P L D 1956 (W (PLP)

(2) Any order of the Court made under the provisions of this section shall entitle the Administrator‑General, (a) to maintain any suit or proceeding for the recovery of such assets, and (b) if he thinks fit, to apply for letters of administration of the estate of such deceased person, and (c) to retain out of the assets of the estate any fees chargeable under rules made under this Act, and to reimburse himself for all payments made by him in respect of such assets which a private administrator might lawfully have made.

12. If, in the course of proceedings to obtain letters of administration under the provisions of section 9, section 10, or section 11, any person appears and establishes his claim (a) to probate of the will of the deceased ; or (b) to letters of administration as next‑of‑kin of the deceased, and gives such security as may be required of him by law, the Court shall grant probate of the will or letters of administration accordingly, and shall award to the Adminis trator‑General the costs of any proceedings taken by him, under those sections to be paid out of the estate as part of the testamentary or intestate expenses thereof.

13. If, in the course of proceedings to obtain letters of administration under the provisions of section 9, section or section 11, no person appears and establishes his claim to probate of a will, or to a grant of letters of administration as next‑of‑kin of the deceased, within such period as to the Court seems reasonable, or if a person who has established his claim to a grant of letters of administration as next‑of‑kin of the deceased fails to give such security as may be required of him by law, the Court may grant letters of administration to the Administrator‑General.

14. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to preclude the Administrator‑General from applying to the Court for letters of administration in any case within the period of one month from the death of the deceased.

31. Whenever any person has died leaving assets within any Division, and the Administrator‑General of such Division is satisfied that such assets, excluding any sum of money deposited in a Government Savings Bank, or in any Provident Fund to which the provisions of the Provident Funds Act, 1897 apply, did not at the date of death exceed in the whole two thousand rupees in value, he may, after the lapse of one month from the death if he thinks fit, or before the lapse of the said month if he is requested so to do by writing, under the hand of the executor or the widow or other person entitled to administer the estate of the deceased, grant to any person claiming otherwise than as a creditor to be interested in such assets, or in the due administration thereof, a certificate under his hand entitling the claimant to receive the assets therein mentioned left by the deceased, within the Division to a value not exceeding in the whole two thousand rupees Provided that no certificate shall be granted under this section‑ (i) where probate of the deceased's will or letters of administration of his estate has or have been granted, or (ii) in respect of any sum of money deposited in a Government Savings Bank or in any Provident Fund to which the provisions of the Provident Funds Act 1897, apply.

32. If, in cases falling within section 31, no person claiming to be interested otherwise than as a creditor in such assets or in the due administration thereof obtains, within three months of the death of the deceased a certificate from the Administrator‑General under the same section, or probate of a will or letters of administration of the estate of the deceased, and such deceased was not an exempted person, or was an exempted person who has left assets within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, or within any area notified by the Government in this behalf in the Official Gazette, the Administrator‑General may administer the estate without letters of administration, in the same manner as if such letters had been granted to him and; if he neglects or refuses to administer such estate, he shall, upon the application of a creditor, grant a certi ficate to him in the same manner as if he were interested in such assets otherwise than as a creditor, and such certificate shall have the same effect as a certificate granted under the provisions of section 31, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act which are applicable to such certificate : Provided that the Administrator‑General may, before granting such certificate, if he thinks fit, require the creditor to give reasonable security for the due administration of the estate of the deceased.

37. The Administrator‑General shall not be bound to take out letters of administration of the estate of any deceased person on account of the assets in respect of which he grants any certificates, under section 31 or section 32, but he may do so if he revokes such certificate under section 35 or ascertains that the value of the estate exceeded two thousand rupees". The application purports to be under sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Administrator General's Act, and if these three were the only provisions which could be invoked, I would have no hesitation in holding that the application does not lie. Section 9 applies only if the deceased was not an exempted person, and, by virtue of the definition contained in section 2 of the Act, Hari Mittar Tewari, who was a Hindu, was an exempted person. Section 10 is applicable only if the deceased left assets within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court and if there is apprehension of misappropriation, deterioration or waste of such assets. Neither of these two conditions is present here. This High Court has no ordinary original civil jurisdiction except with respect to the town of Karachi, and there is no allegation of danger of misappropriation etc. Section 11 too applies only to assets within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court and under circumstances similar to those mention ed in section

10. However, there is another section still to be considered, i.e., section

7. It enacts that after the commencement of the Administrator‑General's Act, any letters of administration which are granted by a High Court are to be granted to the Administrator‑General unless they are granted to the next- of‑kin of the deceased. The section appears to confer a general right on the Administrator‑General to obtain letters of administration from a High Court in all cases where they are not granted to the next‑of‑kin. The question for con sideration is whether the section in fact confers such general right or whether it only states a rule of preference to be given effect to in proceedings under sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Act. While some of the provisions of the Administrator‑General's Act might suggest an inference to the contrary, I have, after carefully considering the matter, reached the conclusion that on the one hand there are not reasons enough for not giving to the words of section 7 their plain meaning and on the other hand, the interpretation that section 7 provides only a rule of preference for cases under sections 9, 10 and 11 will lead to a situation which could not have been contemplated. As regards the provisions that might suggest an inference to the contrary, I would refer first to section 10, according to which the Administrator‑General too may approach a High Court for a direction to apply for letters of administration. It may be urged that if a right to apply is conferred on him by section 7, why need he invoke section 10 in order to put in an application for letters of administration. An order under section 11 also enables the Administrator General to apply, if he thinks fit, for letters of administration and a similar argument can be advanced. Sections 12 and 13 say the Court may grant letters of administration to the Administrator General if the considerations mentioned in these two sections are present and it can be argued that it was only under these conditions that a grant to the Administrator‑General was contemplated. It is also to be noted that section 22 which provides for the contents of a petition presented by an Administrator‑General refer to a petition "in accordance with the provisions of the Act", and section 29 which makes it unnecessary for the Administrator General to verify his petition refers only to "petition presented by him under the provisions of this Act". It is arguable that section 7 does not provide for any petition, and it would not be reasonable to assume that sections 22 and 29 apply only to applications for letters of administration which arise out of sections 9, 10 and 11 and that to an application which the Administrator‑General may present by virtue of his general right under section 7 the provisions contained in sections 22 and 29 are not to apply. All these considerations are there, but the considerations in favour of the interpretation that section 7 does confer a general right are much stronger, and while the provisions to which I have referred are capable of being explained on some ground other than the intention to confine the right of the Administrator‑General to sections.9, 10 and 11 of the Act. the interpretation that section 7 is only a rule of preference leads to a result which could not have been contemplated at all and there are other provisions too supporting the inference of the general right. With respect to section 10, it can be said that the provision as to an application by the Administrator‑General is only intended to protect the Administrator‑General in respect of the costs that he incurs or even that it is superfluous. The proceedings under section 11 are only supple mentary to the grant of letters of administration, and sections 12 and 13 though they speak of cases in which the Administrator‑General is to be granted letters of administra tion, do not necessarily exclude the right of the Administrator General apart from these sections. The intention of sec tions 9, 10 and 11 may also be to provide for forcing the Administrator‑General to take action. The application under sections 10 and 11 can be submitted by any person interested so that any such person is enabled to protect the property of the deceased. As regards sections 22 and 29, it can be contended that even an application presented by virtue of section 7 is covered by these sections. On the other hand, if section 7 is held to be only a rule of preference with respect to proceedings under sections 9, 10 and .11, what is to happen if the application for letters of administration of an exempted person is by a person who is not a next‑of‑kin and no next‑of- kin either exists or is prepared to apply, and sections 9, 10 and 11 are not applicable? Would the High Court in such a case refuse letters of administration altogether, (because under section 7, the High Court cannot grant letters of administra tion to a person other than the next‑of‑kin)? Under section 300 of the Succession Act, the High Court has concur rent jurisdiction with the District judge for hearing applications for letters of administration and in respect of Hindus etc. it may even be the only Court which has been authorised by the Provincial Government to hear such appli cations. If we accept the interpretation that section 7 provides only a rule of preference, then the only effect of section 7 would be to debar the grant of letters of administra tion to persons other than the next‑of‑kin without at the same time enabling the Court to grant letters of administration to the Administrator‑General. I see no reason to assume that by the provisions of the Administrator‑General's Act the legislature simply intended to debar certain persons (who had a right under the Succession Act to obtain letters of Adminis tration) from obtaining letters of administration without at the same time providing for the grant to some other person: As pointed out in Mst. Ram Kati v. Administrator‑General U. P. (A I R 1943 All. 356), such an interpretation would amount to a repeal of section 234 of the Succession Act, and although the provisions of the Administrator‑General's Act are to prevail in case of conflict with the Succession Act, one would expect a clear reference to such, a repeal if it was intended. I would add that this construction will repeal not only section 234 but other sections of the Succession Act which provide for the grant of letters of administration to persons other than next- of‑kin. There are other provisions in the Act supporting the interpretation, which I am adopting. Section 14, it will be observed, recognises the right of the Administrator‑General to apply before the expiry of one month and it is not easy to explain this section on any hypothesis other than the existence of the general right to the Administrator‑General to apply. Section 37 is also not a weak argument in favour of the Administrator‑General. It says he is not bound to apply for letters of administration in respect of the assets for which he grants a certificate but he may do so if he revokes the certi ficate or if he finds that the assets exceed Rs. 2,

000. This section recognises, in the first instance, that the Administrator General may apply for letters of administration even if he issues a certificate. It recognises further that he can apply if he revokes the certificate, or the assets exceed Rs, 2,

000. Certainly the application in such cases would not, and at least it need not, fall under sections 9, 10 and

11. There is no escape from the conclusion that the Administrator‑General is entitled to apply for letters of administration even apart from sections 9, 10 and

11. One more question may arise in this connection. Has the High Court jurisdiction to hear this application? Under section 300 of the Succession Act the High Court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the District judges but in respect of Hindus etc., the High, Court cannot hear application unless there be a notification by the Provincial Government. There is no such notification in respect of this High Court, but according to section 6 of the Administrator‑General's Act so far as the Administrator‑General is concerned, the High Court is a Court of competent jurisdiction wherever in the division the assets of the deceased may be. So if the right of the Administrator‑General to apply be there, there is jurisdiction in this Court to hear the application. This application is accepted and letters of administration of the estate of Hari Mittar Tewari are granted to the petitioner. A. H. Application accepted.