1965 PLP 604 (PTD)

To appreciate the contentions of the parties it is necessary to notice the scope of the order of the Tribunal dated April 25, 1949. Before the Appellate Tribunal it was contended on behalf of the assessee that the Income-tax Officer who issued the said notice had no definite information which led to the discovery that the said income had escaped assessment within the meaning of the said section. Adverting to the said argument the Tribunal observed: "We do not agree with the contention of the Department that the Income-tax Officer who made the original assessment did not apply his mind to this fact, as there is no evidence to show that at the material time such income was considered taxable by the Department. Ordinarily one would expect that when an Income-tax Officer makes the assessment he does according to law and on the facts as produced before him. If the fact is before him and he refused to take it into account thinking that it was immaterial or even inadvertently takes no notice of it, it cannot be said that the Income-tax Officer came in possession of a definite information within the meaning of section

34. We are, therefore, of the opinion that proceedings under section 34 could not be initiated against the assessee for the four assessment years under reference. The orders passed by the Income-tax Officer in respect of these four years are therefore set aside and the original orders under section 23 (3) are restored." We have extracted the order in extenso as the argument really turns upon the scope of the said order. The Appellate Tribunal in considering the validity of the notice under section 34 of the Act only discussed the question of the escape of the syar income; it did not advert to the interest income at all. It came to the conclusion, having regard to the fact that the Income-tax Officer at the time he made the original assessment had knowledge of the existence of the syar income, that the Income-tax Officer did not come into possession of definite information within the meaning of section 34 of the Act. Though the finding was arrived at on the basis of the syar income alone the Tribunal set aside the entire order of re-assessment and restored the original order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer under section 23 (3) of the Act. The legal effect of the order was that the re-assessment of the entire income, including the syar income and interest income, was set aside on the ground that the Income-tax Officer did not come into possession of definite information leading to a "discovery" and, therefore, he could not initiate proceedings under section 34 of the Act. It is true that the Tribunal had committed a mistake in setting aside the, re-assessment order in respect of the interest income also; but, so long as that order stands, it comprehends both the incomes. The Income-tax Officer did not take any further proceedings by way of reference to the High Court on any question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal; nor did he take any proceedings under section 35 of the Act to have the order corrected on the ground of mistake. With the result the order has become final. The question, therefore, is not whether the order of the Tribunal in so far as it related to the interest income was made by inadvertence or under a mistake, but whether the Income-tax Officer could initiate proceedings over again under section 34 of the Act in derogation of the finding given by the Tribunal that the Income-tax Officer did not "discover" that the income had escaped assessment. The Income-tax Act is a self-contained one: It creates a hierarchy of tribunals with original, appellate and revisional jurisdictions. Section 31 gives, inter alia, right of appeal against some orders of the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner; section 33 provides for a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal; and subsection (6) of section 33 says that save as provided in section 66 orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal shall be final. Section E6 provides for reference to the High Court on a question of law; and section 66-A provides for appeals in certain cases to the Supreme Court. It is clear from the said provisions that the order of the Tribunal made within its jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of section 66 of the Act, is final. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the subject-matter under appeal before it is final and cannot be reopened by the assessee or the Department. The Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Khemchand Ramdas ((1938) 6 I T R 414,424, 426(P C)) succinctly stated the legal position thus: "But it is not true that after a final assessment under those sections. (sections 23 and 29) has been made, the Income-tax Officer can go on making fresh computations and issuing fresh notices of demand to the end of all time . . . But when once a final assessment is arrived at, it cannot in their Lordships' opinion be reopened except in the circumstances detailed in sections 34 and 35 of the Act . . . . . and within the time limited by those sections." Later on the same idea is restated thus: "In their Lordships' opinion the provisions of the two sections are exhaustive, and prescribe the only circumstances in which and the only time within which such fresh assessments can be made and fresh notices of demand can be issued." The Judicial Committee again in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Tribune Trust, Lahore ((1948) 16 I T R 214 (P C)), after noticing the relevant sections of the Act, reaffirmed the same position and held that assessments once made would be valid and effective until they were set aside in the manner prescribed by the Act and that, if not so set aside, they were final. If so, it follows that the order of the Tribunal on the said question, namely, that the whole order of re-assessment under section 34 of the Act was invalid as there was no "discovery" that the relevant income escaped assessment, had become final. The only two sections that enable the Income-tax Officer to reopen final assessments are sections 34 and

35. If the Appellate Tribunal committed a mistake under section 35 it can be rectified within four years from the date of the order. In the present case it was a clear case of mistake, for the Tribunal set aside the order of re-assessment in respect of, the interest income, though its validity to that extent was not disputed. But for one reason or other the revenue did not resort to the obvious remedy and allowed the mistake to remain uncorrected. In these circumstances, can section 34 of the Act be resorted to? Learned counsel for the revenue says that section 34 (1) (a), as amended in 1948, confers such a power on the Income-tax Officer. The material part of section 34, before amendment, read: "(1) If in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession the Income-tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains chargeable., to income-tax have escaped assessment in any year . . . . ." Section 34 (1) (a), as amended in 1948, reads: "If the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee . . . . . to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to incometax have escaped assessment for that year . . . . he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time . . . . . serve on the assessee . . . . . a notice . . . . ." It is said that the word "has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure, on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that years income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment" are more comprehensive than the words "the Income-tax Officer discovers that income, etc., have escaped assessment in any year", and, therefore, though there was a finding by the Tribunal that the Income-tax Officer did not "discover" that there was escape of assessment, the Income-tax Officer under the amended section 34 can initiate proceedings in spite of that finding. We cannot accept this argument. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature by amending the section to enable the Income-tax Officer to reopen final decisions made against the revenue in respect of questions that directly arose for decision in earlier proceedings. The Tribunal held in the earlier proceedings that the Income-tax Officer knew all the facts at the time he made the original assessment in regard to the income he later on sought to tax. The said finding necessarily implies that the Income-tax Officer had no reason to believe that because of the assessee's failure to disclose the facts income has escaped assessment. The earlier finding is comprehensive enough to negative "any such reason" on the part of the Income-tax Officer. That finding is binding on him. He could not on the same facts reopen the proceedings on the ground that he had new information. If he did so, it would be a clear attempt to circumvent the said order, which had become final. We are not concerned in this appeal with a case where the Income-tax Officer got new information which he did not have at the time when the Tribunal made the order. The finding of the Tribunal is, therefore, binding on the Income-tax Officer and he cannot, in the circumstances of the case, reopen the assessment and initiate proceedings over again. If that was not the legal position, we would be placing an unrestricted power of review in the hands of an Income-tax Officer to go behind the findings given by a hierarchy of Tribunals and even those of the High Court and the Supreme Court with his changing moods. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the revenue do not countenance such a contention. Chakravartti, C. J. in R. K. Das & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1956) 30 I T R 439), speaking for the Division Bench, only decided that the Income-tax Officer could not make a re-assessment unless he issued the prescribed notice and issued it in a valid form. As the notice under section 34 of the Act issued therein was held to be bad inasmuch as the Income-tax Officer did not take the sanction of the Commissioner, the learned Chief Justice held that the return filed pursuant to such notice was also bad. We are not here concerned with that aspect of the case. The judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur of Gidhaur ((1961) 411 TR 421 (SC)) held that, as the earlier notice issued under section 34 (1) of the Act without the sanction of the Commissioner was bad, the entire proceedings for re-assessment were illegal. There was an observation at the end of the judgment to the effect that "there was time enough for fresh notices to have been issued, and we fail to see why the old notices were not recalled and fresh ones issued." The point now raised before us, viz., how far and to what extent a final order made in earlier proceedings under section 34 of the Act would be binding on the Income-tax Officer in subsequent proceedings under the said section was neither raised nor decided in that case. The said decisions, therefore, have no bearing on the question raised before us. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it is correct. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.