1993 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

SYED ALLY MADAD SHAH (CHAIRMAN): ‑‑Appellant Syed Shakir Hussain was Accounts Supervisor, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation [PIAC] at Karachi. He was removed from service under the provisions of section 10 of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956 vide Order No. FS1188027, dated 15/20th November, 1988. After rejection of his departmental appeal as per letter, dated 18th February, 1989 addressed to him, he preferred this appeal on 20‑3‑1989.

2. The appellant has assailed the impugned order of removal from service on the ground that .he was removed from service in a summary manner, on a complaint of a lady that he had defrauded her of a sum of Rs 1,20,000 which were dues of her late husband, without holding regular inquiry despite denial of the allegations by him and the action taken against him was not warranted under section 10 of the PIAC Act.

3. The respondents have opposed the appeal. They have raised preliminary objections that the appeal is not maintainable and is also time -barred and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to have entertained it. They have contended that there was a complaint against the appellant that he had defrauded a lady by name Mst. Anwar Bibi of a sum of Rs.1,20,000 and the matter was investigated and thereafter action under the provisions of section 10 of the PIAC Act was proposed to be taken against him and he was served due notice and was afforded opportunity of hearing by the competent authority and order of his removal from service was made thereafter . According to them, the impugned order of removal of the appellant from service was made in accordance with law.

4. Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan, Advocate appeared to represent the appellant. He reiterated the same grounds urged in the appeal. He contended that nature of the allegations against the appellant whereupon action was taken against him were such that regular inquiry provided under Regulation 78 of the Pakistan International Airlines Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985 should have been held. He made reference to several authorities of the Supreme Court of Pakistan as well as of India on the desirability of holding regular inquiry into the allegations against the servants of the punishing authorities in the Government or the statutory bodies etc.

5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents urged that the impugned order of removal of the appellant from service was made under the provisions of section 10 of the PIAC Act, 1956 which did not envisage holding of regular inquiry. He further urged that the appellant was served notice of the action proposed to be taken against him and was afforded opportunity of hearing in person as provided under section 10 of the PIAC Act and thereafter the order of his removal from service was made and no prejudice was caused to the appellant. He laid emphasis on the objection of lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

6. Dealing with the preliminary objections advanced by the respondents, the first objection is that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ceased by virtue of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1989, whereunder subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 10 of the PIAC Act have been omitted. No doubt, the Tribunal has ceased to have jurisdiction in respect of the PIAC employees after the said amendment in section 10 of the PIAC Act, as contended, but the Act is operative prospectively and not retrospectively and the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeals which were filed before the Amending Act, 1989 enacted on 1‑11‑1989. This appeal was filed on 20‑3‑1989 and the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

7. The second legal objection is that of limitation. The impugned order was passed on 15/20 ‑November, 1988. The appellant preferred departmental appeal on 17‑12‑1988. His appeal was rejected and such intimation was sent to the appellant vide letter dated 18‑2‑1989. The appeal was filed on 20‑3‑1989. Apparently, there is two days' delay in preferring the appeal but the appellant has placed on record photostat copy of the envelope whereunder the appellate order was transmitted to him by post and it bears the stamp of 25th February, 1989. The appeal was, therefore, filed within thirty days of the communication of the appellate order to the appellant. Even otherwise, the appeal was‑filed within the period of thirty days as the month of February, 1989 was of only twenty eight days. Of course, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that no departmental appeal lay against an order made under the provisions of section 10 of the PIAC Act. This is a contentious issue, which need not be discussed herein as the departmental appeal preferred by the appellant was not rejected on the ground that it did not lie. The appeal, therefore, does not suffer from the bar of limitation.

8. As regards the merits of the appeal, the appellant was proceeded against under the provisions of section 10 of the PIAC Act, 1956 reproduced below: ‑‑ "(1) The Corporation may appoint such officers, advisers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions on such terms and conditions as it may see fit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) or any law, settlement or award for the time being in force or this Act, or any rules, regulations, orders or instructions issued by the Corporation, or in the terms and conditions of service or any person employed by, or serving under the Corporation, the Corporation may, at any time, retire or remove from its service any person without assigning any reason, after giving him an opportunity of being heard and not less than ninety days notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of ninety days; and, subject to subsection (3) no such order of retirement of removal shall be called in question before any Court or Tribunal or other authority. (3) ............................................................ (4) ............................................................ It would appear from bare reading of subsection (2) of section 10 of the PIAC Act that the competent authority did have power to take action against any employee without disclosing the reasons therefore by only serving a notice on him and affording him an opportunity of hearing in person. Both the requirements of giving notice and affording personal hearing were complied with before passing the impugned order. Of course, the action against the appellant was taken on a complaint by a lady and the matter was investigated into and the appellant was not associated in the investigation except that of his interrogation but that exercise was done for the satisfaction of the competent authority and ultimately the order of removal of the appellant was passed on the satisfaction of the competent authority. Since the authority was empowered under law to punish an employee in a summary manner without disclosing reasons therefore, the order of removal of the appellant without holding regular inquiry was within the purview of law. The provisions of subsection (2) of section 10 of the PIAC Act are analogous to the provisions of section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 which were thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1986 SCMR 18 (WAPDA v. Muhammad Arshad Oureshi), wherein it was held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in such cases extend only to those cases where the orders had the taint of mala fides and/or were coram non judice. Applying the same principle to the instant case, there being no evidence of mala fide in the background of the action taken against the appellant and the order having been passed by the competent authority, the impugned order is not liable to be set aside. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./718/Sr.F Appeal dismissed.