P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑

My brother Kaikaus dismissed an execution second appeal holding on the authority of the Division Bench decision in Anjuman Imdad Kafait Shuari v. Niaz Ahmad and others (P L D 1952 Lah. 478) that rule 18 (a) of the rules framed under section 43 of the Co‑operative Societies Act (II of 1912) did not permit the reference to arbitration of a dispute relating to money due from a dead person, who had been a member of the Co‑operative Society, but as he was of the view that the Division Bench decision he had followed, because he was bound to do so, had not laid down the law correctly, he declared the case to be a fit one for appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, thereupon, Anjuman Imdad Qarza, Chak No. 105/R.B. Tehsil Jaranwala, District Lyallpur, presented the present Letters Patent Appeal.

2. Briefly stated the material facts are these. Hira, a resident of Chak No. 105/R.B., Tahsil Jaranwala, District Lyallpur, who was a member of the appellant society, borrowed some money from the society. During his lifetime an award was obtained by the appellant society against Hira in 1932 as the result of arbitration under rule 18 (a) of the Co‑operative Societies Rules. Execution proceedings to recover the money due on the basis of the award were taken against Hira, but they were consigned to the record room without full satisfaction. It appears that some time later Hira, who died in 1937, made an entry in the books of the appellant society acknowledging that some money was due from him to the society. Hira left behind five sons, namely, Din Muhammad, Abdul Haq, Fazal Karim, Mushtaq Ali and Ihsan Ali, of whom Din Muhammad was himself a member of the society. In 1946, the society passed a resolution that the dispute relating to the recovery of the debt originally contracted by Hira should be referred to arbitration and on the 28th of February 1947, obtained an award for payment of Rs. 2,772 as a debt due from Hira against Din Muhammad, Abdul Haq and Fazal Karim, three sons of Hira, his other two sons evidently not having been proceeded against on the 14th of February 1950, the appellant society started proceedings for execution of the award through a Civil Court and prayed that the land left by Hira should be attached. The prayer for attachment of the land left by Hira was granted and the case was referred to the Collector of the district with a view to having the land leased out for realizing money to satisfy, the award, but before the Collector could take any steps in the matter Din, Muhammad, Abdul Haq and Fazal Karim presented an objection petition in the Civil Court in which the execution proceedings were pending. The main objection raised was that the award was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the execution proceedings could not be taken. The objections were controverted by the appellant society and the executing Court framed six issues, but at this stage we are concerned with the fourth issue only which raised the question whether or not the reference to arbitration was, in the circum stances of the case, allowed by law. The executing Court held that the award was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the execution proceedings must fail. An appeal by the appellant society presented in the District Court, Lyallpur, against the above decision was dismissed by Ch. Fazl‑i‑Ilahi, the then Additional District Judge, Lyallpur, and the second appeal presented by the appellant society (Execution Second Appeal No. 14 of 1953) was, as already mentioned, dismissed by my brother Kaikaus.

3. The only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether the question whether or not any money was due to a society, constituted under the Co‑operative Societies Act (II of 1912) from a member who has died, can be referred to arbitration under rule 18 (a) of the rules framed by the Punjab Government under section 43 (2) (1) of the Co‑operative Societies Act (II of 1912). The relevant part of the rule reads as follows:‑-- "18 (a)‑Any dispute, concerning the business of a co‑opera tive society between members or past members of the society or persons claiming through them or between a member or past member or persons so claiming and the committee or any officers shall be referred to the Registrar. Reference may be made by the committee or by the society by resolution in general meeting or by any party to the dispute or if the dispute concerns a sum due from a member of the committee to the society, by any member of the society." The Division Bench decision in the case reported as Anjuman Imdad Kafait Shuari v. Niaz Ahmad and others which my learned brother Kaikaus followed, was given on a Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of a learned Single Judge, who had taken the view that the question whether or not any debt was due to a Co‑operative Society from a person, who was a member of the Society but had died before the matter was referred to arbitration, could not be dealt with under rule 18 (a) of the Co‑operative Societies Rules. The Division Bench agreed with the view of the learned Single Judge and, holding that a Co‑operative Society which wants to recover a debt alleged to be due from a deceased member has to seek relief from Civil Courts because the expression "past member" occurring in rule 18 (a) did not mean a deceased member, dismissed the appeal.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the term "past member" occurring in rule 18 (a) of the Co‑operative Societies Rules framed by the Punjab Government could include person who, though dead, had been 4 member of the society and in this connection placed great reliance on section 20 of the Co‑operative Societies Act (II of 1912) whereby it is enacted that a registered society shall have a charge upon the share or interest in the capital and on the deposits of a member or past member and upon any dividend, bonus or profits payable to a member or past member in respect of any debt due from such member or past member to the society, and may set‑off any sum credited or payable to a member or past member in or towards payment of any such debt. The argument was that the words employed in section 20 made it clear that the charge of the society mentioned in that section would continue even if a member happened to die before the debt from him was satisfied and as the expression "past member" occurring in rule 18 (a) must be deemed to have the same meaning as it has when used in the Act, the interpretation that a deceased member cannot be deemed to be a past member for the purposes of rule 18 (a) cannot be supported. It is true that in the absence of an indication to the contrary an expression used in an Act and the rules framed under that Act should be held to have the same meaning in both, but this canon of interpretation can be of avail to the appellant only if it is established that the legislature intended that the expression "past member" when used in the Co‑operative Societies Act (II of 1912) was to mean or include a deceased member. No definition of the expression "past member" is given in the Act, but if the expression‑ has all along in the Act been used in such a way as to indicate that it was intended to include a deceased member the absence of a definition will be immaterial. One finds however that in some sections of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912, the expression "past member" does not in the context mean or include a deceased member. In section 22 of the Act wherein the transfer of interest on the death of a member is dealt with such member is described as a. "deceased member" and not "a past member". Another significant fact is that while section 23 of the Act says that the liability of a past member for the debts of a registered society as they existed at the time when he ceased to be a member shall continue for a period of two years, from the date of his ceasing to be a member, section 24 is to the effect that the estate of a deceased member shall be liable for a period of one year from the time of his decease for the debts of a registered society as they existed at the time of his decease and it is clear that in section 23 the expression "past member" cannot mean a member who is dead. It follows, therefore, that the expression "past member" when used in the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912, does not necessarily include a deceased member and one has to consider the context to determine whether or not the expression was intended to include a deceased member and the same thing has to be done even when the expression "past member" occurs in the rules made under the Act.

5. Now, if the canon of interpretation of statutes, to the effect that unless there is something definite to indicate the contrary, an expression used in a section of a statute at more places than one is to be presumed to have the same meaning in all those places, which in addition to having been acted upon from times immemorial has the support of commonsense, is kept in view while determining the meaning of the expression "past member" used in clause (1) of subsection (2) of section 43 of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912, it becomes manifest that the expression "past member" used in that clause could not have been intended to include a deceased member. It will be noted that the clause, referred to above, authorises the Provincial Government to make rules for settlement of disputes con cerning a Co‑operative Society between persons mentioned therein. There cannot be a dispute between persons, be the persons juristic persons or natural persons unless they are in existence. It follows that the expression "past member" used in section 43 (2) (1) of the Co‑operative Societies Act used in relation to disputes of such members with the society would apply only to persons who though no longer members of the society are still in existence. By the same clause the Provincial Government was authorised to make rules for settlement of disputes between a Co‑operative Society and persons claimine under "members" or "past members" and if one were to hold that when the legislature used the expression "persons claiming under past members" it intended to include persons claiming under "deceased members" one would be holding that the legislature which enacted the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912. was indulging in inconsistencies and as an interpretation which would lead to the legislature being held to be inconsistent is to be avoided, it cannot but be held that a dispute between Co‑operative Society and the legal representatives of a deceased member was not intended by the legislature to be a matter about which the Provincial Government had been authorized to make rules. Consequently, I would hold that rule 18 (a), the relevant, part of which has been reproduced in paragraph (3) above cannot be invoked in disputes between a Co‑operative Societ3 and the legal representatives of a deceased member of that society.

6. In view of what I have said above, I would dismiss the appeal, but in view of the fact that, the appeal appears to have been presented because the learned Judge in Chambers had expressed the opinion that the decision of the Division Bench on which reliance had been placed before him, did not lay down the law correctly, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. KAYANI, C. J.‑

I agree. A.H. Appeal dismissed.