgment dated 23‑5‑1998 stands set aside and the rent application is allowed as prayed excepting the order of costs. Appeal accepted.