P L D 1984 Lahore 491 (PLP)

"The Commission has cancelled your candidature of special compe titive examination, 1.982 vide para. 3 (ii) of the notice for exami nation." The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Commission which was dismiss ed on 27‑2‑1983 and the following intimation was sent to him: ‑ "It is regretted that your request for restoration of your candidature cannot be acceded to." Faced with the above situation the petitioner has filed this writ petition in this Court.

4. Comments were called from the Commission. According to them the candidature of the petitioner was cancelled for the following reasons: ‑ (a) His candidature was accepted provisionally subject to the condition that he would produce his domicile of Sind (U) i.e. the same as that of his father as one of the requirements was that the domicile of the candidate should be consistent with that of his father. The petitioner had claimed that he was a domicile of Sind (U) and accordingly sub mitted a domicile certificate which was referred to the Government of Sind for verification. The Government informed the Commission that the petitioner had obtained his domicile on misrepresentation of facts which led to the rejection of this candidature. (b) the domicile certificate of the petitioner's father showed that he did not belong to Sind (U) by the birth and as such the petitioner's case was not covered by instruction 11 (c).

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner had not made any misrepresentation before the Commission at the time of submitting the admission form. He had applied for admission on the basis of domicile of his father as is evident from his admission form. Since at that time he was working as Manager, U. B. L. Kutchari Bazar, Sargodha, he frankly admitted it and mentioned the same in the admission form.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the Commis sion's stand that the admission form of the petitioner was cancelled because it had been established that the petitioner's father did not belong to Sind (U) by birth is incorrect and against facts. According to him there is absolutely no basis for this conclusion and the certificate of domicile of the petitioner's father is still operative and has not been revoked rescinded or recalled by any competent authority. He next argues that the petitioner was never issued any show‑cause notice by the Commission nor given any opportunity to explain his position and the unilateral action taken by the Commission in cancelling the petitioner's candidature and withholding his final result is against the principle of natural justice. He maintains that the principle of locus poenitentiae (power of reced ing till a decisive step is taken was available to the Commission till the acceptance of the petitioner's candidature and once it was accepted and duly conveyed to the petitioner it could not be cancelled without any glaring mis representation or proven falsity. He contends that the Commission's reason ing that they considered the domicile of the father of the candidate as final if that was consistent with that of the candidate contrary to the instructions issued by them in this behalf. According to him it is nowhere mentioned in instruction 11 (c) that the domicile of the father should be consistent with that of the candidate. It only provides that a candidate will be eligible for appointment against vacancies reserved for the province/area if his father belonged by birth or origin to such province or area irrespective of the fact where the candidate had received education or resided and since the petitioner's father was a domicile of Sind by birth, therefore, he was eligible to take part in the said examination,

7. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner had applied for appearing in the examination on the basis of the domicile of his father showing that he was a domicile of Sind (Karachi) by birth. The certificate of domicile Annexure `G' of the petitioner's father is still operative and has not been cancelled or rescinded by any competent authority. The petitioner's own domicile in the present case was immaterial. There was no requirement that there should have been a consistency between the domicile of the candidate and his father. Instruction 11 (c) is very clear on this point which provides that in the case of candidate whose further belongs by birth or by origin to a' Pakistan province, he will be eligible for appointment against the quota o vacancies reserved for the said province/area notwithstanding the fact where the candidate had received his/her education or resided. The special competi tive examination, 1982 was restricted to the candidate domiciled in Sind (U), Sind (R) etc. and since the petitioner's father was domicile of Sind (U) h fulfilled the necessary requirement as mentioned in para. (11) (c), therefore, his admission form could not be rejected on the grounds not covered by the said para. furthermore, the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of being beard before the cancellation of his admission form, nor was any show‑cause notice issued to him nor was, be beard at the appellate stage.

8. It is a settled proposition of law that in all proceedings by whomso ever held, whether judicial or administrative, the principles of natural justice have to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequences affecting "the person or property or other right of the parties concerned". And this rule applies even though there may be no positive words in the statute or legal document whereby the power is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases this requirement is to be implied into it as the minimum require ment of fairness. The principle of natural justice was elaborated in the Uni versity of Dacca through its Vice‑Chancellor and others v. Zakir Ahmad (PLD 1965 SC 90) as under :‑ "The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject‑matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. Nevertheless, the general consensus of judicial opinion seems to be that, in order to ensure the `elementary and essential principles of fairness' as a matter of necessary implication, the person sought to be affected must at least be made aware of he nature of the allegations against him, he should be given a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement put ting forward his own case and "to correct or controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice. Of course, the person, body or authority concerned must act in good faith, but it would appear that it is not bound to treat the matter as if it was a trial or to administer oath or examine witnesses in the presence of the person accused or give him facility for cross‑examining the witnesses against him or even to serve a formal charge‑sheet upon him. Such a person or authority can obtain information in any way it thinks fit, provided it gives a fairs opportunity to the person sought to be affected to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to him. In other words 'in order to act justly and to reach just ends by just means' the Courts insist that the person or authority should have adopted the above 'elementary and essential principles' unless the same had been expressly excluded by the enactment empowering him to so act."

9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case I find that the action of the Commission was arbitrary, unfair, without C any legal authority and of no legal effect. In consequence the writ petition) is accepted with costs. The Commission is directed to declare the petitioner's result without any delay. Petition accepted.