P L D 1952 Lahore 31 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, A. C. J.‑This petition arises out of a suit brought by one Mst. Allah Jawai against her husband Farid for dissolution of their marriage. It was instituted in a Court in the Montgomery District. A number of grounds were advanced in support of, the plea for dissolution, and these were traversed by the defendant who also pleaded that the Montgomery Courts had no jurisdiction. The learned Senior Sub‑Judge, who tried the suit, held that his Court had no jurisdiction because no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff in the Montgomery District. Nevertheless, he received evidence and recorded findings in respect of each of the issues on the merits as well, and eventually dismissed the suit. In view of the absence of jurisdiction, the findings on the merits have no validity, and this error was corrected by the learned District judge upon appeal by the plaintiff. The learned District judge upheld the finding that the Montgomery Courts had no jurisdiction, and directed that the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before a Court of competent jurisdiction. From this order, the plaintiff has filed the present petition, and seeks thereby reversal of the finding that the Montgomery Courts have no jurisdiction. In the grounds for revision, the broad statement is made that several causes of action, among those mentioned in the plaint, accrued to the plaintiff at Montgomery. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, only put forward one ground before me. That ground may be stated somewhat as follows : By clause (viii) of section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, it is provided that in a case like the present, a decree for dissolution may be obtained by a women on the ground "that her husband treats her with cruelty" and the nature of "cruelty" for the purpose of this provision is specified in six separate sub‑clauses of which sub‑clause (b) is particularly referred to by learned counsel. This reads as follows :‑ (b) "associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life." As I read this sub‑clause, its effect is to provide a form of what may be called indirect cruelty, that is to say, a course of action which brings the husband into contact with persons other than the wife in such circumstances that the effect of such behaviour upon the wife is to cause mental suffering to her. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the causation of the suffering being at Montgomery where the plaintiff resides, it must be held that so much of the cause of action arises in Montgomery and therefore, the suit is competent in the Courts of that district. In my opinion, this is an interpretation which stretches the meaning of the expression "cause of action" to an extent which is not permissible in law. As a reference to section 20, Civil Procedure Code, will show, the ordinary place of suing is that where the defendant resides or works for gain, and where a suit is brought in some other place, the burden lies upon the plaintiff of showing that the whole or a part of the cause of action has arisen in such place. Nosy "cause of action" has been defined to mean every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support the claim to the judgment of the Court. Another definition is "everything which, if not proved, would give the defendant a right to an immediate judgment". It has also been described as "the bundle of essential facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit". It seems to me to be clear, on a true construction of sub‑clause (b) of clause (viii) of section 2 of the relevant Act, that proof of the infliction of mental suffering upon the wife is not required in a case falling under this sub‑clause ; it will be assumed that such suffering has been inflicted, and, indeed, it would be no answer to a case under this sub‑clause that the conduct complained of, namely, association with women of evil repute or leading an infamous life, did not in fact cause any mental suffering to the wife. What the plaintiff would require to prove if a plea lying under this sub‑clause were traversed would be that there was actual association with loose women or actual living .of an infamous life by the husband ; if these facts were not proved, the defendant would have a right to an immediate judgment ; these matters would clearly be included in the bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff would have to prove in order to succeed. Therefore, in a case like the present in order to determine where the cause of action arises, it is necessary to search for the place at which' the association with women of evil repute or the leading of and infamous life has taken place or is alleged to have taken place. It is clear from the pleadings in the present case that the conduct of this nature ascribed to the husband did not take place in the Montgomery District. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly fails and I hereby dismiss this petition. No order as to costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.