1970 P Cr (PLP)

(5) All the members on behalf of the Bar to wait upon the District authorities to apprise the real situation and for necessary action." Rule 47 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules is as follows: -- 47.r-(1) No person shall, without lawful authority or excuse- (a) do any prejudicial act ; or (5) If any person contravenes any of the provisions of this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both 'Prejudicial Act' has been defined in sub-rule (6) of rule 41 as meaning any act which is intended or is likely:-- (a) ........... (b) ......... (c) ........... (d) ........... (e) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in Pakistan: (f) ........... (g) ........... (h) to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public. The learned Courts below found upon the evidence that the resolution in question was dictated by the petitioner. This is a question of fact which has been settled by the concurrent finding of boat the Courts. In upholding the Judgment of the trial Court the learned Sessions Judge held that the words "Condemns inhumanly irresponsible action of the Government in supplying poisonous food materials to ration shops" are direct challenge to the Government, and so were the words "Condemns indiscriminate firing on the members of the public by the Central Parliamentary Secretary" and that the words of the resolution were seditious and were intended or likely to intend hatred, contempt and disaffection to the Government. The words 'hatred', "Contempt" and 'disaffection' occurring in the definition of "Prejudicial Act" have not been defined in any of the Statutes but, fortunately, they have been elucidated by judicial pronouncements. In the case of Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and another (1), Strachey J. in his charge to the jury defined the words `disaffection' as meaning "hatred enmity, dislike, hostility, contempt and every form of ill-will to the Government" and stated that the whole question is one of the intention of the accused as to whether he intended to excite in the minds feelings of disaffection or enmity to the Government or intended merely to excite disapprobation of certain Govern ment measures. It was a case under section 124-A of the Penal Code and the gist of offence therein lies in exciting or attempting to excite disaffection against Government. The exposi tion of the law of sedition by Strachey J. in the above case was approved by the Privy Council subsequently in the case of Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (2) which was a case under rule 34(6) (e) of the Defence of India Rules and their Lordships of the Privy Council held that there was no material distinction between Rule 34(6) (e) and section 124-A of the Penal Code though it might be suggested that the words "an Act which is intended or likely to bring" in the Rule are wider than the words "brings or attempts to bring" in the Code. In this case also the language of Strachey J. in the case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak was approvingly quoted. It may be stated here that the definition of the term "Prejudicial Act" as given in clauses (e) and (g) of rule 34(6) of the Defence of India Rules is substantially the same as given in clauses (e) and (h) of rule 41(6) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules. In the case of Sher Muhammad v. The Crown (3) a Special Bench of the Lahore High Court had to consider the implication of the offence in section 4(l) of the Press Act i.e, the Press (Emergency Power;) Act 1931 and of the offence of sedition as described in section 124-A of the Penal Code and Cornelius, J. (as his Lordship then was) while delivering the judgment observed that the mischief of section 4 of the Press Act is, however, very much wider than that of section 124-A of the Penal Code, and proceeded to explain the meaning of the terms, contempt and hatred. His Lordship stated that the word `contempt' in the active sense may be defined as "the act of viewing another as mean, vile or worthless" and `hatred' is `a sustained feeling of bitter aversion or dislike generally combined with a desire to injure, destroy or get rid of its object'. In the case of the `Daily Ehsan' reported in P L D 1949 Lab. 282 which was also a case under the Press Act of 1931, the word `hatred' was defined as meaning aversion carried to the point at which there is a desire to injure or destroy the object of the emotion and contempt means more than regarding the object as inferior; it involves an opinion that the object of a vile, despicable or worthless character'. The law relating to sedition in the context of the circumstances obtaining at present was further considered by this Court in the case of Tofazzal Hossain v. Province of East Pakistan (4) and it was observed that 'in order to determine (1) I L R 22 Bom. 112 (2) AIR 1947 P C 82 (3) A I R 1949 Lab. 218 (4) P L D 1965 Dacca 478 if a particular publication is seditious or not it is to be seen what effect it is likely to produce in the minds of its readers and further that while construing and offending publication the same should be considered as a whole in fair, free and -liberal spirit, without laying stress or emphasis on strong or irritating words used here and there'. Viewed in the light of the definition of the terms `disaffection', `hatred' and `contempt', can the impugned resolu tion be construed as an act which was intended or was likely to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffec tion towards the Government? Or was the resolution intended or likely to cause fear or alarm to the public or to an section of the public. The resolution was passed in the wake of large scale disturbance in the town of Pabna resulting from) death of some people on taking poisonous wheat and Bhutta rumours were afoot that they were being supplied by Government through ration shops and people were already stricken with fear and were alarmed. It does not appear from the record that any untoward incident took place after the resolution was passed. The resolution read as a whole conveys the impression that the members of the legal profession conscious of their role as leaders of public thought be took themselve to the task of apprising the authorities of the seriousness of the situation so that necessary actions may be taken speedily. While expressing themselves through the resolution, they no doubt employed strong and bitter words here and there but such words cannot be considered in isolation and construed) as seditious. In a democratic country, such as Pakistan was claimed to be at the time the resolution was' passed, people's right to express themselves freely and, if need be, strongly and even bitterly against what were considered to be lapses of the Government could not be denied, so long as such expression did not degenerate to mere abuse tending to rouse people's emotions to a pitch at which they might resort to, violence. Mr. A. T, M. Masud, learned Deputy Legal Remembrances appearing on behalf of the State contended that the resolu tion condemning the action of Government in supplying poisonous food materials through ration, was not fair as the offending food materials were not supplied by Government ration shops. Mr. Abdus Salam Khan on the other hand contended that there is no material on record to show that the poisonous articles of food were supplied by private shops and not by Government shops. It appears from the record that the people were carried away by rumours that the poisonous wheat and Bhutta were being supplied to modified shops and the resolution of the Bar Association seems to have taken note of this fact. On a careful consideration of the resolution in a `fair, free and liberal spirit' and having regard to the circumststanc which impelled the Bar Association to pass the same. I have no doubt that the resolution cannot be construed as a Prejudicial act within the meaning of clauses (e) and (h) of rule 41(6) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules and as such they conviction and sentence of the petitioner under rule 47 there of cannot be sustained in law. In the circumstances, the Rule is made absolute and the order of conviction of the petitioner is set aside. As I am inform ed that the sentence of the petitioner has already been remitted, it need not be set aside. Rule made absolute.