P L D﷓ 19&8 Supreme Court 622 (PLP)

SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.‑‑ This is an appeal by special leave from the order, dated 18‑5‑1986 of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby it accepted the appeal of the respondent and altered the order of his removal from service to that of retirement from service.

2. The respondent joined service as senior clerk in WAPDA in February, 1961. On 31‑7‑1982 when he was posted as Accounts Clerk in the office of the Manager Finance (Water), the appellant authority, by an order, dated 31‑7‑1982, made under section 17(1‑A ), WA PD A Act, 1958, removed him from service with immediate effect giving him 30 days' pay in lieu of notice. He made departmental representations against the order of removal but without any success. He then filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal.

3. The learned Tribunal found that there was no element of mala fide in the order of removal and that there was sufficient material available to show that he did not deserve to remain any longer in service. However, for the consideration that he had been in the employment of the appellant Authority since 1961, the learned Tribunal thought that he should have been compensated for this long period. On this ground alone, it accepted the appeal and converted the order of removal into one of retirement from service.

4. In its order the learned Tribunal has observed: "We have seen the material which was produced before the Authority which passed the impugned order. He blackmailed various officers including lady workers of MS & F Division, and for that he was arrested by the Martial Law authorities, but they did not take any action and instead referred the matter to the ordinary Court, where it is still pending. The appellant is alleged to have insulted modesty of Miss Raffia Butt. He also criminally intimidated and threatened Raffia of dire consequences. The record of the appellant also shows a bleak picture. He was. suspended by WAPDA for misconduct, but was then re‑instated. He blackmailed one A.R. Memon and created Sindhi‑Punjabi issue. He was in the habit of sending anonymous and filthy letters in dirty language. He used to make abnoxious calls to officers. He impersonated as a Military Officer to threaten his superiors. The complaint made by him against the Chief Engineer and other officers of WAPDA was thoroughly investigated by different authorities and was found to be ill‑founded. It is quite clear that the respondent had been making a thorough nuisance of himself in his office and the appellant Authority had good justification for getting rid of him. Considering how he had behaved while in the service of the appellant Authority the mere fact that he had been in employment since 1961 would not give a valid ground to the learned Tribunal to interfere with the discretion exercised by his employer. We should, therefore, think that the learned Tribunal erred in modifying the order of the appellant Authority.

5. The respondent who appeared in person contended that under section 17 (1‑A) of WAPDA Act, the Authority was not competent to remove him from service and that the only order that it could make was one of his retirement from service. In support of his contention he referred to the decision of the learned Tribunal in the case of Ii?tiqa Rasul Hashmi v. WAPDA (Appeal No.121 K of 1982). Subsection (1‑A ), ibid, reads as follows:‑ "Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) or any . rules made, or orders or instructions issued, by the Authority, or in the terms and conditions of service of any person employed by, or serving under the Authority, the Authority may, at any time, retire or remove from its service any person without assigning any reason, after giving him not less than thirty days' notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of thirty days." In the case of Irtiqa Rasul Hashmi, the learned Tribunal observed:‑ "Though it is not very clear from the language employed in the provision, the only correct interpretation thereof would be that the words "retire" and "remove from its service" relate respectively to expression "any person employed by" and "serving under the Authority". In other words the Legislature intended to empower the Authority to retire only a WAPDA servant and to revert only a person serving on deputation with WAPDA to his parent department or organization. Indeed, by no stretch of law or imagination an employee of other organization/department serving on deputation with the WAPDA could be retired by WA PD A, rather, could only be sent back to his parent department or organization if his services are no longer required by the WAPDA for one reason or the other . The only possible construction of expression "remove from its service" can be removal from the service of WAPDA and not the termination of incumbent's own service" . It is difficult to support the view taken by the learned Tribunal for, on a proper reading of subsection (1‑A) we can discover no such limitation on the power of the Authority. The requirement o giving 30 days' notice or pay in lieu thereof as mentioned in the subsection leaves no room for doubt that the power of removal from service can be exercised by the Authority in respect of its own employees as well. Such a requirement would not have been necessary, if the power to remove from service was to be exercised only in respect of persons who were on deputation with the Authority for in their case the Authority could simply ask them to go back to their parent department.

6. For the reasons stated above, we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Tribunal and restore the order of the appellant Authority. M.B. A. /W‑25/S appeal accepted.