P L D 1962 Dacca 66 (PLP)

CHOWDHURY, C. J.‑This appeal by defendants No. 1 to 4 is against the judgment and decree in Partition Suit No. 59 of 1950/ 31 of 1947 In the Fourth Court of the Subordinate Judge, Mymensingh.

2. The facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal, shortly stated, are as follows: ‑ The four brothers (1) Maharaja Raj Krishna Singha Sarma, (2) Raja Kamal Krishna Singha Sarma. (3) Raja Jagat Krishna Singha Sarma and (4) Shib Krishna Singha Sarma constituted a joint Hindu family. They along with Lahiri Babus of Shankarpur and Majumdar of Narayandaha were the proprietors of Zemindary No. 136 of Pargana Susang. By a deed of partition the four brothers divided their properties and separated themselves both in mess and property. The share of the first brother was known as Bara Tahbil and that of the second brother Raja Kamal Krishna Sarma was known as Madhyam Tahbil. Raja Kamal Krishna died leaving two sons Promode Chandra Singha Sarma commonly known as Promode Bahadur and Girindra Chandra Singha Sarma commonly known as Girindra Bahadur. Promode Bahadur had three sons Sudhir Chandra Singha Sarma. Sudhindra Chandra Singha Sarma, defendant No. 1, and Suhrid Chandra Singha Sarma, defendant No.

2. Sudhir Chandra died on 21‑7‑1928 during the life‑time of his father Promode Bahadur, leaving plaintiff No. 1 Debesh Kumar and plaintiff No. 2 Sumesh Kumar, three daughters kalita, Binita and Namita and a widow Shibani Devi plaintiff" No. 3, who again died during the pendency of the suit leaving the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 as her heirs and the three daughters.

3. Girindra Bahadur died on 16‑3‑1934 leaving two sons, defendant No. 3 Surat and defendant No. 4 Subesh as his heirs. Promode Bahadur died on 1‑12‑1939. The two brothers Promode Bahadur and Girindra Bahadur, after the death of their father Kamal Krishna, continued to live in joint mess and properties and acquired more properties with their joint fund which they amalgamated to form part of the Madhyam Tahbil and they possessed it as ejmali and both the brothers lived in joint mess and properties as members of a joint Hindu family. Now the plaintiffs, the two sons and widow of deceased Sudhir, who died during the life‑time of his father Promode Bahadur, filed the present suit for partition of the joint Hindu family properties of Promode Bahadur and Girindra Bahadur against the other heirs of Promode Bahadur, i.e., defendants Nos. 1 and 2, and defendants Nos. 3 and 4, the sons of Girindra Bahadur claiming 1/6th share in the property as well as Rs. 10,000 as the marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter Namita Devi cut of the joint family property.

4. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit of the plaintiffs holding that the marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter would come out of the joint property of the family and the expenses was fixed at Rs. 10,000 with reference to the rules of management before the deed of partition where there was a provision for payment of Rs. 10,000 to Promode Chandra Singha to defray the marriage expenses of Lalita Debi, another daughter of late Sudhir and the gross annual income of the Madhyam Tahbil to the extent of two lacs of rupees and he decreed the claim of the plaintiffs declaring their share to the extent of 1/6th of the property of Madhyam Tahbil after deduction of Rs. 10,000 as marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter Namita. Hence, this appeal.

5. We need not deal with other matter in the appeal than that of the decree of Rs. 10,000 as marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter of Sudhir out of the joint family property, as the learned Advocate in his usual fairness, did not press the appeal in respect of the matters other than the decree of Rs. 10,000 as marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter Namita Debi.

6. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants is that the marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter would come out, not from the entire joint family property but out of the share of her father in that property and that the learned Subordinate Judge erred in law in holding that it would come entirely out of the joint Hindu family property.

7. It is not disputed that the family is governed by the Bengal School of Hindu Law, namely, Dayabhaga School and not by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. In the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law there is no specific provision for marriage expenses of unmarried daughter of a joint Hindu family. So we are to look to tire provisions in the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law as section 272 of Mulla's Hindu Law provides "As to the points on which the Dayabhaga is silent, the rules of the Mitakshara law are to be applied so far they are applicable."

8. Under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, as laid down in section 27 of Mulla's Hindu Law in dealing with the expenses for family purposes, it is provided; 'The family purposes referred to above are the maintenance, education, marriage, Sradh and other religious ceremonies of the coparceners and of the members of their respective fami lies. In taking accounts at the time of partition, no charge is to be made against any coparcener, because in consequence of his having a larger family to maintain than others, a larger share of the joint income was spent on his family. Such expenditure is considered to be the legitimate expenditure of the whole family." Then again we get reference in section 304 of Mulla's Hindu Law, to the marriage expenses of unmarried daughter of the family. In that section it is provided that to order to determine what property is available for partition, provision amongst other is to be made for marriage expenses of the unmarried daughters. As to the marriage expenses of male member of the family, the section provides that it has been held by the Judicial Committee in the case of Narayan Annavi and others v. K. Ramalinga Annavi and others (I L R 39 Mad. 587) that since the institution of the suit for partition by a member of the joint family effects a severance of the joint family status of the family, a male member of the family, who is then unmarried, is not entitled to have a provision made on partition of his marriage expenses, although he marries before the decree in the suit is made. In this very section it is provided further that the case of an unmarried daughter, however, stands on a different footing. Her right to maintenance and marriage expenses out of the joint family property is in lieu of a share on partition ; provision should accordingly be made for her marriage expenses in the decree.

9. In view of this provision in the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law from which it is not clear whether the marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter will come out of the joint family property or it will come out of the share of her father in the joint family property as contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee; and as none appearing on behalf of the respondents, we asked Mr. Mati Lal Acharyya, learned Advocate, to appear as amicus curiae and he rendered valuable assistance to us which we must acknowledge with thanks.

10. In the same section, namely, section 304 of Mulla's Hindu Law, there is an illustration, but the illustration itself is not very clear particularly when It refers to the marriage expenses of S 2's daughters, if any, she being the daughter of a collateral and her marriage expenses should come out of her own father's share.

11. These provisions in section 304 of Mulla's Hindu Law are obviously passed on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Subbya v. Ananta Ramayya (I L R 53 Mad. 84). We have very carefully gone through the judgment of this case, because this is the only authority available to us and cited by Mr. Bhattacharjee on the point. One of the reasons given therein for holding that the marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter would come out of the share of her father is not very clear. The case in that reported decision is of a joint family consisting of father and son and it has been held that marriage of an unmarried daughter of a Hindu joint family on the property of the joint family consisting of father and sons is in lieu of her share which is degenerated to the right of maintenance and marriage expenses and her such right is not due to paternal obligation of her father to be extended to the whole joint family through him, but an independent obligation arising out of joint family property law. It' that is the position in law and if it is an independent obligation arising out of the joint family property law, then it is expected that the obligation should continue to be the obligation of all the members of the family including the collateral not only during the continuance of the jointness of the family but also till partition.

12. So far as this proposition of law cited above, there is no difficulty in its application in case of marriage of the unmarried daughter which took pace before the family was separated or before there was a severance of the status of the joint family, as it has been held and there is no dispute that such marriage expenses are family expenses, on matter whose daughter she is. So also in the case of marriage expenses of a daughter of a father of a family consisting of father and sons, the whole family is liable as the obligation falls upon all the members of the family. But in the case of marriage of son's daughters, though during the continuance of the joint family whole family must bear the expenses, it is stated in this case that primarily it is the obligation of the sons' branch (presumably after the severance of the status of joint family on the Institution of the partition suit) and the father has nothing to do with it which though apparently seems to be inconsistent with the principle "independent obligation arising out of joint family property law" and "not due to paternal obligation of her father" is not really inconsistent so far as it relates to Hindu Joint family governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. It is further stated "it stands exactly in the same position as the son's debt incurred not for family purposes) as contracted with the father's debt. Therefore, after the partition it fell upon the sons' branch only and not upon the brother's branch nor upon his father the learned Judge observed: - "To put the matter briefly, the obligations of an ancestor and his family would fall after partition upon all the members of the family but the obligation of the head of a. sub‑branch will fall upon the branch after partition and not on other collateral branches or upon members higher in the genealogical tree." This observation of the learned Judge in that case in respect of son's daughter in joint family consisting of father, sons and collateralls is an obiter, because the facts of that case disclose that marriage expenses in. dispute in that case was in respect of the daughter of a father of the family consisting of father and sons only.

13. This principle enunciated in the case reported in I L R 53 Mad. 84-A I .R 1929 Mad. 586 so far as it relates to marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter of a joint family consisting of father and sons has been followed in a later decision in the case of Naramsetti Venkatappala Narasimhalu and another v. Naramsetti Someswara Rao and another (A I R 1948 Mad. 505, 506) and by the Privy Council in the case of M. A. Rajagopala Ayyar v. M. A. Venkataraman and others (51 C W N 829). Both these cases are of joint family consisting of father and sons. So the principle of independent obligation arising out of joint family property law applied to the facts of those cases.

14. The analogy of debt by son (not for family purposes) given in the judgment in that Madras Full Bench case reported in A I R 1929 Mad. 586 though not very much appropriate, we think the fundamental principle of law on which the judgment is based, so far as it relates to marriage expense of son's daughter, though an obiter, do support the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee.

15. The principle of law is that the marriage expenses off an unmarried daughter is in lieu of her share in the joint family property degenerated to a right of maintenance and marriage expenses. Both under the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga Schools of Hindu Law, inheritance of the ancestral property by the members of the family is through their respective father, that is per stripe on the death of the grand‑father or great‑grand‑father and the son's daughter's share in the property of her grand‑father came out of her father's share. This is the joint family property law under the Hindu Law spoken of by the learned Judge in the Full Bench case of Madras if her marriage expense is in lieu of her share in the property and if that share is to come outs of her father's share, it cannot be claimed at tsar; time of partition out of the entire property including the properties of the share of her uncle, i.e. out of the share of the collateral branches e or upon the members higher in the genealogical tree, but only out of the share of her father. So, it necessarily follows that the expenses of marriage of an unmarried daughter in the family at the time of partition will be provided out of the share of her fatter and not out of the entire joint family property.

16. This is the position of the joint Hindu family under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law where the demand of partition of a joint family property affects a severance of the joint family status of the family. But a different consideration arises in case of a joints Hindu family under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law where jointness of the family continues till actual separation of possession of the property on partition.

17. Section 279 of Mulla's Hindu Law provides that the essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara Law is unity of ownership and once the shares of the coparceners are defined, a partition is deemed to have taken place, and the coparcenary is dissolved from that moment. On the other hand, the essence of a coparcenary under the Dayabhaga law is unity of possession and not unity of ownership at all and partition then, according to the Dayabhaga Law, consists in splitting up joint possession and assigning specific portion of the property to several coparceners.

18. Further, under the Mitakshara 'School of Hindu law a demand of partition will affect the joint family status ; but in case of Dayabhaga not only splitting up of joint possession but also the assignment of specific portion of the property will affect the jointness of the family.

19. Therefore, the fact of filing of suit for partition doe not affect the jointness of the family under the Dayabhaga School and the property continues to be joint family property g till a specific portion on partition is allotted to the respective member of the family. Consequently the marriage expenses of unmarried daughter will be the family expenses to come out of the joint family property.

20. This position has been conceded by Mr. Bhattacharjee the learned advocate for the appellants, but he contends that would be the position if marriage takes place before the splitting up of possession of the joint family property and his information is that the marriage of Namita Devi, the unmarried daughter of Sudhir, has not yet taken place. It appears from the judgment that one of the points raised before the lower Court was that when Namita Devi attained puberty the marriage expenses was not the expenses of the joint Hindu family and it was in the year 1949. We do not know whether a Hindu girl, who attained puberty before 1949, has yet remained unmarried after 11 years. As the other side has not appeared we are not getting any assistance on this point.

21. Therefore, the question is what provision is to be made in the decree of the partition suit on the assumption that Namita Devi has not yet been married as well as on further assumption that she will not be married until the splitting up of possession in execution of the decree in this partition suit. Mr Bhattacharjee contends that family expenses mentioned in section 237 of Mulla's Hindu Law comprises maintenance, education, marriage, sradh and other religious ceremonies of the coparceners etc. and means the expenses actually incurred and cannot mean expenses to be incurred. If it includes the expenses to be incurred then provision in the decree is to be made for all these expenses to be incurred for the maintenance, education, marriage, sradh and other religious ceremonies of the coparceners, which on the face of it, is inpracticable. So, there cannot be any provision made in the decree in respect of marriage expenses of unmarried daughter whose marriage has not taken place up to the actual assignment of possession of specific portion of the joint property to the coparceners.

22. Mr. Matilal Acharyya tried to meet this point con tending that the right of marriage expenses of unmarried daughter in the joint Hindu family is a right created by birth in addition to her maintenance out of the joint family property and cannot be classified along with other family expenses which are liabilities only when they are incurred. In support of this contention Mr. Acharyya relied on the decision of Ramesam, J. In the Full Bench case of Chedalvada Subbayya v. Chedalvada Ananda Ramavya, where Ramesam and Reilly, JJ., held that in a coparcenary consisting of father and son, the obligation of maintaining and marrying the daughter is not only on the father and through him on the coparcenary but it is an obligation oil the coparcenary itself, because such an obligation being only a historical remnant of the daughter's original right to a share in the coparcenary is created by birth.

23. This contention of Mr. Acharyya is obviously intended that this right of marriage expenses of unmarried daughter will follow joint family property even after partition as contemplated by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law; I do not agree to this position. But this much is clear that until the property is separated and possession delivered the property continues to be joint family property under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law and marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter before actual partition of possession of the property must come out of the joint family property, and if the marriage takes place after the separation of possession it will come out of the share of her father.

24. Therefore, our conclusion is, which conclusion is based on the assumption that Namita Devi, the unmarried daughter of Sudhir is still unmarried and if her marriage takes place before the actual separation of possession of the property on partition‑that her marriage expenses will come out of the joint family property and provision is to be made in the decree of this partition suit to that effect. If the marriage has already taken place, then there is no doubt that the marriage expenses will be borne out of the joint family property. In this view of the matter, we think the contention advanced by Mr. Bhattacharjee is not wholly correct and the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge so far as they relate to the marriage expenses of Namita Debi out of the joint family property are to be maintained, if marriage takes place during the pendency of this suit upto the actual separation of possession on partition.

25. In the result, we dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment and decree of the lower Court with this modification that the marriage expenses of Namita Debi amounting to Rs. 10,000 will come out of the joint family property if the marriage has already taken place or if it takes place at any time before actual separation of possession of the joint family property on partition in pursuance of the decree in this partition suit.

26. There will be no order as to costs as there is no appearance on behalf of the respondents.

27. The connected application was not pressed and it is accordingly rejected. SATTAR, J.‑This partition suit is in respect of the Madhyam Tahbil of what was once known as Susang Raj Estate and was started as the instances of Debesh Kumar Singha Sarma, Somesh Kumar Singha Sarma and their mother, Shibani Devi, the two great grandsons of Raja Kamal Krishna Singha Sarma by his grandson Sudhir.

29. Raja Kamal Krishna Singha Sarma died leaving ‑2 sons‑ Promode Chandra Singha Sarma and Girindra Chandra Singha Sarma. Promode Chandra had 3 sons Sudhindra, Suhrid and Sudhir and Girindra Chandra Singha Sarma left two sons‑Surat and Subesh. The plaintiffs filed the suit against their uncles Sudhindra Chandra Singha Sarma and Suhrid Chandra Singha Sarma and the sons of Girindra Chandra Singha Sarma for partition. Shibani Devi has died and plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 are her heirs.

30. The point that arises in this appeal is whether the marriage expenses of Namita alias Khuku, an unmarried sister of the plaintiffs, should come out of the entire joint estate or from the share of her brothers only. The learned Subordinate Judge has assessed the expenses at Rs. 10,030 and ordered the said sum to be provided for in the decree to come out of the entire joint family property.

31. The point is some what intricate and we are grateful to Mr. D. C. Bhattacharjee, who appears for the defendant appellants, and to Mr. Matilal Acharyya, who appears as amicus curiae, at our request, for the able assistance that we have received from them. The family in question is governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law; but there is no direct provision in the Dayabhaga in regard to this question. The rule in such circumstances is that in the absence of any provision In Dayabhaga, Mitakshara School of Hindu Law should be the guide in deciding the question (See Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, Articles 11 and 272).

32. It is not disputed that under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, provision should be made at the time of partition for the marriage expenses of the unmarried daughter in the parti tion decree. The only point of difference is whether such expenses should come out of the shares of her father and also of collaterals if the joint family is composed of collaterals also. Two cases which have been referred to at the tine of hearing having direct bearing on this point are the following: In the case of Vaikuntam Ammangar v. Kallapiran Ayyangar (I L R 23 Mad. 512), the mother of the girl sued her uncle for the recovery of the marriage expenses incurred by her in connection with her daughter's marriage. The joint family in that case consisted of 2 brothers, one of whom died leaving behind a widow and an unmarried daughter. The entire property was in the hands of the uncle. The mother incurred the expenses and sued the uncle for the recovery of those expenses. It was held in that case that in such circumstances the defendant, namely, the uncle was liable to pay for the marriage expenses already incurred by the mother. In the case of Chedalavada Subbayya v. Chedalavada Ananda Ramayya, the joint family consisted of the father and his sons. The point in dispute was whether the marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter of the father should be provided for in the decree in the partition suit instituted by one of the sons. The main judgment in that case was delivered by Ramesam, J. The learned Judge while holding that the marriage expenses should be provided for in the partition decree and should come out of the entire joint family property, made some observations to the effect that when such a joint family consisted of collaterals also, the expenses should come from the shares of the father and brothers of the girl and not of the collaterals. The authority of the judgment of Ramesam, J. in that case that the right to have the expenses of marriage of an unmarried daughter out of the joint family property is in lieu of the ancient right of inheriting a share of the joint family, cannot be question ed. The learned Judge after tracing the history on tire basis of some texts on the subject has observed as follows:‑ "In Sirkar's Hindu Law, Edn.6, p. 328, the unmarried daughter's right is thus described `Similarly an unmarried daughter acquires an imperfect right in the father's property by virtue of which she enjoys the same and is maintained out of it until marriage and is also entitled to a quarter share, if partition takes place before her marriage, that is to say, when she continues as a member of the family.' " I agree with this passage. It seems to me that in the early law both the rights of the sons and the daughters were imperfect rights in the property which cannot be materialized by compelling parti tion against the wishes of the father but where as the sons' right gradually developed into a right to compel partition, the daughter's right first became a right to compel partition against the brothers only and not against the father and latterly degenerated into merely a right to maintenance and marriage expenses. When the daughter's right is so viewed, Mitakshara, Ch. 1, S. 7, placitum 14 does not mean that the daughter's interest is not an interest in the property. It only shows that during his lifetime she could not compel partition and should take whatever he gives, which of course does not mean that he is not bound to maintain her or marry her. This is all what is meant by S. 482, Mayne's Hindu Law. The first sentence: - "Where a partition takes place during the life of the father the daughter has no right to any special apportionment," simply means that the daughter cannot compel partition and ask for a definite share during the father's lifetime, but it does not mean that she has no interest in the property for she had the right to a fourth share against the brothers after her father's death. I, therefore, infer that the right of the daughter for marriage expenses and for maintenance is a right over the joint family property of the father and the brothers and though during the father's lifetime she cannot enforce such right in the form of a partition because of placitum 14 of the Mitakshara, still if the father is willing to exercise his discretion in favour of the daughter by giving some thing towards her marriage expenses, the joint family property is liable towards such expenses. I have taken pains to trace the early history of the law and draw the above inference simply for the purpose of showing that the right to get expenses out of the joint family property is not a right derived from the parental obligation of the father to maintain a child but an independent obligation arising out of the joint family property law. The next question that arises is after partition on whom does the obligation fall? Mr. Raghava Rao says on the father only, because it is an obligation peculiar to the father by reason of his paternal position. We have seen that the obligation existing before the death of the father is not the obligation derived from the pater nal position. If so, there is no reason why after partition it should fall upon the father only. It is true there are cases showing that, while during the continuance of a joint family the obligation falls on the whole family after partition, it does not fall upon the whole family but on some branch or branches of the family. For instance in a partition between a father and two sons, debts contracted by the son not for family necessity will not fall on the whole joint family but only on his branch, that is, on himself and his descen dants, but not on his brothers or on his father. But the debts of a father not illegal or immoral will certainly fall upon all branches of the family not only upon Vie father but upon the branches of each of his sons. In each case we have to see whether there is an obligation peculiar or personal to the head of the parti cular branch or sub‑branch or an obligation to which the whole family is liable. In the case of a father's debts the whole family is liable ; in the case of son's debts, the son's branch only is liable. "Similarly in respect of marriage expenses of the daughter of a father the whole joint family is liable. Therefore after par tition the obligation falls upon all the members of the family. But in the case of the marriage of a son's daughter (the case put by my brother Jackson, J. in his Judgment) though during the continuance of the joint family the whole family must bear the expenses, still primarily it is the obligation of the son's branch and the father bas nothing to do with it. I do not concede that no part of the family is liable. It stands exactly in the same position as the son's debts as contracted with the father's debts. Therefore, after partition it falls upon the sons' branch only and not upon the brothers' branches or upon his father. To put the matter briefly the obligations of an ancestor and his family would fall after partition upon all the members of the family but the obligation of the head of a sub‑branch will fall upon the branch after partition and not on other collateral branches or upon members higher in the genealogical tree. The analogy of the debts, which is well established and well known makes my meaning clear. But Mr. Raghava Rao says that whereas the law covering debts relates to debts that are incurred, we are here dealing with an obligation which has not yet been incurred but which is to be incurred after partition. But the reply to this argument is that the obligation has been incurred before the partition by the birth of the daughters. It is not a case of obligation, which is to be incurred after the partition. Only it is to be completed and materialized at the actual time of the marriage, which may be after partition, but this does not mean that the obligation does not arise before the partition. This is easily seen when we remember that the obligation is not merely an obligation to maintain but the present remnant of what was formerly an interest in the property. I, therefore, hold that the obligation of a joint‑family does not after parti tion fall on the father only but on all the members of the family." It is to be remembered that the learned Judge was concerned with a joint family consisting of the father and his sons only. It is evident that the learned Judge has clearly come to the conclusion that the liability for marriage of an unmarried daughter in a Mitakahara family must be shared by the father and his sons but this liability cannot be extended to collaterals.

33. It is true that there are authorities to show that if the expenses are incurred during the continuance of the joint family, the expenses are to be borne by the entire family or if a debt is incurred in connection, therefore, the debt is realisable from the properties of the joint family irrespective of the fact whether the joint family consisted of the father and his sons only or sons only or they and other collaterals. It is not difficult to support that position in view of the peculiar importance that attaches to the joint family In Hindu Law. During the continuance of the joint family, the responsibilities of the family are shared by all irrespec tive of the shares, which the members are entitled to on partition, and this is done, in my view, for the continuance of the jointness in harmony. Once a sacrifice is considered by a member to be dis proportionate to the advantages of the jointness his remedy is by partition, but he cannot both remain joint and yet refuse to pay for the obligations of the joint family.

34. The case, however, becomes different on partition. Then the obligation must fall on those who are primarily responsible for it. Thus unmarried daughter's present right to the marriage expenses out of the joint family property being the historical remnant of her original right to share the family property, the consideration that should decide the issue, in my view, is who gets her share in the property now on partition. The rule of Hindu Law with regard to inheritance is to be found in Article 23 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law and has been dealt with by my Lord, the Chief Justice, in his judgment. If that is so, then on partition the benefit of the share that she used to get formerly now goes in the case of a Mitakshara family to her father and brothers if the father is alive or to her brothers only and not to collaterals. If that is the position, then in my view, they are responsible for the marriage expenses, which she is now entitled to in lieu of her share. In that view of the matter, I entirely agree with the conclusions to which my Lord, the Chief Justice, has arrived at in this case and I agree with the order made by hind. K. A. B. Appeal dismissed.