1990CLC43 (PLP)

‑‑‑ Redundancy in legislation is to be avoided and only such interpretation is to be made as would be calculated to suppress the mischief and to advance the remedy (c) Interpretation of statutes‑‑ ‑‑Various provisions in the statute are to be harmoniously construed so as to accord due effect to the intention of the legislature. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction‑‑‑Relief under Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court is to operate within well defined lines and is discretionary in nature which has to be exercised on judicial lines. (e) Cantonments Act (II of 1924)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss. 277 & 71(1‑A)‑‑‑Revisional jurisdiction‑‑‑Assessment of property‑‑‑Mode of assessment under provisions of Cantonments Act ‑‑‑Revisional Authority had validly disagreed with findings of District Magistrate that period of one month contemplated by provisions of S.71(1‑A) refers to the proposal stage of assessment and not to the finalization of assessment under provisions of Cantonments Act, 1924‑‑‑District Magistrate was not justified in taking drastically technical view, and should have considered the matter of assessment on merits‑‑ Revisional Authoritys assessment on merits did not seem to be unreasonable. Partab Rai for Petitioner Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th April, 1989. WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑‑The facts giving rise to this Constitutional petition are that the property situated at 50‑B, Civil Lines, Hyderabad, belonging to the petitioner was initially assessed by the Cantonment Board, Hyderabad, Respondent No.2, herein, to Rs.10,00,000 per annum for the period 1‑7 1982 to 30‑6‑1985. Such annual rental value for the period 1‑7‑1985 to 30‑6‑1988, was enhanced by the Assessment Committee to Rs. 44,45,964 apparently, on the basis of the rent agreement d4ted 21‑11‑1981, between the petitioner and the State Bank. On appeal under section 84 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, the District Magistrate, Hyderabad, revised the assessment at the rate of Rs.11,25,000 per order dated 4‑10‑1987. Review Application of the Respondent No.2, Board, was also dismissed by the District Magistrate on 14‑3‑1988. On revision being preferred by the Board before the Federal Government on 11‑4‑1988, against the two aforesaid orders of the District Magistrate, Hyderabad, the delegatee of the Federal Government, acting under section 277, heard the case on 2‑10‑1988, revised the assessment per order dated 26‑10‑1988, and assessed the annual rental value at the rate of Rs.23,70,595.26. The last mentioned order is questioned invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court on the ground that no revision lay against the final orders of the District Magistrate and further that on facts as well the impugned order is bad.

2. As to lack of jurisdiction of the revisional authority, it is urged that section 277 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, was not attracted as the provision for revision in that section relates to orders passed in appeal under Section 274 of such Act only. It is further contended that the scheme of the Cantonments Act would show that sections 274 and 277 appear in Chapter XV of the Act and are restricted to proceeding under that Chapter only whereas the orders passed by the District Magistrate under section 84 of the Act are final as reflected in section 88, both of which provisions occur in Chapter V of the Act and deal expressly with the subject of taxation. This argument is untenable for several reasons. Under section 274 aforesaid, appeals a. a provided, as contemplated by Schedule V of the Act, from the orders of the authorities mentioned in the second column of such Schedule to the Authorities indicated in the third column thereof. Such appeals relate to orders under section 126 and subsequent sections and only one such appeal lies with the District Magistrate and that too against the issuance of notice by a Magistrate. If the argument is accepted and revisional power under Section 277, is restricted to the appellate orders passed under Section 274 alone the result would be that no revision would arise at all as Section 277 postulates that revisional jurisdiction would be attracted only in respect of orders passed on appeal by the District Magistrate against the orders made by the Board. This is so as Schedule V does not contemplate any appellate order of the District Magistrate against the Board, leading to the implication an inference that section 277, is a broader provision available in all cases where an order in appeal is passed by a District Magistrate against the orders of a Cantonment Board, Besides, section 277, is not restricted to Chapter XV only because amongst the A various orders contemplated even under Section 274 none falls under Chapter XV. Further merely because the revisional provision in Section 277, occurs where it does namely, in Chapter XV, aforesaid, is no reason to limit the application of that provision to such chapter only. In this context, it is the language of the provision which has to be seen and that language is broad enough to include all appellate orders of a District Magistrate passed in relation to the orders of the Cantonment Board arising as of the first instance. As regards finality envisaged in section 88 of the Cantonments Act such finality has been clarified under Section 278 of the Act meaning thereby that the same is subject to the revisional power under Section 277 aforesaid. It must be remembered that one of the basic rules of interpretation is that redundancy in legislation is to be avoided and only such interpretation is to be made as would be calculated to suppress the mischief and to advance the remedy. Besides, the various provisions in the statute are to be harmoniously construed so as to accord due effect to the intention of the legislature. On the touchstone of all these principles the irresistable conclusion is that the revisional power under section 277 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, is a power of general application and is applicable in all cases where the original order is that of a Cantonment Board which has been subjected to an appellate exercise at the level of the District Magistrate and neither the nature of such order nor that of the one passed in appeal is of any consequence. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that section 277, conferring revisional jurisdiction of a general character, is not susceptible to any restricted meanings, as suggested. Revision, therefore, to the Government, in our view, was fully competent.

3. In the context of the merits of this case, it must, at the outset be stated that the relief under constitutional jurisdiction of this Court governed by Article 199 of the Constitution is to operate within well defined lines and in cases of this g kind is even discretionary. The Director General Military Lands and Cantonments Department, Ministry of Defence, who heard the revision in this case accorded, contrary to what has been urged before us, due hearing to the petitioner, as the impugned order would seem to reflect. He has validly disagreed with the findings of the District Magistrate that the period of one month contemplated by section 71(1‑A) refers to the proposal stage of the assessment and not to the finalization of the assessment pursuant to the provisions of the Cantonments Act. Besides, under section 72 of the Act express power has been given to prepare a new assessment list at least once every three years. Even otherwise, the factors which weighed with the District Magistrate in passing the order on appeal did not seem to really arise as hearing was accorded on objections to the petitioner Bank at the initial stage and further if anything more had to be said the same could have been and was said before the District C Magistrate. The latter, therefore, was not justified in taking such a drastically technical view of the situation and should have considered the matter of assessment on merits which, however, he declined to do and without examining the merits set aside the orders of committee. Such exercise was done at the revisional level as would be presently seen.

4. The revisional authority has disagreed even with the Assessment Committee on the ground that furniture and machinery, inclusive of airconditioning, cannot be included in assessing rental value. Likewise, fittings and fixtures, howsoever expensive, are not to be excluded being necessary to make a building habitable or fit for occupation. On weighing all the facts, the revisional authority has concluded that the rented portion is to be assessed at Rs.4 per sq. ft. per month whereas the self‑occupied portion is subjected to an assessment of Rs. 2. 75 per sq. ft. per month. None of this seems to be unreasonable. On the other hand while we were not sure whether the agreement of lease between the petitioner Bank and the State Bank of Pakistan dated 21‑11 1981, was still applicable between the parties, we on our part, wanted to know as to what was the rental involved but the learned counsel for the petitioner expressed his inability to do so as he was not himself aware of the same. Nonetheless, from the recitals in the memo of the petition, we find that the petitioner has admitted that the Assessment Committee fixed the assessment at "Rs.44,45, 964 only on the basis of the rent agreement dated 21‑11‑1981, between the Petitioner Bank and the State Bank of Pakistan." This being so and as the total assessment made by the revisional authority is reduced to Rs.23,70,595.26, in totality for the rented and self‑occupied portions, no injustice seems to have been done. As has been said earlier, the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in such matters is one of a discretionary nature which, of course, has to be exercised along sound judicial lines. In the circumstances of the case as, apart from everything else, no inequities are involved, we are disinclined to exercise our discretion, even if the same was available. Dismissed. AA./N‑224/K Petition dismissed.