P L D 1957 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

CORNELIUS, J.‑

This case arises out of the murder of one Chaudhri Imam Din, of which in the first instance, four persons were accused. The death was caused by a single blow of a knife in the abdomen, allegedly delivered by one Rasul Bakhsh, who was assisted by Allah Bakhsh and Miran Bakhsh and incited by one Din Muhammad. Allah Bakhsh and Miran Bakhsh are brothers; Rasul Bakhsh is the son of Miran Bakhsh, and Din Muhammad is nephew to the two brothers. There being no other injury upon the person of the deceased nor any material evidence to connect any of the accused persons with the commission of the crime, it is significant that while in his dying declaration, recorded in the hospital, Chaudhri Imam Din said be was thrown on the ground by Allah Bakhsh and Miran Bakhsh, in which position he was stabbed by Miran Bakhsh, in the initial report made soon after the occurrence by Muhammad Ashiq, his son (not an eye‑witness) it was said clearly that Allah Bakhsh and Miran Bakhsh had got hold of the victim who was in a standing position when Rasul Bakhsh stabbed him. Rasul Bakhsh was absconding when the trial of the other three was held, at which Din Muhammad was acquitted and the other two accused persons were sentenced to transportation for life, upon conviction under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, They appealed to the High Court, and were acquitted on several grounds, inter alia that:‑- (1) the prosecution story was unnatural in several respects: (2) none of the eye‑witnesses or the waj‑taker witnesses was wholly independent ; and therefore the possibility of exaggeration could not be eliminated; and (3) it was inconceivable that having open knives (as alleged) in their hands, Allah Bakhsh and Miran Bakhsh would not have used them to injure Chaudhri Imam Din. The present petition for special leave to appeal against the order of acquittal, has been moved by the aforesaid Muhammad Ashiq. The petition states that he has moved the District. Magistrate for an appeal by the Government but Mr. Qalandar Ali Khan states that this application was rejected, on the ground that there is no provision in the law or rules for such an appeal. To put the matter beyond doubt, we might say that, as held in the case of Matlub Hussain (P L D 1951 F C 115), the State is clearly a party to a murder case, and therefore the right of the State to move this Court under Article 160 of the Constitution, by way of appeal, against an order of acquittal by the High Court admits of no doubt. An instance of such an appeal being admitted (and allowed) is the case of Mehar Ali (P L D 1956 F C 106). But the person who made the original report to the police is not necessarily a party to the case. Such a report is to be regarded as an intimation of the commission of a cognizable offence, and not as a prayer for redress for F personal wrong or injury suffered. The report may be made by any person, e.g., a lambardar or a chowkidar, or even a member of the public who has gained knowledge in any manner, howsoever, of the commission of a cognizable offence. The further pursuit of the matter by the police is an activity of the State. It was remarked in Matlub Hussain's case:‑ "In a murder case, no person other than the accused who is being prosecuted, or the Crown at whose instance he is being prosecuted, appear to be parties." That was a case in which the acquittal was by the Sessions Court, and there had been an unsuccessful approach to the Government for the institution of an appeal, upon the failure of which, a petition for revision had been moved in the High Court by a relation of the murdered person. Here, the present petitioner Muhammad Ashiq has not been a party to any judicial proceeding connected with the murder of his father, and the case is stronger against him, than it was against Matlub Hussain, to deny him the position of a party when he seeks to move the Supreme Court by way of a petition for special leave to appeal. We must not however be understood to say that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal by a High Court or any other Court otherwise than upon appeal by the State. There are circumstances in which such an appeal may be clearly competent, e.g., where the prosecution was commenced and continued upon a private complaint. In a more general view of the Court's jurisdiction, which is still being exercised on the principles laid down by the Privy Council in a number of cases where the limits of their jurisdiction in criminal matters came under consideration, we feel no doubt in saying that the Court will not, in a proper case, hesitate to interfere where the circumstances indicate that there has been a grave miscarriage of justice, by some disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice. The obligation to do so under the changed conditions following the enactment of the Constitution Act in 1956 is in no wise altered from the position as it was stated by the Privy Council in the case of Bertrand (L R (1887) 1 P C 520) in the following words:‑- "Upon principle and reference to the decisions of this Committee, it seems under undeniable that in all cases, criminal as well as civil, arising in places from which an appeal would lie, and where, either by the terms of a Charter or Statute, the authority has not been parted with, it is the inherent prerogative right, and, on all proper occasions, the duty of the Queen‑in‑Council to exercise, an appellate jurisdiction, with a view not only to ensure so far may be, the due administration of justice in the individual case, but also to preserve the due course of pro cedure generally." In the same case, it was further observed that among the circumstances which might render it proper for the Judicial Committee to entertain an appeal were the following, viz:‑ (1) that the petition raises questions of great and general importance which are likely to occur often ; (2) that the due and orderly administration of the law might have been interrupted, or diverted into a new course, which might create a precedent for the future; and (3) that there is no other means of preventing these consequences. In Bertrand's case, the judicial Committee treated of the jurisdiction in a positive sense, but in the case of Dillet (L R 12 App. Cas. 459) often quoted in the context of the present question, a restrictive statement is made, containing a clear definition of the limits laid upon itself by the judicial Committee in relation to its criminal jurisdiction. That statement is in the following terms:‑ "The rule has been repeatedly laid down and has been invariably followed that Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done". It is quite conceivable that these conditions might be satisfied in a case in which the State might not choose to move this Court against an order of acquittal, and it is therefore D of great importance that we should not be understood to pronounce an absolute bar against motions of the present kind. There may be no other means of preventing the kind of consequences which are conceived, in the passage quoted above from Bertrand's case, as attracting the duty of the Sovereign to exercise the inherent jurisdiction, derived from the prerogative, to entertain an appeal. That juris diction has now devolved upon this Court, and falls to be exercised under Article 160 of the Constitution. But, in the present case, after having been taken through the judgment of the High Court by Mr. Qalandar Ali Khan, and having appreciated his arguments in criticism thereof, we cannot see the slightest reason to disagree with any of the conclusions upon which the order of acquittal is based. Every point of criticism raised before us goes to the apprecia tion of the evidence by the High Court, in relation to the general circumstances of the incident, and, as to these matters, the consistent practice of the Court has been not to interfere with such findings in the absence of "something so irregular or outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice". (Mohindar Singh's case (59 I A 233)). So far from finding anything of that kind in the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, we are, on the other hand, clearly of the view that the conclusion reached by the High Court upon the evidence are both possible as well as natural. We accordingly dismiss this petition. A.H. Petition dismissed.